[19] Cicero, De Officiis, i. 41.
The rule of custom is conceived of as a moral rule, which decides what is right and wrong.[20] “Les loix de la conscience,” says Montaigne, “que nous disons naistre de nature, naissent de la coustume.”[21] Mr. Howitt once said to a young Australian native with whom he was speaking about the food prohibited during initiation, “But if you were hungry and caught a female opossum, you might eat it if the old men were not there.” The youth replied, “I could not do that; it would not be right”; and he could give no other reason than that it would be wrong to disregard the customs of his people.[22] Mr. Bernau says of the British Guiana Indians:—“Their moral sense of good and evil is entirely regulated by the customs and practices inherited from their forefathers. What their predecessors believed and did must have been right, and they deem it the height of presumption to suppose that any could think and act otherwise.”[23] The moral evil of the pagan Greenlanders “was all that was contrary to laws and customs, as regulated by the angakoks,” and when the Danish missionaries tried to make them acquainted with their own moral conceptions, the result was that they “conceived the idea of virtue and sin as what was pleasing or displeasing to Europeans, as according or disaccording with their customs and laws.”[24] “The Africans, like most heathens,” Mr. Rowley observes, “do not regard sin, according to their idea of sin, as an offence against God, but simply as a transgression of the laws and customs of their country.”[25] The Ba-Ronga call derogations of universally recognised custom yila, prohibited, tabooed.[26] The Bedouins of the Euphrates “make no appeal to conscience or the will of God in their distinctions between right and wrong, but appeal only to custom.”[27] According to the laws of Manu, the custom handed down in regular succession since time immemorial “is called the conduct of virtuous men.”[28] The Greek idea of the customary, τὸ νόμιμον, shows the close connection between morality and custom; and so do the words ἔθος, ἤθος, and ἠθικά, the Latin mos and moralis, the German Sitte and Sittlichkeit.[29] Moreover, in early society, customs are not only moral rules, but the only moral rules ever thought of. The savage strictly complies with the Hegelian command that no man must have a private conscience. The following statement, which refers to the Tinnevelly Shanars, may be quoted as a typical example:—“Solitary individuals amongst them rarely adopt any new opinions, or any new course of procedure. They follow the multitude to do evil, and they follow the multitude to do good. They think in herds.”[30]
[20] Cf. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, i. 104; Tönnies, ‘Philosophical Terminology,’ in Mind, N.S., viii. 304. Von Jhering (Zweck im Recht, ii. 23) defines the German Sitte as “die im Leben des Volks sich bildende verpflichtende Gewohnheit”; and a similar view is expressed by Wundt (Ethik, p. 128 sq.).
[21] Montaigne, Essais, i. 22 (Œuvres, p. 48).
[22] Fison and Howitt, op. cit. p. 256 sq.
[23] Bernau, Missionary Labours in British Guiana, p. 60.
[24] Rink, Greenland, p. 201 sq.
[25] Rowley, Religion of the Africans, p. 44.
[26] Junod, Ba-Ronga, p. 477.
[27] Blunt, Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates, ii. 224.