I might rest on these examples the case for the real meaning of the bride-dance and the kiss which the European bride bestows upon the guests (or rather, of course, on the masculine guests) at the wedding. But it is not necessary to do so; for we find even in Europe a practice of which the significance is unmistakable. The most important official at a marriage among the Southern Slavs is the djever (in German, brautführer) bride-leader, or bride-carrier. One only appears to be necessary, but commonly the bridegroom appoints two. They are chosen from his own brothers, or adoptive brothers, or his most intimate and trusty friends; or the chief brautführer may be his godfather. Adoptive brotherhood and godfatherhood are very sacred ties, at least as close as natural relationships; and the duties they impose are rarely violated. It is for this reason that such persons are selected for the office of djever. For the djever is allowed to relieve the tedious festivities of the wedding (and Slav weddings are tedious indeed) as often as he likes by kissing the bride and taking other liberties with her. And in the Bocca and Herzegovina, when the night at length arrives, he sleeps beside her “as a brother with a sister”; or if there be two, they both occupy the room with her. The latter custom is now falling into disuse; and the djever’s place is taken by the bridegroom’s mother and sister, the happy man himself not being permitted to obtain possession of his bride for two, or sometimes three, nights.[363.2] It needs no words of mine to drive home the conclusion that here we have a survival of a rite identical with that of the Kurnai. The djeveri are the representatives of the entire band of the bridegroom’s brethren and assistants, whose rights are concentrated in their hands. The connection between this usage and those in other parts of Europe comes to the surface in the Wendish requirement that permission for the bride-dance be obtained from the brautführer.
If this conclusion be correct, the ancestors of the European nations must have passed through a stage of society wherein group-marriage was the rule, the groups on either side probably consisting of husbands reckoned, according to the standard of savage kinship, as brothers, and wives reckoned as sisters, among themselves. The limited promiscuity thus established would be entirely in harmony with—nay, it would be a consequence of—the conception of gentile solidarity which I have endeavoured to summarise in a previous chapter. This is what the late Mr. Lewis Morgan called the Punaluan Family. Starting from the kindred-names and customs of Hawaii, he traced it over a large part of the Old and New Worlds, and successfully vindicated its existence against the criticisms of Mr. MacLennan. The most striking piece of evidence in favour of Mr. Morgan’s theory that has come to light since he wrote is perhaps to be found among the inhabitants of the island of Tanna in the New Hebrides. Their rules of marriage and terms of relationship may be studied in detail in a paper by the Rev. William Gray, read at a meeting of the Australasian Association, held at Hobart in January 1892, and published in the report of the meeting. It will suffice here to say that in the laws and language of the Tannese no distinctions are drawn between a wife and a wife’s sister, between a husband and a husband’s brother; all a man’s brother’s children are his own; all his wife’s children and his wife’s sisters’ children are alike his; the relation of uncle or aunt and nephew or niece does not exist, for the person whom we should call uncle or aunt is recognised by a Tannese as his father or mother, or else the term is indistinguishable from those for wife’s or husband’s father or mother; in like manner the terms for nephew and niece are the same as those for son-in-law and daughter-in-law; and the children of a man’s father’s brothers, or of his mother’s sisters, are regarded as his brothers and sisters equally with the children of his own parents.[365.1] For such a condition of society any explanation is impossible, unless it be that an entire band of brethren is—or was down to a recent period, yesterday if not to-day—actually or potentially married to an entire band of sisters. The Punaluan Family is thus Australian group-marriage surviving into a somewhat higher stage of culture, but surviving, of course, in a more restricted form. The sense of solidarity has become stronger, but more circumscribed.
When in the progress of culture group-marriage began to give way to individual appropriation, and inroads were made upon the totemistic clan, the clan-brethren would not immediately cease to be specially interested in the marriage of one of their number. Their rights would not be extinguished all at once; they would only become dormant. They might never be exercised during the continuance of the marriage. Probably they never would be, at all events without the individual husband’s assent. But, whether exercised or not, there the rights would be, ready to arise upon a favourable opportunity. Rights thus in abeyance would be likely to be exercised at the entrance upon marriage, prior to the husband’s sole ownership, if the assistance of the clan-brethren were required to obtain the bride. They might be exercised also during the marriage, if the wife ran away and the clan-brethren helped to recover her. The opportunity for asserting the rights would come with the call for assistance.
In the most archaic period, such as may be represented for us by the Kurnai, the assistance would take the form of physical force. But after a while purchase began to supersede violence as the method of bride-winning, and capture dwindled to a form. The help of the clansmen would be equally required in purchase as in capture. I select a few examples from different parts of the world. Among the Nestorians, relatives and friends are called on to contribute to the dowry and wedding-dress given by the bridegroom to the bride, and the presents he has to make to her parents, as well as the expenses of the feast.[366.1] The tribes of the Caucasus are divided into exogamous clans; and when a member of a clan marries, all the brethren contribute to the ransom paid for the bride. Every member of a Kurdish commune pays a share of the purchase-money. A similar collection is made among the comrades of the Lithuanian bridegroom. In Ukrainia, before the bridegroom and his suite set out for the bride’s dwelling, each of the suite is called upon by the best man to make a contribution towards the sum which is afterwards paid to the brothers of the bride.[366.2] Among the Khonds of Orissa a large price in cattle and money is paid for a wife; and this is chiefly subscribed, as among others of the aboriginal tribes, by the bridegroom’s “near relatives and his branch of the tribe.”[367.1] The inhabitants of Sumatra buy their wives; but the debt is often allowed to remain for many years undischarged. “Sometimes it remains unadjusted,” says Marsden, “to the second and third generation, and it is not uncommon to see a man suing for the jujur (or price) of the sister of his grandfather.” And he adds that “in Passummah, if the race of a man is extinct, the dusun or village to which the family belonged must make it good to the creditor.”[367.2] This implies that the dusun was originally collectively liable for the payment. The Melanesian custom seems to be for the youth’s kindred and friends to contribute to the sum he is called on to pay.[367.3] Among the Basutos a marriage is an affair of much concern to the relatives of the young people on both sides. The bridegroom’s relatives furnish the cattle he gives for her, and go in a body to make the bargain and present the beasts.[367.4] On the western continent the Araucanian aspirant for matrimony takes counsel with his friends and relatives, who inform him what contributions they are prepared to make towards the amount of the purchase-money. Among the Peguenches the relatives negotiate the marriage and collect the articles of value to be paid for the damsel.[367.5] In Guatemala the price was furnished by the bridegroom’s clansmen.[367.6] In what is now Los Angeles County, California, the male relatives “proceeded in a body to the girl’s dwelling, and distributed small sums in shell-money among her female kinsfolk, who were collected there for the occasion,” and who afterwards returned the visit and gave baskets of meal to the bridegroom’s kindred.[368.1]
From these examples, and many more might be cited, it is obvious that the purchase was made by the clan, just as the capture was probably made by the clan. And we might well expect to find that the clan, and not merely the individual, acquired by the act rights over the bride, such as would be expressed in the rude Nasamonian custom, and in the Bride-dance and other survivals of modern Europe. I have only space for a few examples indicating community of wives or of husbands. But the subject has been so exhaustively treated by anthropologists of distinction that little more than a passing notice is needful. An observation or two must, however, be made first of all, in reference alike to the examples that follow, and to those I have cited in previous pages. When we read, whether in classical writers or in the works of modern travellers, of community of women, we must always beware of giving the words the meaning of absolute promiscuity. Very strong evidence, and not merely that of writers imperfectly acquainted with the language and customs of a savage people, is called for to establish absolute promiscuity. But limited promiscuity among the members of a clan is a different matter. As a savage practice it is beyond doubt; and I have already pointed out that it owes its origin to the solidarity of the kindred in the lower culture. We must fully grasp the meaning of this solidarity if we would avoid the twofold chance of error in descriptions of savage life and the inferences to be drawn from them. The chance of error too, it may be parenthetically observed, is not confined to marriage ceremonies, nor to the abiding customs of the conjugal relation; but we must guard against it on many other occasions, as for instance those described in the last chapter. Travellers having but a superficial knowledge of the peoples they describe—especially in the days before savage kinship had become the subject of scientific investigation—are not careful to define, because they do not understand, the relationship of members of a tribe to one another. Their vague expressions “relatives” and “friends” are therefore subject to interpretation by what has been ascertained of clan-organisation, if we would avoid one source of error. But there is a further consideration which ought not to be overlooked. The clan system has rarely been found complete and unimpaired. The evolution of civilisation is always modifying it, sometimes in one direction, sometimes in another. Consequently ceremonies limited in theory to the clan-brethren display a constant tendency on the one side to limitation to the smaller circle of the family, as the family is evolved from the clan; and on the other side to extension among the intimate friends and relatives of the person chiefly concerned, as blood-relationship begins to be recognised outside the clan, and as the ties of friendship are knit between man and man regardless of kinship. Herein lies our other difficulty. The criticism that the privileges we are discussing are not recorded as belonging to the members of one group only, though it applies with greater force to the instances mentioned by classical writers, who understood the gentile system, than to modern writers who do not understand it, is by no means enough to dispose of the evidence where such record is wanting. Unfortunately we cannot cross-examine the writers. We can, however, and we must, read their accounts by the light of more accurate investigations. We shall then be inclined to admit that most of the cases alleged are not referable to phallic worship, nor to an outbreak of indiscriminate licence occurring in the midst of long-established monogamy, to which they are sometimes ascribed.[370.1]
Turning now to the privileges themselves, it must be remembered that we have not to deal with cases in which polyandry is still open and avowed, but to customs which indicate its former existence. Group-marriage, like that of the Australians, the more limited polyandry of the Tibetan peoples, and the ruder polyandry like that of the Nairs, whether it be the remains of a more savage and unorganised society before the rise of the clan, or a sporadic degradation of clan-marriage, may be studied in the writings of MacLennan, Morgan, and Robertson Smith. Group-marriage and Tibetan polyandry, indeed, we must assume as the precursors of the state of barbarous culture where the marriage is primarily between individuals, but in which the kin still have certain rights over the spouse. And in dealing with the rights of the husband’s kin we are not required to take into account whether his marriage be polygynous or no.
Bearing these things in mind then, let us consider a few examples. Among the Santals, it is said, “a man’s younger brother may share his wife with impunity; only they must not go about it very openly.”[371.1] In dealing with women taken in adultery the main point considered by the Dhobás of Orissa is whether the paramour be a member of the caste.[371.2] For, while a slight penance is deemed sufficient penalty for such a lapse of virtue, and the husband by no means invariably insists on divorce, the offence committed with an outsider is incapable of atonement, and the offending woman is turned out of the caste. Here, although the limits of the gotra are not coextensive with those of the more venial sin, it is to be observed that the Dhobás all claim descent from a common ancestor, and they eat and drink together indiscriminately. It is not considered any offence among the Bhuiyars of South Mirzapur for a married woman to grant her favours to her husband’s brothers. More distant relatives must give a tribal feast; or, if the kindred be very remote, the paramour must repay to the husband the cost of her marriage.[371.3] Similarly, in Southern India a Cunian woman who has been guilty of an intrigue with a lover of her own tribe is not disgraced thereby; and if her husband desire to get rid of her she will have no difficulty in finding another.[371.4] Among the Thlinkits of North America a wife has the privilege of selecting as her lover a brother or near kinsman of her husband; and such a man is required to contribute towards her maintenance. On the other hand, a seducer who is no relation may be slain by the outraged husband, or compelled to submit to a heavy fine.[372.1] The right loosely described by Herodotus as exercised by the Massagetai over other men’s wives must probably be understood as limited to kinsmen.[372.2] In the island of Timor a brother made by the blood-covenant coming to the house of one of the brothers of the same covenant or clan “is in every respect regarded as free and as much at home as its owner. Nothing is withheld from him”: not even the wife. “And a child born of such a union would be regarded by the husband as his.” For, as Dr. Trumbull appositely comments, “are not—as they reason—these brother-friends of one blood—of one and the same life?”[372.3]
The common meal, as we have seen, implies brotherhood. The rites of hospitality among many nations constitute a temporary brotherhood, and confer on the guest many of the privileges of a kinsman. This, it seems reasonable to think, may have been the ground of that widely extended custom of offering the host’s wife to his guest. The custom is too well known to require more than a passing reference. Nor do I propose to give more to another custom, that, namely of the exchange, temporary or permanent, of wives. Where it is not dictated by mere occasional wantonness, but is a regular institution, it is usually limited to brethren of the blood. These cases may not go very far: to understand the true value of their evidence they must be placed side by side with cases where the husband’s prior right is determined either by his death or divorce. Among the Arabs, if a man divorced his wife, his heirs had a right to take her. “That implies,” as Professor Robertson Smith points out with unanswerable force, “that the kin had an interest in the woman’s marriage even while her husband lived, and that their interest became active as soon as he divested himself of his special claims on his wife. In short, the right of the heir is a modification of the older right of kinsmen to share each other’s marriages; and as soon as the exclusive right conferred on the husband by more modern law ceases and determines, whether by marriage [? death] or divorce, the older right of the kin revives.”[373.1] Although it does not appear that a similar privilege is exercised by the kindred among the Bengali tribes, their rights over a woman are usually guarded by the requirement that divorce can only take place with the consent of a council of relatives or a panchayat of the village or caste.[373.2] It is generally admitted now that the institution of the Levirate is traceable to polyandry wherein the husbands were united among themselves by the ties of blood. The Levirate was an institution deeply rooted in Hebrew polity, consecrated, if we may believe the traditions preserved in the most ancient Hebrew book now extant, by divine sanction under the tremendous penalty of death, and even in historic times enforceable by the public disgrace of a man who refused compliance.[373.3] It has only become obsolete among the Jews in Europe during the last three centuries, while those of Palestine still hold to it.[373.4] When a man died married but childless, leaving brothers, it was the duty of the eldest of the survivors to take the widow and beget issue for the deceased; nor was any form of marriage necessary between him and her. The same rule was prescribed in the Laws of Manu to the Hindu Aryans. There a brother or some other kinsman, not merely of a dead man, but also of a man who, in consequence of disease or mutilation, was incapable of himself begetting issue, might be appointed for the purpose; and the reason is expressly declared in the Apastamba to be that the bride is given to the husband’s family, and not to the husband alone. Moreover, logically following out the idea of solidarity, Manu declares that if only one among brothers have a son, all have male offspring through that son; and conversely, if only one of all the wives of one husband bear a son, all are mothers of male children through that son.[374.1] If a Malagasy die childless, his next younger brother “must marry the widow to keep his brother in remembrance; the children of such marriages being considered as the elder brother’s heirs and descendants.”[374.2] The Basuto custom is the same.[374.3] But the Levirate is only a specialised form of a more general rule. It was developed when society had passed into the patriarchal phase, in order to preserve due succession. It shows how strong the feeling of solidarity of the kindred was. And that the wife was not regarded as no more than heritable property is brought into clear relief in the Hebrew and Hindu laws, where cohabitation ceased on the birth of a boy. Though this limitation be not observed by the Malagasy and Basutos, at least we cannot forget that the children begotten by the levir (that is, the man who took the widow) rank as his brother’s, and are entitled to his brother’s property. If the wife were simply inherited, both she and the children she afterwards bore would become the property of the man to whom she passed.
Omitting as equivocal the numberless and widespread instances where the heir takes possession of his predecessor’s wives with the rest of his property, we may take note of some whose interpretation is less open to question. Usually among the aboriginal people of Bengal the younger brother, or cousin, of the deceased husband has the first claim on the widow, a claim which must be released before she is at liberty to wed any other person. The cases are few where, as among the Santals, the consent of the younger brother’s first wife must be procured; and they only exist where such consent would be necessary in any case to his second marriage.[375.1] Several tribes of the North-west Provinces practise the custom. Indeed, it seems usual among the aborigines over the greater part of India; and frequently no ceremony of any kind is necessary. Where, as among the Játs of the Panjáb, a ceremony is performed, it is of the simplest kind. The husband’s brother simply throws his scarf or cloak over the widow’s head.[375.2] If a Ját youth die betrothed, but before consummating the marriage, his father can claim the girl for another son, or, in default of a son, for any male relation in that degree.[375.3] A virgin widow among the Baiswars of South Mirzapur can be married, but it is usual to give some remuneration to the family of the deceased husband.[375.4] When a Habura is sentenced to a long term of imprisonment, or is transported for life, his wives are taken by his brothers.[376.1] In the Hindu Koosh, while a man’s property passes to his children, his brother takes the widows. It is disgraceful to refuse them; and they can marry nobody else without the consent of their husband’s brothers.[376.2] An Afghan ought to marry his brother’s childless widow. If any other man offer first it is a grave insult to him.[376.3] Among the Ostiaks and other Turanian tribes, a younger brother is bound to marry his elder brother’s widow.[376.4] On the island of Sumatra, while the inheritance descends to the sons, the brothers in order of age have a right to the widow married by jujur, or purchase. In the event of their declining her successively they may give her in marriage to any relation on the father’s side, the person who takes her replacing the deceased. If she marry a stranger, the new husband may be adopted into the family to replace the deceased, or she may be married by purchase, as the relatives please.[376.5] On the adjacent island of Nias one of the sons may marry all the widows save his own mother; and if no son exercise this right, they pass to a brother. If they do not marry they must be maintained by the family of their dead consort.[376.6] On Engano a man in marrying pays the value of two hundred cocoa-nuts to the bride’s family. Yet he does not thereby acquire her for himself. On the contrary, he becomes part of her family; and if she die and he marry again, an indemnity must be paid to her relatives. If he die, however, the widow must offer herself to his brothers; nor can she wed any one else until they have refused her.[377.1] The widow of a Gilbert Islander is taken by his surviving brother into his own hut, and she can then marry no one else.[377.2] A bachelor or widower among the Andaman Islanders is expected to marry his brother’s widow; and the term brother, as in most savage lands, includes what we call a cousin. Of the property of the deceased the widow retains as much as she requires for her personal use, dividing the rest between his male relatives.[377.3] Among the Sihanaka, one of the aboriginal tribes of Madagascar, a widow is stripped and in various ways ill-treated for several months, and only allowed to return home to her own kindred after having obtained a formal divorce from her husband’s family.[377.4] In Africa, individual property is hardly recognised by the Krumen of the Grain Coast: almost everything is possessed by the family community. When a Kruman dies his wife passes over to his brother or some other near relation. An Oromó widow can only marry with the consent of her husband’s brother. A Zulu is obliged to cohabit with all the widows of an elder brother. Among the Tedas in Sahara, if an affianced bridegroom die before completion of the marriage, his place is taken by his brother or nearest kinsman.[377.5] On the Slave Coast a younger brother was formerly compelled to marry the headwife of his elder brother deceased, while the subordinate wives devolved with the rest of the inheritance on the sons. Compulsion has now become obsolete; but the headwife still resides with her husband’s relatives; and if she marry any other man than her first husband’s brother, the second husband repays to the relatives (apparently not to the heirs as such) of the first the amount originally paid for her.[378.1] In Natal, when a Kafir dies, “those wives who have not left the kraal remain with the eldest son. If they wish to marry again, they must go to one of their late husband’s brothers.” Children born of such a marriage, however, belong to the son.[378.2] On the western continent the Thlinkit, among whom we have already found traces of clan-marriage, require the eldest brother or nephew to marry the widow.[378.3] In Guatemala, where, as we know, the kindred of the husband bought the wife, she passed over into her husband’s clan, and was taken on his death by his brother or her stepson.[378.4] Among the Hidatsas it is a common practice for a man to marry his brother’s widow; but apparently this is subject to her consent.[378.5] When one of the Blackfeet, or one of the Omahas, died, his wives became the potential wives of his eldest brother, while his property passed to his sons, though a few horses were generally given to his brothers.[378.6] An Ojibway widow may be taken by her husband’s brother, or apparently by any one of the clan; and this is sometimes done at the grave by the ceremony of walking her over it, in which event she is not required to undergo the terrible ordeal of mourning. Or she has a right to go to him, and he is bound to support her.[379.1] The Miwok of California destroy the property of the dead; but the eldest brother is entitled to the widow.[379.2] The Aztecs regarded it as a duty to marry a brother’s widow; and the reason given is that her children, if she had any, might not remain fatherless—a reason, however, which would not apply where she had none.[379.3] In Samoa, where property belonged to the kin, one of the brothers, or some other relative, took the wife; and her children were taught to regard him as their father. The reason here alleged was the desire to preserve the woman and her children to the family, whose number and influence were thus maintained.[379.4] In New Caledonia, where the property seems to descend to the eldest son, the husband’s brother is bound to marry the widow.[379.5] In the Loyalty Islands she could not marry again without the consent of her first husband’s family.[379.6] A Tasmanian woman became common property; but she might be given in marriage again.[379.7] In some at least of the islands of New Britain also, a widow became common property;[379.8] and a similar custom seems to have been followed by the Eskimo.[379.9] The natives of the west of Victoria divided the property of a departed tribesman equally among his widow and his children; but it was his brother’s duty to marry the widow if she had offspring, because he was bound to protect her and rear the children. He seems to have been at liberty to marry her also if she were childless.[380.1] The duty or the right of a deceased husband’s brother to take the widow seems, in fact, to be general among the aborigines of Australia, and to be wholly disconnected with the right of succession to property. And the evidence that it is a survival of group-marriage is confirmed by the custom of the Gippsland tribes, which, there is reason to believe, sanctioned the occasional cohabitation of a single man with his living brother’s wife, and of a married man with his wife’s sister. “A man spoke of his sister-in-law as puppar-worcat, which means another wife; and when a wife died her sister not infrequently took her place.” In Europe, among the Moslem Albanians the sons succeed to the property, but the brother has a right to the widow with or without her consent. Nor can she marry any one else in the same village save with his consent. If, however, she marry into another family, her husband’s heirs are entitled to half the dowry. The brother of an affianced husband who dies is entitled to the bride on paying additional dowry.[380.2] A trace of the right of a surviving brother to the widow is perhaps found among the Scandinavians; and the conjecture derives some support from the conduct imputed to Frigg, the wife of Odin, who is accused by Loki of laying her husband’s two brothers in her bosom.[380.3]
I have mentioned some cases in which payment for the widow who marries out of her husband’s kin, is made to the kin. A few others may be added. This is the custom of the Toaripi, Dori, and Koiari tribes of New Guinea. If she belong to the first-named tribe she remains with her husband’s relatives until her second marriage, only when she has children; if she belong to either of the latter she remains, whether with or without children.[381.1] In Kulu, Ladák, the widow could be sold by her husband’s relatives into a second marriage; but so long as she did not quit her husband’s house she was at liberty to keep a paramour.[381.2] Among the Smoos of Central America we are told that widows are the property of the husband’s relatives, to whom “widow-money” must be paid before they are allowed to marry.[381.3] In the western provinces of China, Mr. Cooper tells us, when a widow signifies her intention of marrying again, her deceased husband’s relations generally dispose of her to the highest bidder; but she cannot be forced to marry against her will: by which I understand that it rests with her to say whether she will marry or not; but if she decide to marry, her deceased husband’s relations have the right to determine whom she shall marry, and to receive the bride-price.[381.4]