Even a year later—"The military force," says Mr. Tucker, "embarked in the beginning of 1781, to maintain the cause of independence, is thus stated in (Chief Justice) Marshall's Life of Washington: The Southern troops, from Pennsylvania to Georgia, did not exceed three thousand men. Of the Northern troops, twelve hundred had been detached to Virginia, under La Fayette; with these they amounted only to three thousand effective men in April. The cavalry and artillery was less than one thousand. With some small additions, the whole reached four thousand men in May. They were ill supplied with clothing, and were seriously threatened with a want of provisions. The quartermaster's department was without means of transport," (Marshall, Vol. IV., p. 446).[30]
Such was the character and such the fruits of the alliance with France during the first two years of its existence; and such was the state of the revolutionary army in 1780, and which seems to have been largely owing to the incapacity and ill conduct of the Congress itself, which had become degenerate and corrupt—equal to that of any British Parliament, or of any Provincial Legislature, under any Royal Governor.[31]
Abundant evidence can be adduced in proof and illustration of this statement from the warmest partizans of Congress; but the testimony of Washington himself is ample and indisputable. In the winter of 1778-9 he had to concert his measures with Congress at Philadelphia, and he writes from thence as follows to his friend Benjamin Harrison:
"If I were to be called upon to draw a picture of the times and of men from what I have seen, heard, and in part known, I should in one word say that idleness, dissipation, and extravagance seem to have laid fast hold of them; that speculation, peculation, and an insatiable thirst for riches seem to have got the better of every other consideration and of every order of men; that party disputes and personal quarrels are the great business of the day; whilst the momentous concerns of an empire, a great and accumulating debt, ruined finances, depreciated money, and want of credit, which in its consequence is the want of everything, are but secondary considerations, and postponed from day to day, and from week to week, as if our affairs wore the most promising aspect. * * Our money is now sinking fifty per cent. a day in this city, and I shall not be surprised if in the course of a few months a total stop is put to the currency of it; and yet an assembly, a concert, a dinner, a supper, that will cost three or four hundred pounds, will not only take men from acting in this business, but from thinking of it; while a great part of the officers of our army, from absolute necessity, are quitting the service. * * I have no resentments, nor do I mean to point at particular characters. This I can declare upon my honour, for I have every attention paid me by Congress that I could possibly expect. * * But such is the picture which from my inmost soul I believe to be true; and I confess to you that I feel more real distress on account of the present appearances of things, than I have done at any time since the commencement of the dispute."[32]
Such is General Washington's own account of the character and occupation of the Congress of the United States in the third year of the revolutionary war, and in the second year of their alliance with France—idleness, dissipation, extravagance, speculation, peculation, avarice, party and personal quarrels, dancing, feasting; while the credit was reduced almost to nothing, and the army neglected and suffering.[33]
Such was the progress of the war; such the failure of the expeditions of the French alliance; such the state of the revolutionary army, and of the public credit; and such the degenerate character and proceedings of Congress and its surroundings in the beginning of 1780—the fifth year of the civil war.
FOOTNOTES:
[13] "They urged D'Estaing to return with his fleet into the harbour; but his principal officers were opposed to the measure, and protested against it. He had been instructed to go into Boston if his fleet met with any misfortune. His officers insisted on his ceasing to prosecute the expedition against Rhode Island, that he might conform to the orders of their common superiors. A protest was drawn up and sent to him, which was signed by John Sullivan, Nathaniel Greene, John Hancock, I. Glover, Ezekiel Cornel, William Whipple, John Tyler, Solomon Lovell, John Fitconnel. They protested against the Count's taking the fleet to Boston, as derogatory to the honour of France, contrary to the intention of his Christian Majesty and the interests of his nation, destructive in the highest degree to the welfare of the United States, and highly injurious to the alliance formed between the two nations. Had D'Estaing prosecuted his original plan within the harbour, either before or immediately after the pursuit of Lord Howe, the reduction of the British post on Rhode Island (which had been in the possession of the British since 1776) would have been probable; but his departure in the first instance to engage the English fleet, and in the second from Rhode Island to Boston, frustrated the whole." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xvi., p. 272.)
"Whatever were the reasons which induced Count D'Estaing to adopt that measure (of sailing with his fleet direct for Boston), the Americans were greatly dissatisfied. They complained that they had incurred great expense and danger, under the prospect of the most effective co-operation; that depending thereon, they had risked their lives on an island, where, without naval protection, they were exposed to particular dangers; that in this situation they were first deserted, and afterwards totally abandoned, at a time when, by persevering in the original plan, they had well-grounded hopes of speedy success. Under these apprehensions the discontented militia went home in such crowds that the regular army, which remained was in danger of being cut off from a retreat. In these embarrassing circumstances, General Sullivan extricated himself with judgment and ability. He began to send off his heavy artillery and baggage on the 26th, and retreated from the lines on the night of the 28th." (Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VI., Chap. lviii., p. 173.)
[14] "The inveteracy to the French, traditionally inherent in the lower classes of the New England people, could not be restrained from breaking out in Boston, in manner that might have been attended with the most serious consequences to the interests of both France and America, had not the prudence of the magistracy interposed on the one hand, and the sagacity of Count D'Estaing co-operated on the other. A desperate fray happened in that city between the populace and the French sailors, in which these were roughly handled, and had much the worse. A number of them were hurt and wounded, and some, it was reported, were killed."