Definition of lying, p. [72].—Of good faith, [ibid.]—The regard for truth and good faith among uncivilised races, pp. [72]–88.—Foreigners visiting a savage tribe apt to underrate its veracity, pp. [86]–88.—The regard for truth varies according as the person concerned is a foreigner or a tribesman, p. [87] sq.—The regard for truth and good faith among the Chinese, p. [88] sq.—Among the Japanese, Burmese, and Siamese, p. [89].—Among the Hindus, pp. [89]–92.—In Buddhism, p. [92].—Among the ancient Persians, p. [93] sq.—Among Muhammedan peoples, p. [94].—In ancient Greece, pp. [94]–96.—In ancient Rome, p. [96].—Among the ancient Scandinavians, p. [96] sq.—Among the ancient Irish, p. [97].—Among the ancient Hebrews, pp. [97]–99.—In Christianity, pp. [99]–101.—In the code of Chivalry, p. [101] sq.—In the Middle Ages and later, p. [102] sq.—In modern Europe, pp. [103]–106.—The views of philosophers, [ibid.]—Deceit in the relations between different states, in peace and war, pp. [106]–108.
[CHAPTER XXXI]
THE REGARD FOR TRUTH AND GOOD FAITH (concluded)
Explanation of the moral ideas concerning truthfulness and good faith, pp. [109]–131.—When detected a deception implies a conflict between two irreconcilable ideas, which causes pain, p. [109].—Men like to know the truth, p. [109] sq.—The importance of knowing the truth, p. [110].—Deception humiliating, [ibid.]—A lie or breach of faith held more condemnable in proportion to the magnitude of the harm caused by it, [ibid.]—The importance of truthfulness and fidelity even in apparently trifling cases, p. [110] sq.—Deceit held permissible or obligatory when promoting the true interest of the person subject to it, p. [111].—The moral valuation of an act of falsehood influenced by its motive, p. [111] sq.—The opinion that no motive can justify an act of falsehood, p. [112].—Why falsehood is held permissible, or praiseworthy, or obligatory, when directed against a stranger, [ibid.]—Deceit condemned as cowardly, p. [113].—A clever lie admired or approved of, p. [114].—The duties of sincerity and good faith to some extent founded on prudential considerations, pp. [114]–124.—Lying attended with supernatural danger, [ibid.]—A mystic efficacy ascribed to the untrue word, pp. [116]–118.—The efficacy of oaths and the methods of charging them with supernatural energy, pp. [118]–122.—Oaths containing appeals to supernatural beings, pp. [120]–122.—By being frequently appealed to in oaths a god may come to be looked upon as a guardian of veracity and good faith, p. [123].—The influence of oath-taking upon veracity, p. [123] sq.—The influence of education upon the regard for truth, p. [124].—The influence of habit upon the regard for truth, p. [125].—Natural to speak the truth, p. [125] sq.—Intercourse with strangers destructive to savage veracity, pp. [126]–129.—Social incoherence apt to lead to deceitful habits, p. [129].—Social differentiation a cause of deception, p. [129] sq.—Oppression an inducement to falsehood, p. [130] sq.—The duty of informing other persons of the truth, p. [131].—The regard for knowledge, pp. [131]–136.
[CHAPTER XXXII]
THE RESPECT FOR OTHER MEN’S HONOUR AND SELF-REGARDING PRIDE—POLITENESS
Definition of “honour,” p. [137].—The feeling of self-regarding pride in animals, p. [137] sq.—In savages, pp. [138]–140.—The moral disapproval of insults, pp. [140]–142.—The condemnation of an insult influenced by the status of, or the relations between, the parties concerned, p. [142] sq.—Pride disapproved of and humility praised as a virtue or enjoined as a duty, p. [144] sq.—Humility an object of censure, p. [145] sq.—Deviation from what is usual arouses a suspicion of arrogance, p. [146].—Politeness a duty rather than a virtue, [ibid.]—Many savages conspicuous for their civility, p. [146] sq.—Politeness a characteristic of all the great nations of the East, p. [147] sq.—The courtesies of Chivalry, p. [148].—The demands of politeness refer to all sorts of social intercourse and vary indefinitely in detail, p. [148] sq.—Salutations, pp. [149]–151.—The rule of politeness most exacting in relation to superiors, p. [151] sq.—Politeness shown by men to women, p. [152].—Politeness shown to strangers, [ibid.]
[CHAPTER XXXIII]
REGARD FOR OTHER PERSONS’ HAPPINESS IN GENERAL—GRATITUDE—PATRIOTISM AND COSMOPOLITANISM
The regard for other persons’ happiness in general, p. [153] sq.—The moral ideas concerning conduct which affects other persons’ welfare influenced by the relationship between the parties, pp. [154]–166.—The feeling of gratitude said to be lacking in many uncivilised races, pp. [155]–157.—Criticism of statements to this effect, pp. [157]–161.—Savages described as grateful for benefits bestowed on them, pp. [161]–165.—Gratitude represented as an object of praise or its absence as an object of disapproval, p. [165] sq.—Why ungratefulness is disapproved of, p. [166].—The patriotic sentiment defined, p. [167].—Though hardly to be found among the lower savages, it seems to be far from unknown among uncultured peoples of a higher type, p. [167] sq.—Many of the elements out of which patriotism proper has grown clearly distinguishable among savages, even the lowest, pp. [168]–172.—National conceit, pp. [170]–174.—The relation between the national feeling and the religious feeling, p. [174] sq.—The patriotism of ancient Greece and Rome, p. [175] sq.—The moral valuation of patriotism, p. [176].—Duties to mankind at large, pp. [176]–179.—The ideal of patriotism rejected by Greek and Roman philosophers, p. [177] sq.—By Christianity, p. [178] sq.—The lack of patriotism and national feeling during the Middle Ages, pp. [179]–181.—The development of the national feeling in England, p. [181] sq.—In France, p. [182].—The cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth century, p. [182] sq.—European patriotism after the French revolution, p. [183] sq.—The theory cf nationalism, p. [184].—The cosmopolitan spirit, p. [184] sq.