[273] Ibid. ii. 47. Cf. Kames, op. cit. iv. 157.
[274] Pike, History of Crime in England, i. 283.
[275] Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law before the Time of Edward I. ii. 535 sq.
[276] Pike, op. cit. i. 265, 269; ii. 392.
[277] Ibid. i. 142; ii. 238.
In modern times, according to Mr. Pike, the Public Records testify a decrease of deception in England.[278] Commercial honesty has improved, and those mean arts to which, during the reigns of the Tudors, even men in the highest positions frequently had recourse, have now, at any rate, descended to a lower grade of society.[279] At present, in the civilised countries of the West, opinion as to what the duty of sincerity implies varies not only in different individuals, but among different classes or groups of people, as also among different nations. Duplicity is held more reprehensible in a gentleman than in a shopkeeper or a peasant. The notion which seems to be common in England, that an advocate is over-scrupulous who refuses to say what he knows to be false if he is instructed to say it,[280] appears strange at least to some foreigners;[281] and in certain countries it is commonly regarded as blamable if a person ostensibly professes a religion in which he does not believe, say, by going to church. The Quakers deem all complimentary modes of speech, for instance in addressing people, to be objectionable as being inconsistent with truth.[282] Certain philosophers have expressed the opinion that veracity is an unconditional duty, which is not to be limited by any expediency, but must be respected in all circumstances. According to Kant, it would be a crime to tell a falsehood to a murderer who asked us whether our friend, of whom he was in pursuit, had taken refuge in our house.[283] Fichte maintains that the defence of so-called necessary lies is “the most wicked argument possible amongst men.”[284] Dymond says, “If I may tell a falsehood to a robber in order to save my property, I may commit parricide for the same purpose.”[285] But this rigorous view is not shared by common sense, nor by orthodox Protestant theology.[286] Jeremy Taylor asks, “Who will not tell a harmless lie to save the life of his friend, of his child, of himself, of a good and brave man?”[287] Where deception is designed to benefit the person deceived, says Professor Sidgwick, “common sense seems to concede that it may sometimes be right: for example, most persons would not hesitate to speak falsely to an invalid, if this seemed the only way of concealing facts that might produce a dangerous shock: nor do I perceive that any one shrinks from telling fictions to children, on matters upon which it is thought well that they should not know the truth.”[288] In the case of grown-up people, however, this principle seems to require the modification made by Hutcheson, that there is no wrong in false speech when the party deceived himself does not consider it an injury to be deceived.[289] Otherwise it might easily be supposed to give support to “pious fraud,” which in its crudest form is nowadays generally disapproved of, but which in subtle disguise still has many advocates among religious partisans. It is argued that the most important truths of religion cannot be conveyed into the minds of ordinary men, except by being enclosed, as it were, in a shell of fiction, and that by relating such fictions as if they were facts we are really performing an act of substantial veracity.[290] But this argument seems chiefly to have been invented for the purpose of supporting a dilapidated structure of theological teaching, and can hardly be accepted by any person unprejudiced by religious bias. As a means of self-defence deviation from truth has been justified not only in the case of grosser injuries, but in the case of illegitimate curiosity, as it seems unreasonable that a person should be obliged to supply another with information which he has no right to exact.[291] The obligation of keeping a promise, again, is qualified in various ways. Thoughtful persons would commonly admit that such an obligation is relative to the promisee, and may be annulled by him.[292] A promise to do an immoral act is held not to be binding, because the prior obligation not to do the act is paramount.[293] If, before the time comes to fulfil a promise, circumstances have altered so much that the effects of keeping it are quite different from those which were foreseen when it was made, all would agree that the promisee ought to release the promiser; but if he declines to do so, some would say that the latter is in every case bound by his promise, whilst others would maintain that a considerable alteration of circumstances has removed the obligation.[294] How far promises obtained by force or fraud are binding is a much disputed question.[295] According to Hutcheson, for instance, no regard is due to a promise which has been extorted by unjust violence.[296] Adam Smith, on the other hand, considers that whenever such a promise is violated, though for the most necessary reason, it is always with some degree of dishonour to the person who made it, and that “a brave man ought to die rather than make a promise which he can neither keep without folly nor violate without ignominy.”[297]
[278] Ibid. i. 264. Cf. ibid. ii. 474.
[279] Ibid. ii. 14 sq.
[280] Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, p. 316. Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, iii. 15 (Complete Works, ii. 117). The same view was expressed by Cicero (De officiis, ii. 14).
[281] See also Dymond, Essays on the Principles of Morals, ii. 5, p. 50 sqq.