The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914

by Edwin A. Pratt

When the wagons were not deliberately kept loaded, it might still be impossible for the unloading to be done because of there being no military in attendance to do the work. As for the picking out, from among the large number in waiting, of some one wagon the contents of which were specially wanted, the trouble involved in this operation must often have been far greater than if the wagon had been unloaded and the supplies stored in the first instance.

Even the stations themselves got congested, under like conditions. The Commissariat wanted to convert them into depôts, and the Artillery sought to change them into arsenals. There were stations at which no platform was any longer available and troops arriving by any further train had to descend some distance away, several days elapsing before their train could be moved from the place where it had pulled up. At stations not thus blocked trains might be hours late in arriving, or they might bring a squadron of cavalry when arrangements had been made for receiving a battalion of infantry.

In one instance a General refused to allow his men to detrain on arrival at their destination at night, saying they would be more comfortable in the carriages than in the snow. This was, indeed, the case; but so long as the train remained where it was standing no other traffic could pass. Sometimes it was necessary for troop trains to wait on the lines for hours because no camp had been assigned to the men, and there was at least one occasion when a Colonel had to ask the stationmaster where it was his troops were to go.

Most of the traffic had been directed to Metz and Strasburg, and the state of chaos speedily developed at the former station has become historic.

The station at Metz was a large one; it had eight good depôts and four miles of sidings, and it was equal to the unloading of 930 wagons in twenty-four hours under well-organised conditions. But when the first infantry trains arrived the men were kept at the station four or five hours owing to the absence of orders as to their further destination. The men detrained, and the wagons containing road vehicles, officers' luggage, etc., were left unloaded and sent into the sidings. Other trains followed in rapid succession, bringing troops and supplies, and the block began to assume serious proportions.

The railway officials appealed to the local Commissariat force to unload the wagons so that they could be got out of the way. They were told that this could not be done because no orders had been received. The Commissariat force for the division also declined to unload the wagons, saying it was uncertain whether the troops for whom the supplies were intended would remain at Metz or go further on.

Any unloading at all for several days was next rendered impossible by the higher military authorities. They asked the railway officers to prepare for the transport of an army corps of 30,000 men. This was done, and forty trains were located at various points along the line. An order was then given that the trains should be brought to Metz, to allow of the troops leaving at once. Within four hours every train was ready, and its locomotive was standing with the steam up; but no troops appeared. The order was countermanded. Then it was repeated, and then it was countermanded over again.

All this time fresh train-loads of supplies and ammunition had been arriving at Metz, adding to the collection of unloaded wagons which, having filled up all the sidings began to overflow and block up, first the lines leading to the locomotive sheds and next the main lines themselves. Everything was in inextricable confusion. Nobody knew where any particular commodity was to be found or, if they did, how to get the truck containing it from the consolidated mass of some thousands of vehicles. "In Metz," telegraphed the Commissary-General to Paris, "there is neither coffee, nor sugar; no rice, no brandy, no salt, only a little bacon and biscuit. Send me at least a million rations to Thionville." Yet it was quite possible that the articles specified were already in some or other of the trucks on hand, had the Commissary-General only known where they were and how to get them.

The railway people did what they could. They unloaded some of the consignments and removed them a considerable distance by road—only to have them sent back again to Metz station for re-loading and conveyance elsewhere. Hay unloaded at the station was sent into Metz to some magazines which, in turn, and at the same time, were sending hay to the railway for another destination. Finally, as a last resource, and in order both to reduce the block and to get further use out of the wagons, the railway officials began to unload them and put their contents on the ground alongside. A big capture alike of wagons and of supplies was made by the enemy on his occupation of Metz.