Several other members spoke to the same effect. The treaty recognizing the Independence of America could not be reversed, as an Act passed the previous session had expressly authorized the King and his Cabinet to make it; but it was denied that a treaty sacrificing the Loyalists and making the concessions involved had been authorized; in consequence of which an express vote of censure was passed by the Commons by a majority of seventeen. The Earl of Shelburne, the Prime Minister, forthwith resigned in consequence of this vote of censure, and it was nearly three months before a new Administration could be formed; and during this administrative interregnum affairs were in great confusion.
In the House of Lords, Lord Walsingham said that "he could neither think nor speak of the dishonour of leaving these deserving people to their fate with patience." Lord Viscount Townsend considered that "to desert men who had constantly adhered to loyalty and attachment, was a circumstance of such cruelty as had never before been heard of." Lord Stormont said that "Britain was bound in justice and honour, gratitude and affection, and by every tie, to provide for and protect them." Lord Sackville regarded "the abandonment of the Loyalists as a thing of so atrocious a kind, that if it had not been painted in all its horrid colours he should have attempted the ungracious task but never should have been able to describe the cruelty in language as strong and expressive as were his feelings;" and again, that "peace on the sacrifice of these unhappy subjects must be answered in the sight of God and man." Lord Loughborough said that "the fifth Article of the treaty had excited a general and just indignation, and that neither in ancient nor modern history had there been so shameful a desertion of men who had sacrificed all to their duty and to their reliance on British faith."
In reply, Lord Shelburne, the Prime Minister, frankly admitted that the Loyalists were left without better provision being made for them "from the unhappy necessity of public affairs, which induced the extremity of submitting the fate of their property to the discretion of their enemies;" and he continued: "I have but one answer to give the House—it is the answer I gave my own bleeding heart—a part must be wounded, that the whole of the empire may not perish. If better terms could be had, think you, my lords, that I would not have embraced them? I had but the alternative either to accept the terms proposed or continue the war." The Lord Chancellor held that the stipulations of the treaty were "specific," and said: "My own conscious honour will not allow me to doubt the good faith of others, and my good wishes to the Loyalists will not let me indiscreetly doubt the disposition of Congress, since the understanding is that all these unhappy men shall be provided for; yet, if it were not so, Parliament could take cognizance of their case, and impart to each suffering individual that relief which reason, perhaps policy, certainly virtue and religion, required."
Such were the sentiments of members in both Houses of Parliament, and of both parties, as to the character and merits of the Loyalists. But there were no prospects of the States compensating them for their losses. Indeed, this idea was entertained by Lord Shelburne himself, and that compensation would have to be made to the Loyalists by Parliament when, in the speech above quoted, he said that "without one drop of blood spilt, and without one-fifth of the expense of one year's campaign, happiness and ease can be given to them in as ample a manner as these blessings were ever in their enjoyment." This was certainly a very low and mercenary view of the subject. It was one thing for the Loyalists to have their rights as British subjects maintained while they were obeying the commands of the King and maintaining their allegiance to the empire, and another thing for them to become pensioners upon the bounty of the British Parliament, to be paid in pounds, shillings, and pence for the rights and privileges which should have been secured to them by national treaty as British subjects. The House of Commons had adopted a resolution against continuing the American war for the purpose of enforcing the submission of the colonies; but it had not resolved against continuing the war to protect the rights and property of British subjects in the colonies. A campaign for this purpose, on the refusal of the American Commissioners to recognize what was sanctioned by the laws and usages of nations, would have been honourable to the British Government, would have been popular in England, and would have divided America; for there were many thousand "Whigs" in America, who believed in the equity of treating the Loyalists after the war as all others were treated who conformed to the laws, as has been the case in Holland, Ireland, and Spain. England was then mistress of the seas, held New York, Charleston, Rhode Island, Penobscot, and other military posts, and could soon have induced the Americans to do what their Peace Commissioners at Paris had refused to do—place British subjects in America upon the same footing as to property that they possessed before the war, and that they possess in the United States at this day. England could have easily and successfully refused granting to the United States a foot of land beyond the limits of the thirteen colonies, and thus have secured those vast western territories now constituting the larger part of the United States, and retained the garrisons of New York, Rhode Island, and Charleston as guarantees until the stipulated conditions in regard to the Loyalists should be fulfilled. A joint Commission in America could have settled upon equitable grounds all disputed claims in much less time than the six years occupied by a Parliamentary Commission in examining into and deciding upon the individual claims of Loyalist claimants. If the war to reduce the colonies to absolute submission had been unpopular in England, the peace upon the terms submitted to by the English Commissioners and the Ministry was equally unpopular. If England had been wrong in its war of coercion against the revolting colonists, was she not equally wrong, and more than wrong, in abandoning to their enemies those who had abided faithful to her laws and commands? The language of the speeches of members of both Houses of Parliament, above quoted, is as just as it is severe; although much could be and was said in justification of the policy of the Government in promoting peace upon almost any terms, seeing that England was at war with the three most powerful naval nations of Europe, besides that in America.
The fallacy of the argument employed by the advocates of the treaty, that the Americans would honourably fulfil the recommendations of Congress, was illustrated by the following facts:
"The province of Virginia, a short time before the peace, had come to an unanimous conclusion 'that all demands or requests of the British Court for the restoration of property confiscated by the State were wholly impossible; and that their delegates should be instructed to move Congress that they should direct the deputies for adjusting peace not to agree to any such restitution.'"
The State of New York resolved, "That it appears to this Legislature that divers of the inhabitants of this State have continued to adhere to the King of Great Britain, after these States were declared free and independent, and persevered in aiding the said king, his fleets and armies, to subjugate the United States to bondage: Resolved, That as on the one hand the scales of justice do not require, so on the other the public tranquillity will not permit, that such adherents who have been attainted should be restored to the rights of citizens, and that there can be no reason for restoring property which has been confiscated or forfeited."
PART II.
AGENTS OF LOYALISTS—PROCEEDINGS OF PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION—RESULTS.
Of course all hope of obtaining relief under the stipulations of the treaty was abandoned by the Loyalists, who "now applied to the Government which they had ruined themselves to serve, and many of them, who had hitherto been 'refugees' in different parts of America, went to England to state and recover payment for their losses. They organized an agency, and appointed a Committee composed of one delegate or agent from each of the thirteen States,[124] to enlighten the British public, and adopt measures of proceeding in securing the attention and action of the British Ministry in their behalf. In a tract printed by order of these agents (which now lies before us, entitled The Case and Claim of American Loyalists impartially Stated and Considered, published in 1783), it is maintained that 'it is an established rule, that all sacrifices made by individuals for the benefit and accommodation of others shall be equally sustained by all those who partake of it,' and numerous cases are cited from Puffendorf, Burlamaqui and Vattel, to show that the 'sacrifices' of the Loyalists were embraced in this principle. As a further ground of claim, it is stated that in case of territory alienated or ceded away by one sovereign power to another, the rule is still applicable; for that in the treaties of international law it is held, 'The State ought to indemnify the subject for the loss he has sustained beyond his proportion.' And in the course pursued at the close of the civil war in Spain, when the States of Holland obtained their independence, under the Treaty of Utrecht, and at various other periods, proved that the rights of persons similarly situated had been respected and held inviolate. The conclusion arrived at from the precedents in history, and diplomacy, and in the statute-books of the realm, is, that as the Loyalists were as 'perfectly subjects of the British State as any man in London or Middlesex, they were entitled to the same protection and relief.' The claimants had been 'called by their sovereign, when surrounded by tumult and rebellion, to defend the supreme rights of the nation, and to assist in suppressing a rebellion which aimed at their destruction. They have received from the highest authority the most solemn assurances of protection, and even reward, for their meritorious services;' and that 'His Majesty and the two Houses of Parliament having thought it necessary, as the price of peace, or to the interest and safety of the empire, or from some other motive of public convenience, to ratify the Independence of America, without securing any restitution whatever to the Loyalists, they conceive that the nation is bound, as well by the fundamental laws of society as by the invariable and external principles of natural justice, to make them compensation.'"[125]