The first was the final change of tactics on the part of the leaders of the Church of England party in the contest. The second was the persistent and personal efforts which Lieutenant Governor Arthur put forth in behalf of that party, so as to enable them to accomplish their object, and, at the same time, to counteract the efforts of those who were seeking to uphold Canadian and popular rights. The third was (as shown in the last chapter) the plan adopted to foment discord in the Methodist body—which was by far the most formidable opponent of the scheme of monopoly and aggrandisement which the ruling party was seeking to promote.

At this distance of time it is easy to survey the whole field of conflict, and to note the plans and strategies of the combatants. Although efforts had hitherto been made to shift the battle-ground from Upper Canada to England, yet, as the Colonial Secretary had discouraged such efforts as unwise, and as an unnecessary interference with the rights of the Provincial Legislature, the matter was not openly pressed in 1839. Nor was it pressed at all to a conclusion in 1838. For, by a singular coincidence, the very day (29th December, 1837) on which Mr. Cartwright had moved to bring a bill into the House of Assembly to revest the clergy reserve in Her Majesty, Sir George Grey penned a despatch to Sir George Arthur, in which he disclaimed, on behalf of the Imperial Government, any wish or intention to interfere, in the settlement of the clergy reserve question, with the functions of the Provincial Legislature, on the ground that—

Such interference would tend to create a not unreasonable suspicion of the sincerity with which the Legislature have been invited to the exercise of the power [to vary or repeal] reserved to them on this subject by the Constitutional Act of 1791.

It is likely that the publication of this despatch prevented the House of Assembly from proceeding any farther with Mr. Cartwright's bill, than ordering it to a second reading on the 26th February, 1838. In this dilemma the ruling party were evidently at a loss how to act. It required much tact and skill to break the ranks of the chief forces arrayed against the scheme to revest the reserves in the Crown—a scheme distasteful to Canadians generally, and subversive of the legislative independence of Upper Canada. Two methods were therefore adopted: The first was to divide the Methodists (as shown in the last chapter). The second and more astute one was to appeal to the professed loyalty of that class which hitherto had been held up to scorn as disloyal, and denounced as republican in its tendencies, as well as seditious in their conduct. The appeal was varied in form, but it was in substance that as those who made it were not themselves afraid to trust their interests in the hands of the Sovereign, their opponents should be equally trustful in the equal and entire justice which would be meted out to all of her Canadian subjects.[104] This appeal, from its very speciousness, and the skill with which it was pressed, had its effect in many cases. But, as a general rule, it failed. The object of the decisive change of tactics was too transparent to deceive the more sensible and thoughtful men to whom the appeal was addressed.

The two other methods adopted (already referred to) were only partially successful; but the three combined, no doubt, strengthened the hands of the advocates of the scheme for the re-investment of the reserves in the Crown. They, however, ceased to press the matter upon public attention, being determined to bide their time, and (as events proved), to carry their point in another and more skilful way.

In the meantime, and early in 1839, Dr. Ryerson was deputed by several important circuits to present loyal addresses to Sir George Arthur. This he did on the 2nd February; and in enclosing them to the Governor's secretary, used language which sounds strange in these days of religious equality. He said:

I feel myself fully authorized, by various communications and my official position, to assure His Excellency that the members of the Wesleyan Methodist Church will not be contented with subordinate civil standing to any other church, any more than the members of the Church of Scotland. They do not, and never have asked for any peculiar advantages; but they feel that upon the principles of justice, by labours, by usefulness, by character, by numbers, and by the principles laid down in royal despatches, they are entitled, in the eye of the law, and in the administration of an impartial government, to equal consideration, and equal advantages with any other church. I am confident that I but state a simple fact, when I express our belief that the Methodist Church, in its doctrines, ministry, and institutions, furnishes as formidable a barrier against the irreligion and infidelity of the times as any other section of Protestantism. Nor is it possible for us—notwithstanding our unfeigned respect for His Excellency—to feel ourselves under any obligations to tender our support to another section of the Protestant Church, whose clergy, in this Province, collectively, officially, and individually (with solitary exceptions), have resisted the attainment of every civil and religious privilege we now enjoy—have twice impeached our character and principles before the Imperial Government—who deny the legitimacy of our ministry, who, in their doctrines respecting Church polity, and several points of faith, do not represent the doctrines of the Church of England, or of the established clergy in England as a body, but that section only of the established clergy that have associated with all arbitrary measures of government against various classes of Protestant non-conformists which have darkened the page of British history, and also the dark ages, notions of rites and ceremonies, and the conductor of whose official organ in this Province has recently represented the Methodist ministry as the guilty cause of those divine chastisements under the influence of which our land droops and mourns. I am sure my brethren, as well as myself, freely forgive the great wrongs thus perpetrated against us; but we feel ourselves equally bound in duty to ourselves, to our country, and to our common Christianity, to employ all lawful means to prevent such exclusive, repulsive, and proscriptive sentiments from acquiring anything more than equal protection in the Province.

I might appeal to circumstances within His Excellency's knowledge, to show that from 1836 to the close of the last session of our Provincial Parliament, I have spared no pains—without the remotest view to personal or even Methodistic advantage—to second, to the utmost of my humble ability, any plan to which the Province might, under all circumstances, be induced to concur, in order to settle the protracted controversy on the clergy reserve question; and that it has not been, until I have had indubitable proofs that there was no disposition or intention on the side of the Episcopal clergy to yield a single iota any further than they were compelled. It was not until all these circumstances had transpired, that we reluctantly determined to appeal against the exclusive and unjust pretensions of the Episcopal clergy, to the bar of public opinion—a power recognized by our free constitution, and which no party or administration can successfully resist many years.

The reply of the Governor was friendly and conciliatory; but in it he expresses his

Surprise to find that his appeal on a late occasion to the Wesleyan Methodists, to give the Church of England their most cordial support, had been misunderstood and construed into an expression of sectarian preference. By inviting the Methodists to such a course of conduct, His Excellency thought that he was only appealing to a feeling of attachment for the Church of England, which he had always been induced to consider—especially from personal observation—as a badge of "legitimate Wesleyan Methodists" all over the world.