Equal in enormity with the sin of not believing in a certain god is sometimes the sin of having a false belief about him. It seems strange that a god should be so easily offended as to punish with the utmost severity those who hold erroneous notions regarding some attribute of his which in no way affects his honour or glory, or regarding some detail of ritual. Thomas Aquinas himself admits that the heretic intends to take the word of Christ, although he fails “in the election of articles whereon to take that word.” But it is in this election that his sin consists. Instead of choosing those articles which are truly taught by Christ, he chooses those which his own mind suggests to him. Thus he perverts the doctrines of Christ, and in consequence deserves not only to be separated from the Church by excommunication, but to be banished from the world by death.[47] Moreover, the heretic is an apostate, a traitor who may be forced to pay the vow which he has once taken.[48] The extreme rigour of this sophistical argumentation can only be understood in connection with its historical surroundings. It presupposes a Church which not only regards itself as the sole possessor of divine truth, but whose cohesion and power depend upon a strict adherence to its doctrines.[49] Nor was it a religious motive only that induced Christian sovereigns to persecute heretics. Certain heresies, as Manichæism and Donatism, were expressly declared to affect the common welfare;[50] and the Frankish kings treated heretics not only as rebels against the Church, but as traitors to the State, as confederates of hostile Visigoths or Burgundians or Lombards.[51]
[47] Thomas Aquinas, op. cit. ii.-ii. 11. 1, 3.
[48] Ibid. ii.-ii. 10. 8.
[49] Cf. Ritchie, Natural Rights, p. 183.
[50] Milman, History of Latin Christianity, ii. 33.
[51] Ibid. ii. 61.
Whilst intolerance is a characteristic of all monotheistic religions which attribute human passions and emotions to their godhead, polytheism is by nature tolerant. A god who is always used to share with other gods the worship of his believers cannot be a very jealous god. The pious Hennepin was struck by the fact that Red Indians were “incapable of taking away any person’s life out of hatred to his religion.”[52] Among the natives of the African Gold and Slave Coasts, though a man must show outward respect for the gods so as not to provoke calamities, he may worship many gods or none, just as he pleases. “There is perfect liberty of thought in matters of religion…. At this stage, man tolerates any form of religion that tolerates others; and as he thinks it perfectly natural that different people should worship different gods, he does not attempt to force his own personal opinions upon anyone, or to establish conformity of ideas.”[53] On the Slave Coast even a sacrilege committed by a European is usually regarded with indifference, as the gods of a country are supposed to be concerned about the actions of the people of that country only.[54] “The characteristics of Natural Religion,” says Sir Alfred Lyall, “the conditions of its existence as we see it in India, are complete liberty and material tolerance; there is no monopoly either of divine powers or even of sacerdotal privilege.”[55] In China the hatred of foreigners has not its root in religion. The Catholics residing there were left undisturbed until they began to meddle with the civil and social institutions of the country;[56] and the difficulty in persuading the Chinese to embrace Christianity is said by a missionary to be due to their notion that one religion is as good as another provided that it has a good moral code.[57] Among the early Greeks and Romans it was a principle that the religion of the State should be the religion of the people, as its welfare was supposed to depend upon a strict observance of the established cult; but the gods cared for external worship rather than for the beliefs of their worshippers, and evidently took little notice even of expressed opinions. Philosophers openly despised the very rites which they both defended and practised; and religion was more a pretext than a real motive for the persecutions of men like Anaxagoras, Protagoras, Socrates, and Aristotle.[58] So also the measures by which the Romans in earlier times repressed the introduction of new religions were largely suggested by worldly considerations; “they grew out of that intense national spirit which sacrificed every other interest to the State, and resisted every form of innovation, whether secular or religious, that could impair the unity of the national type, and dissolve the discipline which the predominance of the military spirit and the stern government of the Republic had formed.”[59] It has also been sufficiently proved that the persecutions of the Christians during the pagan Empire sprang from motives quite different from religious intolerance. Liberty of worship was a general principle of the Imperial rule. That it was denied the Christians was due to their own aggressiveness, as also to political suspicion. They grossly insulted the pagan cult, denouncing it as the worship of demons, and every calamity which fell upon the Empire was in consequence regarded by the populace as the righteous vengeance of the offended gods. Their proselytism disturbed the peace of families and towns. Their secret meetings aroused suspicion of political danger; and this suspicion was increased by the doctrines they professed. They considered the Roman Empire a manifestation of Antichrist, they looked forward with longing to its destruction, and many of them refused to take part in its defence. The greatest and best among the pagans spoke of the Christians as “enemies,” or “haters of the human race.”[60]
[52] Hennepin, New Discovery of a Vast Country in America, ii. 70.
[53] Ellis, Yoruba-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast, p. 295. See also Idem, Ew̔e-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast, p. 81; Monrad, Skildring af Guinea-Kysten, p. 28; Kubary, ‘Die Verbrechen und das Strafverfahren auf den Pelau-Inseln,’ in Original-Mittheil. aus d. ethnol. Abtheil. d. königl. Museen zu Berlin, i. 90.
[54] Ellis, Ew̔e-speaking Peoples, p. 81.