[10] The conciliatory acts of the British Parliament and the letter of the Commissioners were referred by the Congress to a Committee of three—all known to be opposed to any reconciliation with England. This Committee made, the next day after its appointment, a report which was adopted by Congress, that the British acts were merely intended to operate upon the hopes and fears of the American people, and to produce divisions among them; "that those who made any partial convention or agreement with the Commissioners of Great Britain would be regarded as enemies; and that the United States could hold no conference with such Commissioners until the British Government first withdrew its fleets and armies, or acknowledged the independence of the United States."

"This rejection of terms which they not long before would have cordially welcomed, was, no doubt, caused by the confident expectation they then had of the support and alliance of France; and accordingly the news of that alliance soon after reached them, and diffused a general joy throughout the land." (Tucker's History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap. iii., pp. 221, 222.)

[11] "The Declaration of Independence effected an alteration of sentiments in England. It was esteemed by many of the most judicious persons in this country, a measure wholly unnecessary, and without recurring to which America might have compassed every point proposed by continuing its resistance to Britain on the same footing it had begun. This measure occasioned an alienation from its interests in the minds of many of its former adherents. It was looked upon as a wanton abuse of the success with which it had opposed the efforts of the British Ministry to bring them to submission, and as an ungrateful return for the warmth with which their cause had been espoused in Parliament, and by such multitudes as in the idea of many amounted to a plurality."

"The Declaration of France completed the revolution that had been gradually taking place in the opinions of men on their being repeatedly apprised of the determination of Congress to break asunder all the bonds of former amity, and to unite themselves in the closest manner with that kingdom." (Dr. Andrews' History of the American War, Vol. III., Chap. xxxiv., pp. 82-84.)

The Declaration of France in favour of the independence of the American colonies, and of alliance with them, was officially communicated to the British Government the 13th of March, 1778, a few days after which the French fleet under the command of Count D'Estaing sailed from Toulon, and arrived off the coast of America in July—after a long voyage of eighty-seven days. On learning the departure of the French fleet for America, the British Government sent out, in the same ships with the Peace Commissioners, orders to Sir Henry Clinton to concentrate his forces on Long Island and at New York. "The successor of Howe, Sir Henry Clinton, was," says Lord Mahon, "in character, as upright and amiable; in skill and enterprise, much superior. Had the earlier stages of the war been under his direction, his ability might not have been without influence upon them. But it was his misfortune to be appointed only at a time when other foes had leagued against us, when the path was beset with thorns and briars, when scarce any laurels rose in view. In consequence of the impending war with France, and in conformity with the advice of Lord Amherst to the King, instructions had been addressed to Sir Henry, on the 23rd of March, to retire from the hard-won city of Philadelphia, and concentrate his forces at New York. This order reached him at Philadelphia, in the month of May, only a few days after he had assumed the chief command; only a few days before, there came on shore the British Commissioners of Peace. These Commissioners might well complain with some warmth, in a secret letter to Lord George Germaine, that an order so important, so directly bearing on the success of their mission, should have been studiously concealed from them until they landed in America, and beheld it in progress of execution. Thus to a private friend wrote Lord Carlisle (one of the Commissioners): 'We arrived at this place, after a voyage of six weeks, on Saturday last, and found everything here in great confusion—- the army upon the point of leaving the town, and about three thousand of the miserable inhabitants embarked on board of our ships, to convey them from a place where they think they would receive no mercy from those who will take possession after us.'"

"Thus from the first," says Lord Mahon, "the Commissioners had against them the news of a retreat from Philadelphia, and the news of the treaty of Paris; further, they had against them, as the Opposition in England had long foreseen and foretold, the fact of their connection with Lord North. Even at the outset, before their affairs could be known (June 14, 1778), one of the leaders in America, General Joseph Reed, answered a private note from one of them as follows: 'I shall only say that after the unparalleled injuries and insults this country has received from the men who now direct the affairs of Great Britain, a negotiation under their auspices has much to Struggle with.'" "How different," remarks Lord Mahon, "might have been his feelings, had they brought their Commission from Lord Chatham." (History of England, Vol. VI., Chap. lviii., pp. 372-374.)

Lord Mahon adds: "Not any, even the smallest opening, was afforded to these messengers of peace. They desired to despatch to the seat of Congress their Secretary, Dr. Adam Ferguson, the well-known Professor of Edinburgh, and they applied to Washington for a passport, but Washington refused it until the pleasure of Congress should be known. The Congress, on their part, had put forth a resolution declining even to hold any conference with the Commissioners unless, as a preliminary, they should either withdraw the fleets and armies, or else, in express terms, acknowledge the independence of the United States. In vain did the Commissioners address the President of the Congress, and entreat some consideration of their terms. (For the terms, see page [11].) To none of these terms, so tempting heretofore, would the Congress hearken; and after their first letter, they decided in a summary manner that no further reply should be returned."—Ib., pp. 374, 375.

[12] "Finding it impossible to proceed with their negotiations, the Commissioners prepared to re-embark for England. First, however, they issued a manifesto, or proclamation, to the American people, appealing to them against the decisions of the Congress, and offering to the colonies at large, or singly, a general or separate peace. This proclamation was in most parts both ably and temperately argued. But there was one passage liable to just exceptions. The Commissioners observed, that hitherto the hopes of a reunion had checked the extremes of war. Henceforth the contest would be changed. If the British colonies were to become an accession to France, the law of self-preservation must direct Great Britain to render the accession of as little avail as possible to her enemy. Mr. Fox and others in the House of Commons inveighed with great plausibility against this passage, us threatening a war of savage desolation. Others again, as friends of Lord Carlisle and Mr. Eden (afterwards Lord Auckland), asserted that no such meaning was implied. The error, whatever it might be, lay with the Commissioners, and in no degree with the Government at home; for Lord North denied, in the most express terms, that his Ministers had intended to give the least encouragement to the introduction of any new kind of war in North America." (Debate in the House of Commons, Dec. 4, 1778.)

Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VI., Chap. lviii., pp. 376, 377.