Even if he had gained distinction only for unimportant enterprises, it were fitting that he should be considered worthy of praise in proportion; but, as it is, all would allow that supreme power is the greatest, the most august, and most coveted of all blessings, human and divine. Who then, whether poet, orator, or inventor of words, could extol in a manner worthy of his achievements one who has gained the most glorious prize that exists by most glorious deeds?

However, while superior in these respects, he will not be found to have been inferior in others, but, in the first place, although naturally gifted with most admirable judgment, and able to carry out his undertakings most successfully, he did not think it right to act carelessly or on the spur of the moment in the conduct of affairs, but occupied most of his time in acquiring information, in reflection, and deliberation, thinking that, if he thoroughly developed his intellect, his rule would be in like manner glorious, and looking with surprise upon those who, while exercising care in everything else for the sake of the mind, took no thought for the intelligence itself.

In the next place, his opinion of events was consistent; for, since he saw that those who look best after realities suffer the least annoyance, and that true recreation consists not in idleness, but in success that is due to continuous toil, he left nothing unexamined, but had such thorough acquaintance with the condition of affairs, and the character of each of the citizens, that neither did those who plotted against him take him unawares, nor were the respectable citizens unknown to him, but all were treated as they deserved; for he neither punished nor rewarded them in accordance with what he heard from others, but formed his judgment of them from his own personal knowledge.

But, while he busied himself in the care of such matters, he never made a single mistake in regard to any of the events of everyday life, but carried on the administration of the city in such a spirit of piety and humanity that those who visited the island envied the power of Evagoras less than those who were subject to his rule; for he consistently avoided treating any one with injustice, but honored the virtuous, and, while ruling all vigorously, punished the wrongdoers in strict accordance with justice; having no need of counsellors, but, nevertheless, consulting his friends; often making concessions to his intimates, but in everything showing himself superior to his enemies; preserving his dignity, not by knitted brows, but by his manner of life; not behaving irregularly or capriciously in anything, but preserving consistency in word as well as in deed; priding himself, not on the successes that were due to chance, but those due to his own efforts; bringing his friends under his influence by kindness, and subduing the rest by his greatness of soul; terrible, not by the number of his punishments, but by the superiority of his intellect over that of the rest; controlling his pleasures, but not led by them; gaining much leisure by little labor, but never neglecting important business for the sake of short-lived ease; and, in general, omitting none of the fitting attributes of kings, he selected the best from each form of political activity; a popular champion by reason of his care for the interests of the people, an able administrator in his management of the state generally, a thorough general in his resourcefulness in the face of danger, and a thorough monarch from his pre-eminence in all these qualities. That such were his attributes, and even more than these, it is easy to learn from his acts themselves.

hyperides

Hyperides, born in 396 b. c., and died in 322 b. c., was a pupil in philosophy of Plato, and studied oratory under Isocrates. He was at one time a close associate and follower of Demosthenes, but later disagreed with him on matters pertaining to the state, and took part in the prosecution that finally drove Demosthenes into exile. Hyperides was famed for the charm of his delivery, being esteemed by many equal to Demosthenes in this respect, and for the brilliancy and quickness of his wit.

Speech Against Athenogenes. [Hyperides’ client, whose name does not appear, desired to obtain a boy slave, who, with his father and brother, was the property of Athenogenes. The plaintiff proposed to purchase the liberty of the boy in question, while Athenogenes, aided by Antigona, lured the purchaser, by false representations, into buying all three slaves with their liabilities, which he pretended were but trifling. After the bargain was completed the plaintiff found that the slaves had brought him debts enough to compass his ruin; he therefore brought suit against Athenogenes and engaged Hyperides as counsel. The following speech, of which some fragments are missing, presents a satisfactory example of the orator’s style. The opening sentences are lost. What is here given is but an extract from the speech]:

Gentlemen, you have heard the whole story in all its details. Possibly, however, Athenogenes will plead, when his turn comes, that the law declares all agreements between man and man to be binding. Just agreements, my dear sir. Unjust ones, on the contrary, it declares shall not be binding. I will make this clearer to you from the actual words of the laws. You need not be surprised at my acquaintance with them. You have brought me to such a pass and have filled me with such a fear of being ruined by you and your cleverness that I made it my first and main duty to search and study the laws night and day.

Now one law forbids falsehood in the market-place, and a very excellent injunction it is, in my opinion; yet you have, in open market, concluded a contract with me to my detriment by means of falsehoods. For if you can show that you told me beforehand of all the loans and debts, or that you mentioned in the contract the full amount of them, as I have since found it to be, I will abandon the prosecution and confess that I have done you an injustice.

There is, however, also a second law bearing on this point, which relates to bargains between individuals by verbal agreements. It provides that “when a party sells a slave he shall declare beforehand if he has any blemish; if he omit to do so, he shall be compelled to make restitution.” If, then, the vendor of a slave can be compelled to make restitution because he has omitted to mention some chance infirmity, is it possible that you should be free to refuse responsibility for the fraudulent bargain which you have deliberately devised? Moreover, an epileptic slave does not involve in ruin all the rest of his owner’s property, whereas Midas, whom you sold to me, has ruined, not me alone, but even my friends as well.