Roman Stoicism / being lectures on the history of the Stoic philosophy with special reference to its development within the Roman Empire

by Edward Vernon Arnold

Soul and body are one.

266. This dualistic conception could be and was incorporated in the Stoic system to the same extent as the dualism of God and matter, but no further. Ultimately, as we have already learnt, soul and body are one; or, in the language of paradox, ‘soul is body[14].’ This follows not only from the general principles of our philosophy, but also specifically from observation of the facts of human life. ‘The incorporeal,’ argued Cleanthes, ‘cannot be affected by the corporeal, nor the corporeal by the incorporeal, but only the corporeal by the corporeal. But the soul is affected by the body in disease and in mutilation, and the body by the soul, for it reddens in shame and becomes pale in fear: therefore the soul is body[15].’ And similarly Chrysippus argues: ‘death is the separation of soul from body. Now the incorporeal neither joins with nor is separated from body, but the soul does both. The soul therefore is body[16].’ This doctrine is commonly adduced as evidence of the ‘materialism’ of the Stoics: yet the Stoics do not say that ‘soul is matter,’ and (as we shall see) they explain its workings upon principles quite different to the laws of physics or chemistry. The essential unity of body and soul follows also from the way in which we acquire knowledge of them. For we perceive body by the touch; and we learn the workings of the soul by a kind of touch, called the inward touch (ἐντὸς ἁφή)[17].

Mind, soul and body.

267. Having realised that the division of man into soul and body is not ultimate, we may more easily prepare ourselves to make other divisions. A division into three parts, (i) body, (ii) soul or life (ψυχή, anima), and (iii) mind (νοῦς, animus), was widely accepted in Stoic times, and in particular by the school of Epicurus; the mind being that which man has, and the animals have not[18]. The Stoics develope this division by the principle of the microcosm. Mind is that which man has in common with the deity; life that which he has in common with the animals; growth (φύσις, natura), that which he has in common with the plants, as for instance is shown in the hair and nails[19]. Man also possesses cohesion (ἕξις, unitas) but never apart from higher powers. Further these four, mind, soul, growth, and cohesion, are not different in kind, but all are spirits (πνεύματα) which by their varying degrees of tension (τόνος, intentio) are, to a less or greater extent, removed from the divine being, the primal stuff. In this sense man is not one, nor two, but multiple, as the deity is multiple[20].

The soul is fire and air.

268. The soul in its substance or stuff is fire, identical with the creative fire which is the primal stuff of the universe[21]. But the popular conception, according to which the soul is air or breath, and is seen to leave the body at death, is also not without truth[22]. There is a very general opinion that the soul is a mixture of fire and air, or is hot air[23]. By this a Stoic would not mean that the soul was a compound of two different elements, but that it was a variety of fire in the first stage of the downward path, beginning to form air by relaxation of its tension: but even so this form of the doctrine was steadily subordinated to the older doctrine of Heraclitus, that the soul is identical with the divine fire. Formally the soul is defined, like the deity himself, as a ‘fiery intelligent spirit[24]’; and in this definition it would seem that we have no right to emphasize the connexion between the word ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα) and its original meaning ‘breath,’ since the word has in our philosophy many other associations. It is further a Stoic paradox that ‘the soul is an animal,’ just as God is an animal. But the soul and the man are not on that account two animals; all that is meant is that men and the brutes, by reason of their being endowed with soul, become animals[25].

The temperaments.

269. According to another theory, which is probably not specifically Stoic, but derived from the Greek physicians, the soul is compounded of all four elements in varying proportion, and the character of each soul (subject, in the Stoic theory, to the supreme control of reason[26]) is determined by the proportion or ‘temperament’ (κρᾶσις, temperatura) of the four elements. There are accordingly four temperaments, the fervid, the frigid, the dry, and the moist, according to the preponderance of fire, air, earth, and water respectively[27]. Dull and sleepy natures are those in which there is an excess of the gross elements of earth and water[28]; whilst an excess of cold air makes a man timorous, and an excess of fire makes him passionate[29]. These characters are impressed upon a man from birth and by his bodily conditions, and within the limits indicated above are unalterable[30]. The ‘temperaments’ have always been a favourite subject of discussion in popular philosophy[31].

The soul’s parts.

270. The characteristic attribute of the soul is that it is self-moved (αὐτοκίνητον)[32]. Although in this point the Stoics agree with Plato, they do not go on to name life as another attribute, for they do not agree with the argument of the Phaedo that the soul, having life as an inseparable attribute, is incapable of mortality. We pass on to the dispositions of the soul, which correspond to its ‘parts’ in other philosophies, and are indeed often called its parts. But the soul has not in the strict sense parts[33]; what are so called are its activities[34], which are usually reckoned as eight in number, though the precise reckoning is of no importance[35]. The eight parts of the soul are the ruling part or ‘principate[36],’ the five senses, and the powers of speech and generation. The seven parts or powers other than the principate are subject to it and do its bidding, so that the soul is, as we have called it, a kingdom in itself. These seven parts are associated each with a separate bodily organ, but at the same time each is connected with the principate. They may therefore be identified with ‘spirits which extend from the principate to the organs, like the arms of an octopus[37],’ where by a ‘spirit’ we mean a pulsation or thrill, implying incessant motion and tension. The principate itself, that is the mind, is also a spirit possessed of a still higher tension; and the general agreement of the Stoics places its throne conveniently at the heart and in the centre of the body[38]. Accordingly Posidonius defined the soul’s parts as ‘powers of one substance seated at the heart[39].’