Roman Stoicism / being lectures on the history of the Stoic philosophy with special reference to its development within the Roman Empire

by Edward Vernon Arnold

Motherhood.

283. In the seed is contained the whole build of the man that is to be[87]. It is therefore important to know whether the procreative principle in the embryo is derived from one or both parents, and if the latter, whether in equal proportion. The Stoics do not appear to have kept entirely free from the common prepossession, embodied in the law of paternal descent, according to which the male element is alone active in the development of the organism; and so they allege that the female seed is lacking in tone and generative power[88]. On the other hand observation appeared to them to show that children inherit the psychical and bodily qualities of both parents, and the general tendency of their philosophy was towards the equalization of the sexes. On the whole the latter considerations prevailed, so that the doctrine of Stoicism, as of modern times, was that qualities, both of body and soul, are inherited from the seed of both parents[89]; wherein the possibility remains open, that in particular cases the debt to one parent may be greater than to the other[90].

Impulses.

284. The Stoic psychology is in its fundamental principles wholly distinct from that of Plato; which does not at all prevent its exponents, and least of all those like Panaetius and Posidonius who were admirers of Plato, from making use of his system as an auxiliary to their own. Plato divided the soul into three parts; the rational part, the emotional (and volitional) part, and the appetitive[91]. Both the two latter parts need the control of the reason, but the emotional part inclines to virtue, the appetitive to vice[92]. The rational part, as with the Stoics, is peculiar to man; the other two are also possessed by the animals, and the appetitive soul even by plants. The Stoics do not however seriously allow any kinship between virtue and the emotions, and they deal with this part of the subject as follows. Nature has implanted in all living things certain impulses which are directed towards some object. An impulse towards an object is called ‘appetite’ (ὁρμή, appetitus or impetus); an impulse to avoid an object is called ‘aversion’ (ἀφορμή, alienatio)[93]. In man appetite should be governed by reason; if this is so, it becomes ‘reasonable desire’ (ὄρεξις εὔλογος, recta appetitio)[94]; if otherwise, it becomes ‘unreasonable desire’ (ὄρεξις ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ) or ‘concupiscence’ (ἐπιθυμία, libido). To living things lower in the scale than man terms that are related to reason can of course not apply.

Will and responsibility.

285. Practical choice is, according to the Stoics, exactly analogous to intellectual decision. Just as the powers of sensation never deceive us[95], so also the impulses are never in themselves irrational[96]. An impulse is an adumbration of a course of action as proper to be pursued[97]; to this the will gives or refuses its assent[98]. It is the will, and the will only, which is liable to error, and this through want of proper tone and self-control. If there is this want, it appears in a false judgment, a weak assent, an exaggerated impulse; and this is what we call in ethics a perturbation[99]. A healthy assent leads up to a right action: a false assent to a blunder or sin. Hence we hold to the Socratic paradox that ‘no one sins willingly’ (οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει); for the true and natural will cannot sin; it must first be warped to a false judgment and weakened by slackness of tone. We can equally use the paradox that ‘every voluntary action is a judgment of the intellect,’ or (in few words) that ‘virtue is wisdom’ (φρόνησις ἡ ἀρετή). In such views we find a starting-point for dealing with the problems of ethics, including those of the ethical ideal or supreme good, its application to daily duties, and its failure through ignorance or weakness of soul.

The body.

286. We pass on to consider the body, but at no great length; partly because many functions often considered as bodily are by the Stoics treated as belonging to the soul (as sensations and impulses), partly because the study of the body is rather the task of the physician than of the philosopher. In the body we may notice separately (i) the bones, sinews, and joints, constituting the framework on which the whole is built up; (ii) the surface, including beauty of outline and features, and (iii) the complexion, which suffuses a glow over the surface and most attracts the attention[100]. No absolute distinction can be made between body and soul. Generally speaking, we may say that body is composed of the two grosser elements, earth and water, whilst soul (as we have seen) rests on the two higher elements of air and fire[101]; of the gradations of spirit body possesses distinctively (but not exclusively) that of coherence (ἕξις), whilst it shares with the soul the principle of growth (φύσις)[102]. Yet these contrasts are after all only secondary. As surely as soul is body so body is soul, and divinity penetrates into its humblest parts. In its practical applications Stoicism dwells so little on the body that the wise man seems hardly conscious of its existence.

‘The flesh.’