By means of family names former connections are kept up, and the past is associated with the present. Even we ourselves are generally more disposed to count kin with distant relatives having our own surname than with those having another. And upon man in a savage state language exercises, in this matter, a much greater influence than upon us. With reference to the aborigines of Western Australia, Sir George Grey observes, “Obligations of family names are much stronger than those of blood;” and a “Saurian,” or a “Serpent,” from the East considers himself related to a “Saurian,” or a “Serpent,” from the West, though no such relationship may exist.[602] Among the Ossetes, according to Baron von Haxthausen, a man is considered more nearly related to a cousin a hundred times removed, who bears his name, than to his mother’s brother; and he is bound to take blood revenge for the former, while the latter is in fact not regarded as a relative at all.[603] Speaking of certain Bantu tribes, Mr. McCall Theal remarks that their aversion to incestuous marriages is so strong, that a man will not marry a girl who belongs to another tribe, if she has the same family name as himself, although the relationship cannot be traced.[604] Is it not a justifiable presumption that a similar association of ideas has influenced the rules of succession also,—all the more so, where community of name implies community of worship as well? It should be observed that in every case—at least so far as I know—where rank and property are inherited through females only, children are named after the mother,—but not vice versa, thanks to the direct influence of local and other connections. In China, a man is even strictly forbidden to nominate as his heir an individual of a different surname.[605]

It is a difficult, sometimes even a hopeless, task to try to find out the origin of savage laws and customs, and I do not pretend to have given an exhaustive explanation of those in question. But it seems to be sufficiently clear, from what has been said, that we have no right to ascribe them to uncertain paternity; nay, that such an assumption is not even probably true. No one has yet exhibited any general coincidence of what we consider moral and immoral habits with the prevalence of the male and female line among existing savages. Among the Barea, for instance, as among the Negroes of Loango, inheritance goes through mothers only, though adultery is said to be extremely rare;[606] whilst, on the other hand, among the wanton natives of Tahiti, possessions always descend to the eldest son. With the Todas and Tibetans, among whom paternity is often actually uncertain on account of their polyandrous marriage customs, succession runs through the male line only. “If one or more women,” Mr. Marshall says with reference to the former, “are in common to several men, each husband considers all the children as his—though each woman is mother only to her own—and each male child is an heir to the property of all of the fathers.”[607] Among the Reddies, a son—although it often happens that he does not know his real father—is the heir of his mother’s husband.[608] And, in India and Ceylon, female kinship is associated with polyandry of the beena type—where the husbands come to live with the wife in or near the house of her birth; and male kinship with that of the deega type—where the wife goes to live in the house and village of her husband.[609]

Lastly, as Mr. Spencer remarks, avowed recognition of kinship in the female line only, shows by no means an unconsciousness of male kinship. As a proof of this may be adduced the converse custom which the early Romans had of recognizing no legal relationship between children of the same mother and of different fathers. For, if it cannot be supposed that an actual unconsciousness of motherhood was associated with this system, neither is there any adequate warrant for the supposition that actual unconsciousness of fatherhood was associated with the system of “kinship through females only” among savages.[610]

The prevalence of the female line would not presuppose general promiscuity even if, in some cases, it were dependent on uncertainty as to fathers.[611] The separation of husband and wife, adultery on the woman’s side, and the practice of lending wives to visitors occurring very frequently among many savage nations, the proverb which says, “It is a wise child that knows his own father,” holds true for a large number of them. According to Mr. Ingham, the Bakongo, who trace their descent through the mother only, assert as a reason for this custom uncertain paternity; but nevertheless, as we have already seen, they would be horrified at the idea of promiscuous intercourse.


Having now examined all the groups of social phenomena adduced as evidence for the hypothesis of promiscuity, we have found that, in point of fact, they are no evidence. Not one of the customs alleged as relics of an ancient state of indiscriminate cohabitation of the sexes, or “communal marriage,” presupposes the former existence of that state. The numerous facts put forward in support of the hypothesis do not entitle us to assume that promiscuity has ever been the prevailing form of sexual relations among a single people, far less that it has constituted a general stage in the social development of man, and, least of all, that such a stage formed the starting-point of all human history.

It may seem to the reader that this question has received more attention than it deserves. But I have discussed it so fully not only because of the importance of the subject, but because of the insight the customs mentioned give us into sexual and family relations very different from our own, and because the unscientific character of the conclusions we have tested shows most clearly that sociology is still a science in its infancy.

Even now my criticism is not finished. Having shown that the hypothesis of promiscuity has no foundation in fact, I shall endeavour, in the next chapter, to demonstrate that it is opposed to all the correct ideas we are able to form with regard to the early condition of man.


[CHAPTER VI]
A CRITICISM OF THE HYPOTHESIS OF PROMISCUITY