[68.1] Frazer, Magic Art, i. 222, 223.
[68.2] Durkheim, Formes Élémentaires, 65. M. Salomon Reinach in a recent brilliant work on the history of religions proposes as a definition: “An assemblage (ensemble) of scruples which stand in the way of the free exercise of our faculties.” This reduces religion to a system of taboos. But he subsequently qualifies it by saying: “Animism on one side, taboos on the other, these are the essential factors of religions” (Orpheus, 4, 10). Thus qualified, however, it excludes Buddhism; and with or without the qualification it does not express the social side of religion. M. Reinach is quite conscious of these omissions. They are an illustration of the extreme difficulty found by the most able and learned enquirers in formulating an adequate definition of religion, a definition at once all-embracing and exact.
[69.1] Durkheim, 323.
[69.2] Frazer, Magic Art, i. 220.
[70.1] Frazer, op. cit., 52.
[70.2] Ibid., 221, 237 sqq.
[70.3] Ibid., 233. Frazer has worked out the theory more completely than anyone else; but it has been more or less anticipated, or shared, by others, such as Sir Edward Tylor, Sir Alfred Lyall, and Professor Jevons.
[72.1] The above is a brief summary (partly borrowed from my review in F. L., xv. 359) of a portion of the argument elaborated by MM. Hubert and Mauss in their “Esquisse d’une Théorie Générale de la Magie,” L’Année Soc., vii. 1-146.
[76.1] Durkheim, op. cit., 61.
[77.1] Spencer and Gillen, C. T., 549, 476.