[17] Orphic Fragments, vi 10-12 (fr. 123 Abel).
[18] Adam, p. 114.
[19] Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, i pp. 46-48.
[20] ib. 48-56.
[21] ib. 56-59.
[22] The terms ‘monism’ and ‘dualism’ have recently become the watchwords of opposing armies of popular philosophers, especially in Germany. In this book they stand for two aspects of philosophical thought which are not necessarily irreconcileable. For without such contrasts as life and matter, universe and individual, right and wrong, thought is impossible; so far we are all ‘dualists.’ Yet as soon as we fix our attention on these contrasts, we find that they are not final, but point towards some kind of ultimate reconciliation; and to this extent all diligent thinkers tend to become ‘monists.’ Similarly the broad monistic principle ‘all things are one’ is meaningless apart from some kind of interpretation in dualistic language.
[23] See below, §§ [71], [195].
[24] Gomperz, i 127.
[25] This phrase does not express a belief in polytheism, see Adam, p. 204.
[26] Xen. apud Euseb. Praep. ev. xiii 13.