"Lord Cornwallis, considering South Carolina as entirely reannexed to Great Britain, would admit of no neutrality among the inhabitants; but insisted on their taking the oath of allegiance, which, however, was generally taken with reluctance by the people of the lower country. This part of the State was still further alienated by the licentious and plundering habits of the British soldiers over a conquered country, and by the seduction of many of the slaves from their masters."[43]
There can be no justification of Lord Cornwallis's policy; but there were some mitigating circumstances that palliate the severities which he inflicted. Among those who had been taken prisoners at the capture of Charleston, and professed loyalty, was, as Lord Mahon says, "One Lisle, who had not only taken the oath of allegiance, but accepted military rank as a King's officer; waited just long enough to supply his battalion with clothes, arms, and ammunition from the royal stores, and then quietly led them back to his old friends. Highly incensed at such signal acts of treachery as Lisle's, Lord Cornwallis had recourse to some severe orders in return. The penalty of death was denounced against all militiamen who, after serving with the English, went off to the insurgents. Several of the prisoners in the battle of Camden, men taken with arms in their hands and British protections in their pockets, were hanged. Other such examples were made at Augusta and elsewhere. Some who had been living on their parole at Charleston, and who, in spite of that parole, carried on a secret correspondence with their insurgent countrymen, were shipped off to St. Augustine. A proclamation was issued, sequestering the estates of those who had been the most forward to oppose the establishment of the royal authority within the province. Perhaps these measures exceeded the bounds of justice; certainly they did the bounds of policy. This was shown by the fatal event, when, on the overthrow of the royalist cause in South Carolina, the measures of Lord Cornwallis became the plea for other executions and for every act of oppression that resentment could devise."
"Within the more limited sphere of his own command, Lord Rawdon had recourse to, or at the very least announced, some measures still more severe, and far less to be justified. In a letter to one of his officers, which was intercepted, we find, for example, what follows: 'I will give the inhabitants ten guineas for the head of every deserter belonging to the volunteers of Ireland; and five guineas only if they bring him in alive.' No amount of provocation or of precedent in his enemies, no degree of youthful ardour in himself, are at all adequate to excuse these most blamable words. When, however, he was called upon to vindicate them, Lord Rawdon declared that many of his threats were meant only 'to act on the fears and prejudices of the vulgar,' and by no means to be carried into practical effect."[44]
During the latter part of the year there were various skirmishes and battles between volunteer parties of Independents, under such leaders as Sumpter and Clarke, and detachments of the British army, with various success, but nothing which affected the supremacy of the royal cause, though the moral influence of it was widely weakened by the arbitrary policy of the British commanders and the conduct of the British troops. The prospects of the revolution were very gloomy,[45] and its leaders were much disheartened. In these circumstances of depression and despondency, an earnest appeal was made to France for men and money,[46] and the transactions following show that the appeal was not made in vain, and that French ships and troops were the main instruments in deciding the battle which was followed by the acknowledgment of American Independence.[47]
Mr. Hildreth, referring to the close of this year, says: "So far, indeed, as related to America, Great Britain had good reason to be satisfied with the late campaign. Georgia was entirely subdued, and the royal government re-established. The possession of Charleston, Augusta, Ninety-Six, and Camden, supported by an army in the field, secured entire control over all the wealthy parts of South Carolina. North Carolina was full of Tories, anxiously awaiting the approach of Cornwallis. The three Southern States were incapable of helping themselves, and those further north, exhausted and penniless, were little able to send assistance. It seemed as if the promises so often made by Lord George Germaine's American correspondents were now about to be fulfilled, and the rebel colonies to sink beneath the accumulated pressure of this long-protracted struggle."[48]
Thus, at the close of 1780, the military conflicts were almost invariably successful on the side of the British; the resources of the revolutionists in both money and men were exhausted, and their hopes of success utterly extinguished without foreign aid. But though the British were successful on the fields of battle, they everywhere lost in the confidence, esteem, and affections of the people, even of the Loyalists. Yet the prospects of the war party of independence were gloomy indeed. General Washington felt that some great achievement was necessary to revive the hopes of his fellow-countrymen, and save from dissolution his daily decreasing army. His only hope was in aid from France. His words were:
"Without an immediate, ample, and efficacious succour in money, we may make a feeble and expiring effort in our next campaign, in all probability the period of our opposition. Next to a loan in money, a constant naval superiority on these coasts is the object the most interesting."
FOOTNOTES:
[34] "The commissaries, greatly in debt, had neither money nor credit, and starvation began to stare the soldiers in the face. To support his army, Washington was again obliged to resort to the harsh expedient of levying contributions on the surrounding country. Each county was called upon for a certain quantity of flour and meat; but as the civil authorities took the matter of supply in hand, for which certificates were given by the commissaries on the appraisement of two magistrates, the use of force did not become necessary." (Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xi., p. 301.)
[35] "Washington's entire force scarcely exceeded ten thousand men, a number not equal to the (British) garrison of New York; and even of these a considerable number were militia drafts, whose terms of service were fast expiring."—Ib., p. 303.