The traditional jealousy between Venetians and Genoese was still formidable. In the present instance each accused the other of not loyally defending Constantinople and of being ready to send away their ships whenever they could do so in safety. The Venetians replied to this accusation by pointing out that they had unshipped the rudders from many of their vessels and had deposited both them and the sails within the city. The Genoese retorted that, though they kept their rudders and sails on board ready for use at any moment, they had their wives and children in Galata and had not the slightest intention of abandoning so excellent a situation. If they had advocated peace with the Turks, it was at the desire of the emperor, with whom they had a common interest. The reply was difficult to answer, but carried no conviction to their rivals, because the Venetians believed that, in spite of it, the Genoese were acting solely to further their own interests. To the most serious charge—that of giving notice to the Turks of the attempt to burn their ships—the Genoese answered that the plan had failed through the bad management of Coco, who, with the object of gaining for himself alone the credit of having destroyed the hostile fleet, had neglected necessary precautions. Recrimination ran high and led to blows. Phrantzes gives us a pathetic picture of the emperor appearing among the rioters and imploring them to make friends. War against the enemy was surely bad enough; he begged them for the sake of God not to make war on each other. His influence was sufficient to restore order, but while the hostile feeling was so far temporarily allayed as to make Genoese and Venetians content during the siege to lay aside their differences, it endured until the end.
Attempt to capture city by assault on May 7 fails.
On May 7, an assault was commenced which the besieged believed would be general by land and sea. On the previous days the monotonous firing against the walls had been constantly going on, and preparations had been noted as being made in the fleet for some new movement. Four hours after sunset thirty thousand Turks with scaling ladders and everything necessary endeavoured to force an entrance over the walls. The attempt lasted for three hours, but the besieged resisted bravely and the Turks had to retreat, having suffered, says Barbaro, much damage and, ‘I should say, with a great many killed.’ The sailors on their side were ready: the ships left the protection of the Galata walls and moved once more to take up their positions in defence of the boom, but the Turks did not come to the attack, possibly, as Barbaro suggests, because they were afraid of the Venetian ships.
The Moscovite mentions an encounter during this attack between a Greek strategos or general named Rangebè and a Turk named Amer Bey, the standard-bearer of the sultan. The Greek made a sortie, put the followers of Amer to flight, and then attacked Amer himself, whom he cut in two. The Turks, furious at the loss, surrounded Rangebè and killed him.[335]
The next day the Venetian Council of Twelve decided that Trevisano with his four hundred men should leave the entrance to the harbour and take up the defence of the newly threatened walls at Aivan Serai. There appears, however, to have been considerable opposition on the part of his crews, who preferred to remain afloat. Finally this was overcome, and on the 13th they went to their positions at the place mentioned, where the defenders had been occupied in constantly repairing the breaches made by the guns. Trevisano’s galleys were left in the imperial harbour of Neorion near the end of the chain. His place was taken by Diedo, captain of the Tana galleys, who was now appointed to the chief command of the fleet.
A new assault on May 12.
At midnight of the 12th fifty thousand Turks made an attack near Tekfour Serai, the Palace of the Porphyrogenitus, between Adrianople Gate and Caligaria, where a battery of guns had been planted from the commencement of the siege and had greatly damaged the breastwork and the Outer Wall. The attack was made with such force, and the shouting of the invaders was so loud, that Barbaro says ‘most of us believed that they would capture the city.’ Once more the attack failed. On the 14th, Mahomet removed the guns which he had placed on the slope of Pera Hill and had them taken to Aivan Serai and placed so as to attack the gate of the imperial palace of Blachern. It was found, however, that the guns in this position did no great harm, and they were once more removed, taken to the Lycus valley, and placed near the others to batter the walls near the Romanus Gate. From this time onward this was the principal place against which Mahomet concentrated his attack.
The entries in the diaries of the siege, showing that, while other parts of the wall were often attacked, the bombardment in the Lycus valley was unceasing day and night, occur during many days with monotonous regularity. Equally constant were the efforts for the defence: ‘We, on our side, were working day and night to repair the walls with logs and earth and other materials.’
New attempts to force the boom, on May 16 and 17.
On the 16th, Mahomet, probably because he had learnt of the landing of Trevisano’s men from the fleet, ordered his ships at the Double Columns to make another attack upon the boom. One would have expected that the seventy or eighty ships that were in the Inner Horn would have co-operated in this attack but they did not move. Neither Turk nor Genoese cared to risk open war with the other. The Turkish fleet came down the Bosporus, and the Greek and Venetian ships prepared to receive them. As the Turkish ships came up to the attack, Diedo brought his vessels from the shelter of the walls of Galata to the boom. Thereupon the Turks retired, and using their oars returned to the Columns. A similar incident occurred on the 17th, but the Turks, again finding that the ships at the boom were prepared for a fight, went back.