"No organized American force was now left in either of the Carolinas. The three most Southern States had not a battalion in the field, nor were the next three much better provided. The Virginia line had been mostly captured at Charleston, or dispersed in subsequent engagements. The same was the case with the North Carolina regiments. The recent battle of Camden had reduced the Maryland line to a single regiment—the Delaware line to a single company." (Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xi., p. 316.)
[41] "On the 22nd of May, confiscation of property and other punishments were denounced against all who should thereafter oppose the King in arms, or hinder any one from joining his forces. On the 1st of June, a proclamation by the Commissioners Clinton and Arbuthnot, offered pardon to the penitent on their immediate return to allegiance; to the loyal, the promise of their former political immunities, including freedom from taxation, except by their own Legislature. This policy of moderation might have familiarized the Carolinians once more to the British Government; but the proclamation was not communicated to Cornwallis—so that when, three weeks later, two leading men, one of whom had been in a high station, and both principally concerned in the rebellion, went to that officer to surrender themselves under its provisions, he could only answer that he had no knowledge of its existence.
"On the 3rd of June (the day of his departure from Charleston), Clinton, by a proclamation which he alone signed, cut up British authority in Carolina by the roots. He required all the inhabitants of the province, even those outside of Charleston, 'who were now prisoners on parole,' to take an active part in securing the royal government. 'Should they neglect to return to their allegiance,' so ran the proclamation, 'they will be treated as rebels to the government of the King.' He never reflected that many who accepted protection from fear or convenience, did so in the expectation of living in a state of neutrality, and that they might say, 'If we must fight, let us fight on the side of our friends, of our countrymen of America.'" (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., pp. 307, 308.)
[42] "Earl (afterwards Marquis) Cornwallis was born in 1738. Early in life he had embraced the military profession, which he pursued with undeviating honour, though variable success. In him the want of any shining talents was in a great measure supplied by probity, by punctuality, by steady courage, by vigilant attention to his duties. In 1776, on the Declaratory Bill, he had shown his conciliatory temper to the colonies; denying, with Lord Camden and only three Peers besides, any right we had to tax them while they remained unrepresented in the House of Commons. When, however, the war broke forth, he acted solely as became a soldier. Under Lord Cornwallis was now serving a young officer of no common spirit and daring, destined, like himself, to attain, at another period, the highest office that an Englishman out of England can fill—the office of Governor-General of India. This was Francis Lord Rawdon, subsequently better known, first as Earl of Moira, and then as Marquis of Hastings. In the ensuing battle of Camden, where he held a second rank, he played a distinguished part; he was not yet twenty-six years of age, and he had already gained renown five years before, in the battle of Bunker's Hill." (Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxii., p. 71.)
[43] Tucker's History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap. iii., p. 254.
"There was no longer any armed American force in South Carolina; and Lord Cornwallis resorted to energetic means of preventing disaffection. All those who were found in arms after they had submitted to British protection were considered as having forfeited their lives, and several of them were hung on the spot. But these severities, instead of their intended effect, produced a strong reaction."—Ib., p. 256.
[44] Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxii., pp. 75, 76.
[45] "While the war raged in South Carolina, the campaign of 1780, in the Northern States, was barren of important events. The campaign of 1780 passed away in the Northern States, as has been related, in successive disappointments and reiterated distresses. The country was exhausted; the continental currency expiring. The army, for want of subsistence, was kept inactive and brooding over its calamities. While these disasters were openly menacing the ruin of the American cause, treachery was silently undermining it. A distinguished officer (General Arnold) engaged, for a stipulated sum of money, to betray into the hands of the British an important post committed to his care," etc. (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxiv., pp. 364-377.)
[46] "Congress could do nothing, and confessed that it could do nothing. 'We have required,' thus they wrote to the States on the 15th of January, 1781, 'aids of men, provisions and money; the States alone have authority to execute.' Since Congress itself made a public confession of its powerlessness, nothing remained but to appeal to France for rescue, not from a foreign enemy, but from the evils consequent on its own want of government. 'If France lends not a speedy aid,' wrote General Greene from the South to her Minister in Philadelphia, 'I fear the country will be for ever lost.' It was therefore resolved for the moment to despatch to Versailles, as a special minister, one who had lived in the midst of the ever-increasing distresses of the army, to set them before the Government of France in the most striking light. The choice fell on the younger Laurens, of South Carolina. To this agent Washington confided a statement of the condition of the country; and with dignity and candour avowed that it had reached a crisis out of which it could not rise by its own unassisted strength. To Franklin he wrote in the same strain; and La Fayette addressed a like memorial of ripe wisdom to Vergennes" (the French Minister for Foreign Affairs). (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap., xix., pp. 417, 418.)
"Scarce any one of the States had as yet sent an eighth part of its quota into the field; and there was no prospect of a glorious offensive campaign, unless their generous allies should help them with money, and with a fleet strong enough to secure the superiority at sea."—Ib., p. 425.