The stockade was probably about four hundred yards long and occupied only the lower part of the valley, shutting in the portion of the Inner Enclosure and being thus a substitute for the Outer Wall. The usual entrance to this enclosure or Peribolos was by the Military Gate of St. Romanus—formerly known as the Pempton—which, indeed, had been constructed solely for this purpose, and by two small gates or posterns at its respective ends, one at the Adrianople Gate, the other at Top Capou. Another postern had, however, says Critobulus, been opened by Justiniani to give easier access to the stockade from the city.
The construction of the stockade had been commenced immediately after the destruction of the tower near the Romanus Gate, on April 21.[361] As the attention of the enemy had been principally directed to the attack on the walls in this part of the city, so the stockade which replaced the Outer Wall continued to the end to be the focus on which was concentrated nearly the entire strength of his attack. No one could say what would be Mahomet’s plan of battle, but no one doubted that the stockade covering the St. Romanus Gate—or, as it is called in old Turkish maps, the ‘Gate of the Assault’—would at least be one of the chief places against which he would direct an assault. Behind it and between it and the great Inner Wall was the flower of the defending army. The emperor himself had his camp quite near, though within the city, while Justiniani, standing for all time as the most conspicuous figure on the Christian side, was in command within the stockade. His energy and his courage had called forth the unqualified admiration of friend and foe. The jealousy of the Venetians at his appointment had long since been overcome. While Barbaro launches his recriminations against the Genoese generally, and even sometimes against Justiniani himself, even he is constrained to repeat that the presence of the great Genoese captain was per benefitio de la Christianitade et per honor de lo mundo. His example communicated itself to his troops, and he thus became the hero of all who were fighting. All the city, says the Florentine soldier Tetaldi, had great hopes in him and in his valour. Mahomet himself was reported to have expressed admiration of the courage and ability, the fertility of resource and the activity of Justiniani, and to have regretted that he was not in the Turkish army. In front of the stockade was the sultan, surrounded by his white-capped Janissaries and the red-fezzed other members of his chosen bodyguard. Everything indeed pointed to a great fight at the stockade, where the great leaders and the flower of each army stood opposite each other.
About the beginning of the last week in May the Turks were alarmed by the rumour of an approaching fleet and of an army of Hungarians under John Hunyadi, both of which were reported to be on their way to the relief of the city.[362] The alarm, however, proved to be false. As Phrantzes laments, no Christian prince sent a man or a penny to the aid of the city.[363] At first sight it is somewhat surprising that no aid came either from the Serbians or Hungarians. During the early days of the siege assistance had been hoped for from both of these peoples. Phrantzes states that the despot of Serbia, George Brancovich, treated the sultan in such a manner as to make Mahomet taunt the Christians with his hostility to Constantine.[364] With the recollection of the Turkish victories at Varna and at Cossovo-pol, and especially of the fact that he had himself been attacked because he would not join in violating the peace between Ladislaus and Murad, it is probable enough that Brancovich was not unfriendly towards Mahomet. Indeed, at the request of the young sultan, he had used his influence to bring about a three years’ armistice between the Turks and the Hungarians. It is not, therefore, surprising that no aid came from him.
More success might have been anticipated from negotiations with Hungary. Here, however, the three years’ agreement (made eighteen months before the siege) for an armistice stood in the way. The Hungarians had received a terrible lesson—at Varna—on the breaking of treaties, and they hesitated before violating the new arrangement. Ducas and Phrantzes agree in stating that the agents of Hunyadi had come to the city in the early days of the siege and had requested the sultan, on behalf of their principal, to give back the copy of the armistice signed by him in return for that signed by Mahomet. They gave as a pretext that Hunyadi was no longer viceroy of the king of Hungary. The design was too transparent to be accepted by the Turks.[365] The idea was to suggest to the sultan that the Hungarians were coming to the aid of the city; that they had compunctions about breaking the treaty, but that, as it was not signed by the prince, they had a valid excuse for so doing. To this extent what was done indicated a spirit friendly to the besieged. The sultan and his council promised to consider the proposition, and put the agents of Hunyadi off with a civil and banal reply.[366]
Ducas tells a story regarding the visits of the agents of Hunyadi which may be noticed, though he is careful to give it as hearsay. He says that the officers in their suite showed the gunners how they might use their great bombard more effectually to destroy the walls by directing their fire in succession against two points instead of one, so as to form a triangle, and that the device succeeded to such an extent that the tower near the Romanus Gate and a part of the wall on each side of it was so broken down that the besiegers and besieged could see each other.[367]