You are not to suppose from these remarks that I have turned politician, or that I am intermeddling with things which do not belong to me. I have been endeavouring to attend to my appropriate work; and though continually pressed with questions, soliciting my opinions respecting passing events, I have said as little on all these matters as possible, and I am identified with no party. Indeed, the state of my health is such as to admonish me to think about other things than worldly politics, and I blush to think that I have written so much respecting them. Powerfully convincing reasoning, with truth on your side, might produce a great effect among our people; but at the present more than nine-tenths of them, in these western parts, are the supporters of the late Executive Council.
In reply to a letter from his brother John, asking his opinion on the pending dispute between Sir Charles Metcalfe and his late Councillors, Dr. Ryerson wrote on April 3rd, and said:—
Of the general measures of the late Council I cordially approve. I cannot say so of their dispute with the Governor-General. Of the policy which he or they had pursued, I have nothing to say. In that they might have been right, and he wrong. But, according to British practice, they ought to have resigned on what he had done, and not on what he would not promise to do. If the Crown intended to do just as they desired the Governor-General to do, still the promise ought not to be given, nor ought it to have been asked. The moment a man promises to do a thing he ceases to be as free as he was before he made the promise. It is essential principle that in the British Constitution that the Crown should be free—should be undefined in its prerogative. The exercise in that prerogative may be checked in various ways; but to bind it by promises is to infringe its constitutional liberty. If the Queen were to bind herself by promise, or declaration, that she would not appoint any person contrary to Sir Robert Peel's advice, how could she refuse to make O'Connell a peer, or appoint him Lord Chancellor of England if Sir Robert were to insist upon it? How could she ever get clear of Sir Robert by differing with him on a question of policy, if she were to bind herself before-hand to act according to his advice? Would it not be virtually giving the regal power into his hands?
Dr. Ryerson then proceeded to illustrate the views which he held on this subject:—
I can find examples in English History since 1688, of British Sovereigns having done just as Sir Charles Metcalfe is alleged to have done; I can also find examples of ministers resigning on account of what such Sovereigns had done; but I can find no example of any minister resigning on account of what the Sovereign would not promise to do on the subject of consultation and possible appointments.
I have seen it alleged, that the Governor-General was not bound to act upon the advice of his Council, only to ask it before he made any appointment. But the Governor-General did take the advice of the Council, in regard to the appointments of the Clerks of the Peace, both in the Bathurst and Dalhousie districts. Yet he is blamed as much for not acting upon it as if he had acted without taking it. But in Mr. Hincks' writings, and in all the papers advocating the same sentiments, I observe that it is contended that the Governor-General should act upon, as well as take, the advice of his Council. If so, what is he but their amanuensis—the recorder of their decrees?—the office which Sir Charles Bagot sustained on account of his illness; but whose example, in such circumstances, can not be laid down as a general rule.
Responsible government was a mere theory with the late Council, or until they came into office under Sir Charles Bagot. They had thought and reasoned about it, but they had never acted upon it, until then; what they learned under the government of a sick and dying man was not adapted to make them perfect practitioners. So they were about as wise and as raw in the business practically, as was Sir Charles Metcalfe, who had doubtless thought, and read, and reasoned upon the subject also. The unskilfulness of inexperience, with good intentions, seems to me to have been evinced in the whole proceeding.
Of course it was considered, on the impulse of the moment, good policy to take a stand upon the principle of responsible government, and not upon the propriety, or policy, of certain appointments. By taking the latter ground, all might be lost; by taking the former ground, all would be gained, and a great deal of glory too, in the course of a few days, or a few weeks at most. But it has turned out otherwise. The question of prerogative has been brought up—a constitutional and imperial question. As such the British Government have decided upon it.... It is now no longer a question between the late Councillors and Sir Charles Metcalfe, but between them and Her Majesty's Government. I see, therefore, nothing in prospect but a renewal of the scenes of 1837, and 1838, only on a larger scale. Whether the point contended for is worth that price, or will be even obtained at that price, is problematical. I see no alternative, unless some enlightening, healing agency interpose. I pray for the safety of our Zion and people, especially, while I implore Divine interposition in behalf of our beloved country.
I am no party man—I have never judged—I cannot judge questions according to party, but according to constitutional principles and history. On the first blush I was favourably impressed with the position and resignation of the late council; but when I came to examine their position, as I had done Hon. Mr. Draper's speech on the University question by the light of history (it being a new question), I came to the conclusions that I have stated above. I think the most general impression in the country, and perhaps amongst the members of our Church, is that which first struck my own mind; but I think it is contrary to the principles and practice of the British Constitution.
During one of his visits to Kingston, early in 1844, Dr. Ryerson called at the office of his old friend, Hon. J. H. Dunn (one of the late Councillors), who had desired to see him. Mr. Dunn was not in when he called. He therefore, on his return to Cobourg addressed him as follows:—My brother John told me that you had asked him what I thought of the late differences between the Governor-General and his Council. After all that I have read and learned, I think very much of them as I did of the differences between the late Lord Sydenham and Hon. Robert Baldwin. You then asked me (at the Lambton House) whether I approved of your remaining in office, or of Mr. Baldwin's resigning. You will recollect my reply, that I thought Mr. Baldwin ought to have waited until an actual difference arose between him and other members of the Council on some measure, or measures; and that he ought not to have resigned on account of an alleged want of confidence, or theoretical difference of opinion. So I think in the present case. After stating your views to Sir Charles Metcalfe, you ought to have waited until some act, or acts, had taken place in contravention of these views, and which act, or acts, you were not disposed to justify; or if you thought it your duty to resign, then it appears to me you should have resigned on some acts which had been performed, and which you would not justify, and on the policy involved in which you were prepared to appeal to the country. But to resign upon a conversation, and not upon specific administrative acts, appears to me to be without precedent. It has brought up the question of prerogative, the constitutional decision of which, rests of course, with the supreme tribunals of the Empire. I think Mr. Baldwin's conscientious theoretical rigidness has led to an error, praiseworthy in its motives, but not the less an error—an error which in private life would have attracted no attention, but in public life makes a great noise, and may lead to serious consequences. I could wish with all my heart that you were in your late office, which you have so long and so faithfully filled.