I have already showed in the course of these papers that, since that ever memorable æra, we suffered some breaches to be made in the most interesting part of this constitution, not by the hand of open violence, but by the insidious, and consequently more dangerous arts of corruption. The great increase in our commerce after the peace of Utrecht, brought in a vast accession of wealth; and that wealth revived, and gradually diffused that luxury through the whole nation, which had lain dormant during the dangerous reign of James the second, and the warlike reigns of William and Ann. To this universal luxury, and this only, we must impute that amazing progress of corruption, which seized the very vitals of our constitution. If therefore we impartially compare the present state of our own country with that of Rome and Carthage, we shall find, that we resemble them most when in their declining period.
To the commercial maxims of the Carthaginians, we have added their insatiable lust of gain, without their economy, and contempt of luxury and effeminacy. To the luxury and dissipation of the Romans, we have joined their venality, without their military spirit: and we feel the pernicious effects of the same species of faction, which was the great leading cause to ruin in both those republicks. The Roman institution was formed to make and to preserve their conquests. Abroad invincible, at home invulnerable, they possessed all the resources requisite for a warlike nation within themselves. The military spirit of their people, where every citizen was a soldier, furnished inexhaustible supplies for their armies abroad, and secured them at home from all attempts of invasion. The Carthaginian was better calculated to acquire than to preserve. They depended upon commerce for the acquisition of wealth, and upon their wealth for the protection of their commerce. They owed their conquests to the venal blood and sinews of other people, and, like their ancestors the Phœnicians, exhibited their money-bags as symbols of their power. They trusted too much to the valour of foreigners, and too little to that of their own natives. Thus whilst they were formidable abroad by their fleets and mercenary armies, they were weak and defenceless at home. But the event showed, how dangerous it is for the greatest commercial nation to rely on this kind of mercantile policy; and that a nation of unarmed undisciplined traders can never be a match, whilst they are so circumstanced, for a nation of soldiers. About two centuries ago a handful (comparatively speaking) of rude irregular Tartars subdued, and still enjoy the dominion of China, the most populous, and the richest commercial empire in the universe. And a neighbouring mercantile republick, by adhering too closely to these maxims, is at this time neither respected by her friends, nor feared by her enemies.
The English constitution was originally military, like that of every kingdom founded by our Gothick ancestors. Henry the seventh gave the first spur to commerce by diffusing property more equally amongst the commons at the expense of the nobility. From that time, the ancient military spirit of this nation has gradually dwindled to the low ebb, at which we now find it. But the great epocha of our marine, as well as commerce, ought properly to be fixed to the glorious reign of Elizabeth. The colonies settled during the peaceful reign of James the first, laid the foundation of our present extensive commerce. The civil wars between Charles the first and the parliament, revived and diffused the ancient military spirit through the whole body of the people; and the able Cromwell made the English name more respectable in Europe, than it ever had been under any of our monarchs. Our naval glory seems to have reached its summit under that period; for though our marine is greatly increased both in the number and strength of our shipping, yet we have by no means surpassed the commanders and seamen of that time either in bravery or ability. The reason is evident. Publick virtue then existed in its full force, and zeal for the national glory was the great spur to action. The commanders sailed in quest of honour, not lucre, and esteemed the glory of the capture as an adequate reward for the most hazardous enterprises. Luxury was as much unknown to the highest class, as spirituous liquors were to the lowest. Discipline, sobriety, and an awful sense of religion, were strictly kept up amongst the private seamen; whilst the humane usage of the officers taught them to obey from love, and a just sense of their duty, not from the slavish principle of fear only. The immortal Blake esteemed five hundred pounds for a ring, and the publick thanks of parliament, a glorious recompense for all those illustrious actions, which made Africa and Europe tremble, and raised the English flag to the summit of glory. Inferior merit, in later times, has been rewarded with coronets and great lucrative employments.
Luxury with its fatal effects was imported by Charles the second at the restoration. The contagious influence of that bane to publick virtue and liberty, corrupted our manners, enervated our bodies, and debased our minds, whilst our military spirit subsided, in proportion as the love of pleasure increased. Charles the second nurtured in the high principles of prerogative, was diffident of a militia composed of the whole body of the people. He obtained a standing force of about four or five thousand men under the specious denomination of guards and garrisons; which he increased afterwards to eight thousand, and suffered the militia gradually to decay, until it became almost useless. A policy fatal to liberty, which has been too successfully copied, since that reign, by every iniquitous minister, who support himself by faction. James the second, devoted to bigotry, and influenced by the most weak, as well as the most wicked counsels, that ever prevailed in this kingdom, at one stroke disarmed the people, and established a large standing army. As the militia were unwilling to act against Monmouth and his followers, whom they looked upon as the protectors of their religion and liberties, James, concealing the true reason, declared to his parliament, that he had found the militia useless and unserviceable by experience, and insisted upon such supplies, as would enable him to support those additional troops, which he should find necessary for his security. And he had actually increased his army to thirty thousand men at the time of the revolution. The whole reigns of William the third and Ann are distinguished by war abroad and factions at home. Yet though we entered into both those wars as principals, the military spirit of our people was not much improved; our national troops composed by a small part of the allied armies, and we placed our chief dependance upon foreign mercenaries.
Frequent attempts have been made since that time to revive a national disciplined militia, which have been as constantly defeated by corruption and the malignity of faction. Our late fears of an invasion, and the introduction of so large a body of foreign troops, a measure highly unpopular and distasteful, procured at last the long wished for act for a militia. Mutilated as it was, and clogged with almost insuperable difficulties by the same faction, who durst no openly oppose it at that dangerous juncture, the real well-wishers to their country were glad to accept it. They looked upon it as a foundation laid for a much more useful and extensive militia; which time and opportunity might enable them to perfect. Much has been said, and many assertions boldly thrown out of the utter impracticability of a national militia. But this is either the language of corruption or of effeminacy and cowardice. The Romans, in the first Punick war, found themselves unable to contend with the Carthaginians for want of a marine. Yet that magnanimous people, without any other knowledge of the mechanism of a ship, than what they acquired from a galley of their enemies, thrown by accident upon their coasts, without either shipwright or seamen, built, manned, and fitted out a fleet under the consul Duilius, in three months time, which engaged and totally defeated the grand fleet of Carthage, though that republick had enjoyed the sovereignty of the sea unrivaled for time immemorial. This effort of the Roman magnanimity gives a higher idea of the Roman genius, than any other action recorded in their history. And by this alone we must be convinced, “that nothing is insurmountable to the unconquerable hand of liberty, when backed by publick virtue, and the generous resolution of a brave and willing people.” The difficulties and obstacles in either case, I mean of making a fleet or establishing a good militia, will admit of no comparison. The Romans may almost be said to have created a fleet out of nothing. We have nothing more to do than to rouse and diffuse that martial spirit through the nation, which the arts of ministerial policy have so long endeavoured to keep dormant. Great indeed has been the outcry of the danger of trusting arms in the dissolute hands of the scum and refuse of the nation in these licentious times. These I consign to the proper severity of the martial discipline of an army; for of this kind of people, the bulk of every army in Europe is at this time composed. I speak to the nobility and gentry, the traders and yeomanry of this kingdom, to all those who are possessed of property, and have something to lose, and from the interest of their respective shares, are equally concerned in the preservation of the whole. Of such as these the Roman armies were composed who conquered Italy. Every Roman soldier was a citizen possessed of property, and equally interested in the safety of the republick. The wisdom of the Romans in the choice of their soldiers never appeared in so conspicuous a light as after the defeat at Cannæ. Every citizen pressed to take up arms in defence of his country, and not only refused his pay, but generously gave up what gold and silver he was master of, even to the most trifling ornaments, for the publick service. The behaviour of the women too, to their immortal honour, was equally great and disinterested. Such is the spirit, which a truly brave and free people will ever exert in a time of distress and danger. Marius was the first man who broke through that wise maxim, and raised his forces out of the sixth class, which consisted only of the dregs and refuse of the people. Marius too gave the first stab to the constitution of his country. People of property are not only the chief support, but the best and safest defence of a free and opulent country; and their example will always have a proper influence upon their inferiors.
Nothing but an extensive militia can revive the once martial spirit of this nation, and we had even better once more be a nation of soldiers, like our renowned ancestors, than a nation of abject crouching slaves to the most rapacious, and most insolent people in the universe. Let us not be too much elated, and lulled into a fatal security from some late successes, in which our national forces had no share. Nothing is so common as unexpected vicissitudes in war. Our enemies have many and great resources; our heroick ally, in case of a reverse of fortune, few or none. Our haughty and implacable enemy, unaccustomed to insults in their own territories, will think the blot in their honour indelible, until they have returned the affront upon our coasts with redoubled vengeance. Whilst a pretender to this crown exists, France will never want a plausible pretext for invading this kingdom. Their last attempt answered the proposed end so well, that we may be certain, so politick an enemy, instigated by revenge, will omit no opportunity of playing the same successful engine once more against us. The French are now perfectly well acquainted with our weak side. The violent shock our national credit received by the inroad of a few Highlanders only, into the heart of this country, has taught them the infallible method of distressing us in that essential point. Should therefore our measures for annoying that nation be ever so wisely planned, yet we can never hope to execute them with proportionate vigour, whilst we remain defenceless at home. If the bare alarm only of an invasion frightened us so lately into the expense, as well as ignominy, of importing foreign mercenaries for our own defence, the French know by experience, that an actual attempt would compel us to recall our fleets and forces, and again expose our commerce, colonies, and our only ally to their mercy. No man, I believe, is so weak as to imagine, that France will be deterred from such an attempt by the danger which may attend it. For if we reflect upon the number of her troops, the risk of ten or twenty thousand men, can hardly be deemed an object worthy the attention of so formidable a power. For should they all perish in the attempt, yet France would be amply repaid by the advantages she would draw from that confusion, which they would necessarily occasion. The traitor who lately pointed out the proper time, as well as place for an invasion, and the fatal effects it would have upon publick credit, whatever success might attend it, furnishes us with a convincing proof, that France never loses sight of so useful a measure. A consideration which greatly enforces the necessity of national union, and a national militia. The unequalled abilities of one man[367] (humanly speaking) have given a turn to the affairs of Germany, as happy, as it was amazing; and hope begins to dawn upon our late despairing nation. The wise and vigorous measures of our present patriot-ministry have conciliated not only the esteem, but the universal confidence of the people. Under the present ministry we laid the foundation of this long wished for, though long despaired of, militia. If we support their administration with unanimity and vigour, we may fix this great national object, upon that extensive and useful plan, which was designed and hoped for by every lover of his country. The fate therefore of the militia depends absolutely upon the present crisis. For if we supinely neglect this auspicious opportunity, future efforts will be just as ineffectual, as the point we have already carried with so much labour and assiduity. For the same function, which has invariably opposed every attempt for a national militia, are avowed enemies to the present ministers, from that antipathy, which private interest and the lust of power for selfish ends, will ever bear to patriotism and publick virtue. Should therefore the evil genius of this nation again prevail, and the same faction once more seize the helm of government, we must give up all hopes of a militia as well as every other national measure.
Let us throw but one glance upon the present situation of these once glorious republicks, and we cannot help reflecting upon the final and direful catastrophe, which will eternally result from the prevalence of ambitious and selfish faction supported by corruption.
Greece, once the nurse of arts and sciences, the fruitful mother of philosophers, lawgivers and heroes, now lies prostrate under the iron yoke of ignorance and barbarism ... Carthage, once the mighty sovereign of the ocean, and the centre of universal commerce, which poured the riches of the nations into her lap, now puzzles the inquisitive traveller in his researches after even the vestiges of her ruins.... And Rome, the mistress of the universe, which once contained whatever was esteemed great or brilliant in human nature, is now sunk into the ignoble seat of whatever is esteemed mean and infamous.
Should faction again predominate and succeed in its destructive views, and the dastardly maxims of luxury and effeminancy universally prevail amongst us ... such too will soon be the fate of Britain.