The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914

by Edwin A. Pratt

I. The increasing dependence of armies on rail transport owing to (a) the vastly greater number of troops employed now than in former days; (b) the supreme importance of time as a factor in enabling a Commander-in-Chief to effect, possibly, an earlier concentration than the enemy, and so obtain the power of initiative; and (c) the magnitude of the supplies, munitions and other necessaries wanted to meet the daily wants of the prodigious forces in the field, and only to be assured by the employment of rail transport from a more or less distant base.

II. The complications, confusion and possible chaos which may result if, without prior preparation, railway lines designed to serve ordinary transport purposes are suddenly required to meet military demands taxing their resources to the utmost extreme.

III. The further troubles that will assuredly arise if, in the absence of efficient control by properly-constituted and responsible intermediaries, railwaymen unfamiliar with military technicalities are left to deal with the possibly conflicting and impracticable orders of individual military officers themselves unfamiliar with the technicalities and limitations of railway working.

IV. The imperative necessity of having an organised and well-regulated system of forwarding military supplies, etc., in order both to avoid congestion of stations and lines and to ensure the punctual arrival of those supplies in the right quantities, at the right spot, and at the right time.

V. The need, in view of the vital importance of the part that railways may play in war, of having organised forces of railway troops and railway workers available, together with stores of materials and appliances, to carry out, speedily and thoroughly, all the work that may be necessary for the repair, construction or destruction of railway lines.

In making the necessary preparations, in time of peace, to ensure the successful realisation of these and other purposes, there is a vast amount of work that requires to be done.

In readiness for the excessive strain that will be thrown on the railways as soon as they pass from a peace footing to a war footing, on the order being given for mobilisation, the military authorities and the railway authorities must needs have at their command the fullest information as to the physical conditions, the resources and the transport capabilities of every line of railway in the country which, directly or indirectly, may be able to render useful service. Details as to double or single track; gradients; number of locomotives, carriages, wagons, horse-boxes and other vehicles available; and facilities afforded by stations in important centres as regards number and length of platforms and sidings, water supply, loading, unloading or storage accommodation, etc., are all carefully compiled and kept up to date. As regards rolling stock, lines not likely to be called upon to carry any military transports at all may still be able to contribute to the supply of carriages and wagons wanted to meet the heavy demands on other railways. By including all lines of railway in the collected data, it will be known exactly where additional rolling stock may be obtained if wanted. The carrying capacity of the different types of carriages, trucks, etc., is also noted. If necessary, arrangements will be made for the reduction of gradients, the improvement of curves, the construction of connecting links between different main lines, the lengthening of station platforms, or the provision of increased loading or unloading facilities.

On the basis of the information collected elaborate calculations are made in regard to such matters as (1) the number of vehicles required for a given number of men, with horses, guns, munitions, stores, road vehicles, etc., so that rolling stock can be used to the best advantage and according as to whether the troops carried belong to the Infantry, Cavalry or the Artillery; (2) the number of vehicles that can be made up into a train going by any one route; (3) the length of time likely to be taken for the entraining and detraining respectively of a given unit; (4) the time intervals at which a succession of troop trains can follow one another on the same line; (5) the speed of troop trains; and (6) the further intervals to be allowed in the arrival at one and the same station, or centre, of a number of trains starting from different points, so as to avoid the risk of congestion and of consequent delays.

Military time-tables, corresponding to those in everyday use, have next to be prepared, showing exactly what trains must run from given stations, at fixed hours, by clearly defined routes, to specified destinations as soon as the occasion arises. The great aim kept in view in the compilation of these time-tables is, not alone preparation in advance, but the most complete utilisation possible of the available transport facilities of the country as a whole.