The origin and development of the moral ideas

by Edward Westermarck

[272] Plutarch, De sera numinis vindicta 19. Cf. ibid. 12; Cicero, De natura Deorum, iii. 38.

[273] Farnell, op. cit. i. 77. Maine, Ancient Law, p. 127.

[274] Dionysius of Halicarnassus, op. cit. viii. 80.

[275] Cf. Montefiore, op. cit. p. 220; Kuenen, op. cit. ii. 35 sq.

[276] Jeremiah, xxxi. 30.

[277] Ezekiel, xviii. 20. For Talmudic views, see Deutsch, Literary Remains, p. 52.

[CHAPTER III]

THE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS (continued)

IT was said in the last chapter that moral disapproval is a sub-species of resentment, and that resentment is, in its essence, an aggressive attitude of mind towards an assumed cause of pain. It was shown that, in the course of mental evolution, the true direction of the hostile reaction involved in moral disapproval has become more apparent. We shall now see that, at the same time, its aggressive character has become more disguised.

This is evidenced by the changed opinion about anger and revenge which we meet at the higher stages of moral development. Retaliation is condemned, and forgiveness of injuries is laid down as a duty.