Roman Stoicism / being lectures on the history of the Stoic philosophy with special reference to its development within the Roman Empire

by Edward Vernon Arnold

362. From another point of view all sin is due to a lack of moral force, a want of tone in the moral sinews, an unhealthy condition of the soul[4]. Ultimately this point of view agrees with that just described: for it is the lack of health and strength which leads to hasty and ill-judged assent[5]. But for practical purposes we may use this distinction to lead up to a difference of grade. Thus we may associate ignorance with that rooted perversity of mind which is the exact opposite of virtue, and which is therefore in the strictest sense ‘vice’ (κακία, vitium)[5]; and want of tone with a passing condition which we cannot deny to be an evil, but may nevertheless describe by the gentler terms ‘perturbation’ and ‘affection[6].’ Such an evil is a disturbance of the soul’s calm, an ‘infection’ of its health. It may exist in three grades to be hereafter described, as a ‘ruffling,’ a ‘disturbance,’ a ‘disease’; and in both the latter forms it must be rooted out, for in both grades it is an evil, and in the last it is a vice which threatens to poison the man’s whole nature. Hence we reach the Stoic paradox that ‘the affections must be extirpated[7].’ But although this is our only ethical standard, we are not debarred from suggesting remedies which may alleviate the malady in particular persons and under special circumstances.

Fear.

363. The evil of Fear (φόβος, formido, metus) is practically opposed to the virtue of Courage. Here philosophy builds upon the foundations of common opinion, and its task is the easier. The youth who is brought up not to regard suffering, poverty, exile, or death as evils, will never be afraid. Since it is death that most alarms mankind by its grim aspect, he who can face this giant without trembling will not know fear, or at the most will only feel a slight ruffling of the soul. In asserting that ‘fear should be rooted out’ the Stoics cross no general sentiment; the tradition of the heroic age is the same.

Greed.

364. The treatment of Greed (ἐπιθυμία, libido) is similar. This fault is opposed to the Soberness with which men should aim at advantages; and when we have determined the standard of Soberness every transgression of it reveals Greed. But under this heading the Stoics include the vices of Anger[8] and Cruelty, for which the heroic age had no condemnation. In regard to the former they come into conflict with the Peripatetics also, who maintain that Anger serves useful ends, and should be controlled, not extirpated[9]. The consideration of this condition of mind will therefore bring out the divergence between the two schools.

Anger.

365. The Peripatetics assign Anger to the passionate part of the soul (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν); they admit that it needs to be restrained by reason, but hold that within proper limits it is both natural and necessary. In war it is essential to heroic action; he who is filled with it despises danger, and rushes on to great achievements[10]. It is no less necessary in peace, in order that the wicked may not go unpunished[11]. Aristotle says compendiously that ‘anger is the spur of virtue[12],’ the armour of the man of high soul. To this point of view the Stoics are opposed alike on the ground of principle and of experience. We do not need disease as a means to health[13], or armour which sways instead of being swayed[14]. A good man will face danger unmoved, from the sense of duty; and will face it more firmly and more perseveringly than he whose passions are excited[15]. He will punish wrong-doers either for their amendment or for the protection of others, without being angry with them[16]. Fabius the Delayer conquered his own spirit before he overcame Hannibal[17]; and the very gladiators strike, not when their feelings move them, but when the opportunity has come[18].

Degrees of anger; remedies for it.

366. Anger is technically defined as ‘the greedy desire of avenging an injury,’ or (more precisely) as ‘the greedy desire to punish one whom you deem to have injured you unjustly[19].’ That it is a temporary madness has always been held by the wise[20]; and this is indicated by the appearance of the angry, the threatening look, the heightened colour, the gnashing teeth, the stamp of the foot[21]; also by the fact that children are specially prone to anger, even for frivolous causes[22], and that anger is often directed against harmless persons or objects[23]. Nevertheless anger does not consist of a merely instinctive feeling, but implies the assent of the will[24]; so that we can always trace the three stages, first the appearance of an injury done (species oblata iniuriae), secondly the assent (animus adsentit atque adprobat), thirdly the outbreak of anger (sequitur ira)[25]. To check anger the first necessity is time[26]: reflection will often show us that we have not been injured at all, or not so much as we supposed[27]. Then it is well to put ourselves in the place of the offender, and try to look at the offence from his point of view[28]. Where anger has become a disease (iracundia), more violent remedies must be used; some have been cured by looking at themselves in a mirror[29]; others must apply the ‘contrary twist[30],’ and learn when struck to turn quietly away[31].