Gallatin embodied some of these thoughts in his celebrated report on the topography of the United States, which he submitted to Congress in 1808. He first described the few attempts which had thus far been made by States and private companies toward constructing canals and turnpikes. Then he threw party theories to the wind and, with a constructive statesmanship second only to that of Hamilton, he suggested a vast system of national improvements on a worthy scale to be undertaken and carried to completion by the central authority. It would require not less than twenty million dollars. Since there would be an annual surplus of five million dollars because of the unredeemable form of the national debt, he would appropriate large sums to these "national objects." Not only would the distant parts be bound together, the mail better accommodated, and internal trade assisted, but, as Gallatin pointed out, it would be possible to transport troops hurriedly from place to place, adding to the national defence. Nature had interposed mountains, falls, and sandbars in the pathways of interstate communication. "The General Government alone," said he, "can remove these obstacles."
Gallatin was compelled to acknowledge, however, that the execution of his plan would be hampered because the National Government could not, under the limits of the Constitution, undertake the construction of a road or canal through a State without the express permission of that State. In the Territories alone would it be possible. State consent might be difficult to obtain, because so many States had inaugurated similar enterprises, which would be obliged to compete with the national roads and canals. Jefferson, in accord with his general theory, suggested an amendment to the Constitution, removing this objection. He overlooked the fact that national post-roads and military roads had been already constructed within States. With such an amendment, he was willing to use the national income accruing above the national expenses for "the improvement of roads, canals, rivers, education, and other great foundations of prosperity and union," as he said in his last annual message.
Gallatin said in his report that the only work undertaken by the United States at their sole expense, and to which the consent of the States had been obtained, was the road from Cumberland to Brownsville. Further appropriations for that object were constitutional. As to other projects, he thought the National Government was empowered to do nothing more at present than to assist those undertaken by giving them loans or subscribing to their stock. Also the Federal engineers might be employed in making surveys for proposed improvements. It seems strange, in the light of modern Government initiative, to see statesmen blocked in a desired undertaking by constitutional quibbling. Having embarked in the work in the case of military and post-roads and in the Cumberland Road, they hesitated to go on.
[Illustration: WRITTEN LAW OF THE NORTH-WEST TERRITORY. A law passed at Vincennes, now in Indiana, against gambling. In the absence of printing-presses it is said the judges were accustomed to nail up copies of the laws on trees for the information of the public.]
This Cumberland National Turnpike is an excellent example of the constant menace to individualism and the irresistible tendency toward unionism resulting from the advance of population, the topography of the country, and the cupidity of the people. The portage across the watershed from the streams of the Atlantic plain to those of the Ohio valley had been a matter of concern from colonial times. Artificial waterways were impossible from lack of water-supply on the high levels. The Union inherited this problem when the policy of creating national Territories out of the back lands was inaugurated. Lack of funds prevented any extensive attempt to solve the problem.
The State of Ohio was the first to be created out of the public domain. The unsold public lands lying within its boundaries remained in the possession of the United States, although sovereignty over them passed to the State. By an agreement between the two powers, the State refrained from taxing the lands for five years, in return for which the Federal Government promised to spend five per cent, of the proceeds of the land sales within the State in the construction of public roads. A portion of this was to be devoted to building a highway over the Allegheny Mountains to the State. Strict-construction scruples were satisfied by securing the consent of the States through which the road was to be built.
Consent having been given by the State Legislatures of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, work was begun in 1808 at the eastern terminus of the portage, Fort Cumberland, Maryland, a name eventually given to the entire road. Grants of money were made from the land sales; but the proceeds accumulated so slowly that they were inadequate for carrying on the work. The demand for the completion of the road increased with growth of travel to the West. A way out of the difficulty was found by making appropriations directly from the national treasury "to be repaid out of the fund reserved for laying out and making roads to the state of Ohio." When this condition would be dropped and appropriations made openly for the road, the same as for the army, the navy, and other specified obligations of the National Government, would depend entirely upon the demands of the people. Every appropriation simply whetted the appetite for more.
As Gallatin said, the Cumberland Road is unique. It is a solitary example. It did not mean the adoption by the Jeffersonians of a party policy on such liberal principles. But it made easier the adoption of such a policy after the War of 1812 had demonstrated in a most unpleasant manner the absolute necessity for such action on the part of the General Government.
Jefferson had a most delightful manner of satisfying his conscience and adjusting himself to the inevitable by likening national to individual actions. In the case of the Louisiana purchase he had compared the National Administration to a guardian who adds a desirable bit of property to his ward's farm and then throws himself on the mercy of the ward for approval. He pardoned the assumption of a constitutional right to build the Cumberland Road by likening the Administration to a farmer who wishes to sell some distant and inaccessible portion of his land, and is compelled to spend part of the proceeds in constructing roads to it in order to sell the remainder. Regardless of the soundness or folly of such philosophy, the mischief was done. Insidiously the internal-improvement precedent had been allowed to creep into the strict-construction fold. How it grew until one veto after another was required to bring the people back to their senses remains to be described later.
During the latter portion of Jefferson's eight years of administration, the party was saved from being driven into more Union-making actions, because domestic matters were overshadowed by the hostile aspect of foreign affairs. Measures looking to the improvement of internal communication, development of interstate commerce, interior exploration and discovery, and the spread of intelligence had to be postponed from session to session to consider retaliation on the European foes to American commerce. Such aggressive acts as the attack of the Leopard on the Chesapeake could brook no delay. But it was inevitable that when the engrossing foreign questions should cease, the demand for paternalistic measures would be renewed with a zeal doubled by delay and by the new spirit of nationality. The important fact to be noted at this time is that the movement of the people across the continent went on steadily, whatever might be the aspect of affairs on the Atlantic coast.