The Cameroons and the Congo
Another ambitious scheme was for the building of a Mittellandbahn which, crossing the Njong, would eventually link up the chief port of the Cameroons with a navigable tributary of the Congo. Here, again, the line as actually constructed has not been carried a greater distance than about 300 km. (186 miles). At one time, in fact, the original project seemed to have been abandoned; but quite recently it has been brought forward again under conditions which have a distinct bearing on what has already been said concerning Germany and Central Africa.
From the views expressed by Emil Zimmermann in his "Neu-Kamerun,"[71] one gathers that in 1913 Germany was regarding with some degree of concern alike the outlook for her Tanganyikabahn, on which over £7,000,000 had been spent, and the prospective set-back to her aspirations in regard to the Belgian Congo; and Herr Zimmermann, in giving an account of the additions made to her Cameroons possessions at the expense of France, under the agreement of November 4, 1911, following on the Agadir crisis, makes certain overtures to Belgium, and follows them up with a distinct threat, should she refrain from responding to them.
Belgium and Germany, he says, in effect, are the two dominant Powers in Central Africa; and he is of opinion that it will be to their mutual interest to co-operate in the development of that great territory. Belgium, however, he finds to be faced by the need for a great outlay of money (1) on account of necessary improvements of her Congo rail and river communication, to meet expanding traffic requirements, and (2) in order to develop her Katanga territory. She cannot herself command the necessary capital, but Germany could assist her to raise it, and would do so—provided Belgium undertook that traffic from her Tanganyika and Mweru districts, and, also, from points east of the Middle Congo, should reach the sea by "its natural outlet," that is to say, by the German East African Central Railway.
Should Belgium refuse to agree to these proposals, and should she, by her high tariffs, continue to impede the flow of traffic to German territory, then it would be open to Germany to construct lines of railway from the west coast either to navigable tributaries of the Congo or to the Congo itself, and so divert the traffic from the Belgian Congo at certain important points, to the serious prejudice of Belgian interests.
Apart from what might be done in the way of extending the Duala-Njong line to the said navigable tributaries of the Congo, as originally projected, Herr Zimmermann says that, under the treaty of November 4, 1911, Germany has the right to continue her Cameroons railways across French territory (France having reciprocal rights as regards German territory); and he points out how she could exercise this power, to the detriment of Belgium, should that country not accept her proposals in regard to the Congo basin and Central Africa. He specially mentions the fact that when the boundaries of the 100,000 square miles of territory added, at the expense of France, to the German Cameroons (then already 191,000 square miles in extent), were fixed by virtue of the treaty of 1911, the wedge-like strip on the south of Spanish Muni was so defined as to leave at the eastern point thereof a gap between the Spanish territory and the French Cameroons wide enough for either a road or a railway; and he emphasises the fact that, by taking advantage of the facilities thus open to her, Germany could, under the treaty of 1911, construct a railway 1,000 km. (621 miles) long from Muni Bay through the said gap and cross French territory to the junction of the Sangha with the Congo. Alternatively, and by arrangement with France, the line could start from Libreville. "What such a railway, tapping the Congo-Sangha-Ubangi traffic at its most favourable point, would mean, can," Herr Zimmermann remarks, "be left to the Belgians themselves to say."
He does not suggest that such schemes as these would in themselves be of great value to Germany; but he thinks they might have a powerful influence, both politically and economically, on the solution of the Tanganyika problem in Germany's favour. In fact, he considers that since the 1911 treaty Germany has practically controlled the situation in Central Africa; and from all he says it is a reasonable assumption that the Agadir crisis, the concession of territory exacted from France, and the undertaking as to the carrying of German Cameroon railways across French territory, had far more to do with German designs on the Belgian Congo and Central Africa than is generally supposed.
In another work, published a year later,[72] the same writer, adopting now a distinctly different tone, endeavoured to appease an "Anti-Central Africa agitation" which, he tells us, had developed in Germany and was protesting alike against the "danger" of acquiring any more "Congo-swamps" and against the "boundless German plans" in Africa. He further sought to soothe the suspicions which, he found, had been excited in Belgium and elsewhere as to the nature of Germany's plans in Africa. Germany, he declared, had no annexation projects in view. Her aspirations were purely economic. Kamerun, thanks to the German-French treaty of 1911 (which, he reiterated, had changed the whole situation), could now take a considerable share in the development of Central Africa, and was the more entitled so to do since she had, in Duala, "one of the best harbours on the west coast of Africa."