The 9·2-inch gun gave good results in its trials, but, although it was run up to Pretoria on its truck, there was no opportunity of firing it on the enemy.
Sir Percy says in his "History" that—
The experiments demonstrated the possibility of big guns being used in siege operations without any difficulty, the only limit to the size of the gun being the weight which the railway bridges will stand.
Apart from the powers of usefulness offered by these batteries on wheels, there arose, in the early days of the war, the further question whether the usefulness of armoured trains proper might not be marred as the result of a defective system of control.
At the outset the trains were placed entirely under the orders of officers commanding sections of the line; but the arrangement was found unsatisfactory as the trains were constantly being rushed out regardless of Traffic Department regulations, and sometimes without even a "line clear" message. Having, also, the trains at their disposal, as they considered officers commanding sections of the line often made use of them to inspect posts between stations, other traffic being stopped while the inspections were being made. On one occasion, when a large mob of cattle was being sent to Pretoria and there were no mounted troops available to convoy them, the expedient was resorted to of employing an armoured train for the purpose. The train had to adapt its speed to the rate of progress of the cattle alongside, and such was the interference with other traffic that the entire length of railway on the Delagoa main line was blocked until the cattle had reached their destination. In fact, instead of assisting traffic by preventing the enemy from interrupting it, the armoured trains caused, Sir Percy Girouard declares, "more interruptions than the enemy themselves."
With a view both to meet these particular difficulties and to ensure a better use of the trains, there was appointed an Assistant-Director of Armoured Trains who was placed on the staff both of the Commander-in-Chief and of the Director of Railways and had under his control all the armoured trains in South Africa. Captain H. C. Nanton, R.E., the officer so appointed, had practical acquaintance alike with railway requirements and regulations and with armoured trains. In touch with Headquarters, and kept informed as to which portions of the line were most threatened by the enemy, it became his duty to order where the trains should be sent. Once despatched to a particular section of the line, an armoured train was to be under the control of the General or other officer commanding that section. The Assistant-Director had power to remove it, however, if he thought it was more urgently required elsewhere. It was his duty, also, to work in harmony with the officers in question; but they, in turn, were not to use as a private conveyance the train sent to them, and they were not to alter its garrison or equipment, or to give orders to the officer in charge which were contrary to the spirit of the general instructions. The Assistant-Director was himself required to instruct officers in command of the trains as to the proper tactics to adopt, the best methods of patrolling, etc., and to see that they "worked in harmony with the railway officials, and were an assistance and not a hindrance to traffic."
These improved conditions led to a recognised system for the employment of armoured trains, the purposes and duties of which were eventually defined as follows[44]:—
1. In conjunction with columns in the field, to intercept the enemy whom the columns were driving on to the line.
2. To act on the flank of a column or line of columns, the train being well advanced so as to prevent the enemy breaking to that flank.
3. To reinforce stations and camps on the railway which were threatened by the enemy.