[61] ‘[non] in hunc furorem omnes mortales consensissent adloquendi surda numina et inefficaces deos, nisi nossemus illorum beneficia’ Sen. Ben. iv 4, 2.
[62] Sext. math. ix 123 (Arnim ii 1017).
[63] ib. 133 (Arnim i 152). Pearson (Z. 108) describes the argument as a ‘transparent sophistry’; but at the present time there is a widespread tendency towards its revival; see Höffding, Philosophy of Religion, ch. iii.
[64] Xen. Mem. i 1, 2.
[65] Cic. Div. i 5, 9 and 6, 10.
[66] ib. 3, 6; Diog. L. vii 149.
[67] Divination is based upon the συμπάθεια τῶν ὅλων (continuatio coniunctioque naturae), Cic. Div. ii 69, 142. See also Epict. Disc. i 14, and above, § [248].
[68] ‘[Tuscis] summa est fulgurum persequendorum scientia’ Sen. N. Q. ii 32, 2.
[69] ‘non ullo saecula dono | nostra carent maiore deum, quam Delphica sedes | quod siluit’ Lucan Phars. v 111-113; cf. 86-96.
[70] Epict. Disc. ii 7, 3 and 4. The Stoic belief in divination is very severely criticized by Zeller: ‘these vagaries show in Stoicism practical interests preponderating over science’ Stoics, etc. p. 280. But the belief in μαντική is traced back to Zeno and Cleanthes, who were hardly ‘practical’ men in the sense in which Zeller seems to use the word.