Added to this is the tribal danger. It may not be generally known that many of the tribes of this great ethnological garden, stretching from Burma right away to the north of the Chinese Empire and south as far as Tonking and Kwangtung, are of Tibeto-Burman origin. The Hsi-fan group, the Nou-su group (this is my own theory, for several other theories are known, and the Nou-su group is placed broadly under the Lolo, itself a term of opprobrium), and many other tribes of these great families. It is safe to say, broadly, that all these tribes are allied racially or religiously. It is well known that in all stages of their civilisation not one tribe has a good word to say for the Chinese, and in the western provinces these tribes peoples predominate probably seven in ten. One cannot pose as a political prophet. China's Revolution has shown the world that prophecy in political possibilities in China is charged with an extraordinary element of chance, and one may certainly declare that it is not in the power of any one to say that these non-Chinese peoples could not be won over to the British. My personal opinion is that it could be easily done.
And one is able to imagine that in the revolution of politics in Eastern Asia which this great Revolution will inevitably bring about, and it were found necessary for China's regular army to proceed en bloc to the east of the Empire, the tribes of the west would be able to create a situation, by civil war and open rebellion against the Government, of so serious a nature that years would intervene before China could completely conquer the people and gain their moral support.
This New China Government—Republican or Monarchical, or both, as may be—has to find out for herself her own weak points. No thoughtful man who has been through these wild regions can doubt that the tribal danger is one of China's greatest weaknesses, greater as one understands it more, confronting the new Government with a problem greater than the Manchu Government was prepared to recognise.
A PRE-REVOLUTION GROUP.
Tuan Fang, the "friend of the foreigner," is seated.
He was decapitated by his own men in Szechuen. General Chang
Piao, Commander in Chief of the Hupeh Army, is standing
on his right, in military uniform. After being routed
by the Revolutionaries, he fled the country.
In a review of the Szechuen Revolt, the author feels that he has wandered considerably in his chronicle. But the information contained in what has just been written has a most vital bearing upon the maintenance of peace in Western China.[[1]]
[[1]] In 1898 Tuan Fang was a Secretary of the Board of Works; his rapid promotion after that date was chiefly due to the patronage of his friend Jung Lu. For a Manchu, he is remarkably progressive and liberal in his views.
In 1900 he was Acting-Governor of Shensi. As the Boxer movement spread and increased in violence, and as the fears of Jung Lu led him to take an increasingly decided line of action against them, Tuan Fang, acting upon his advice, followed suit. In spite of the fact that at the time of the coup d'état he had adroitly saved himself from clear identification with the Reformers and had penned a classical composition in praise of filial piety, which was commonly regarded as a veiled reproof to the Emperor for not yielding implicit obedience to the Old Buddha, he had never enjoyed any special marks of favour at the latter's hands, nor been received into that confidential friendliness with which she frequently honoured her favourites.