Just as Rimpau began to study the nature of plants before trying to realise his ideal, so also varied and profound knowledge is the first requisite for the ideal of moral conduct. It is necessary not only to know the structure and function of the human organism, but to have exact ideas on human life as it is in society. Scientific knowledge is so indispensable for moral conduct that ignorance must be placed among the most immoral acts. A mother who rears her child in defiance of good hygiene, from want of knowledge, is acting immorally towards her offspring, notwithstanding her feeling of sympathy. And this also is true of a Government which remains in ignorance of the laws which regulate human life and human society.
It must be well understood that I am not here thinking of written knowledge, set down in treatises and volumes. Rimpau and Burbank went outside manuals of botany to obtain their knowledge. Besides books, wide ideas on the practice of life are required to direct aright the conduct of men. A doctor who has just finished his studies at the hospital, notwithstanding all his knowledge, is not yet sufficiently trained to be a good practitioner. He must acquire the habit of treating patients, and for this years are required. So also is it with regard to the practical applications of the principles of morality. The regulation of conduct requires profound knowledge both theoretical and practical, and men selected to frame or to apply laws of morality must have this double qualification. If the human race come to adopt the principles of orthobiosis, a considerable change in the qualities of men of different ages will follow. Old age will be postponed so much that men of from sixty to seventy years of age will retain their vigour, and will not require to ask assistance in the fashion now necessary. On the other hand, young men of twenty-one years of age will no longer be thought mature or ready to fulfil functions so difficult as taking a share in public affairs. The view which I set forth in The Nature of Man regarding the danger which comes from the present interference of young men in political affairs has since then been confirmed in the most striking fashion.
It is easily intelligible that in the new conditions such modern idols as universal suffrage, public opinion, and the referendum, in which the ignorant masses are called on to decide questions which demand varied and profound knowledge, will last no longer than the old idols. The progress of human knowledge will bring about the replacement of such institutions by others, in which applied morality will be controlled by the really competent persons. I permit myself to suppose that in these times, scientific training will be much more general than it is just now, and that it will occupy the place which it deserves in education and in life.
It is equally clear that if a mother is to act morally with regard to her child, she must teach herself properly. In place of mythology and literature, she must learn hygiene and all that relates to the rational rearing of children. So, also, in the education of men, the study of the exact sciences must occupy by far the most important place. Then only will moral conduct and scientific knowledge begin to unite. An ignorant mother will bring up a child very badly notwithstanding all her good will and her affection. A doctor, however imbued with strong sympathy for his patients, could do them much harm if he had not the appropriate knowledge. Are not politicians open to the reproach from the point of view of morality that very often through ignorance they do the very worst evil in public administration? With the progress of knowledge, moral conduct and useful conduct will become more and more closely identified.
I have been reproached because in my system the health of the body occupies too large a place. It cannot be otherwise, because health certainly plays the chief part in existence. Notwithstanding his pessimism, Schopenhauer was convinced that health was the greatest treasure, a treasure before which everything else yielded. In many religions care of the health is laid down amongst the chief duties. Although many scientific men do not hold the opinion that circumcision was ordained for hygienic reasons, it is certain that hygiene was extremely important in the Jewish religion. It is only in Christianity, which despises the human body, that hygiene is excluded from the religious code, as in the words of Jesus:-
“Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment?” (Matt. vi., 25). As for long ages hygiene was very imperfectly known, it is not surprising that it played a small part in human affairs. Probably the objection to the importance that I assign to it in orthobiosis is a relic from the old order of things. Now, however, the situation is different. Bacteriology has placed hygiene on a scientific foundation, so that the latter is now one of the exact sciences. It has now become necessary to give it the chief place in applied morality as it is the branch of knowledge that teaches how men ought to live.
It has been objected that I have left no place for altruism in my system.[231] Certainly I have tried to find an egoistic basis for moral conduct, as I have shown above. I think, however, that the wish to live according to the ideal of orthobiosis and to make others live a normal life would be a powerful agency in improving social life, in preventing mutual damage, and promoting mutual help. Such a motive, within the reach of persons whose altruistic feelings are not specially strong, must largely extend moral conduct amongst human beings, and even although in future such manifestations of high morality as the sacrifice of life and health will become wholly or nearly wholly useless, I think that for the present there is still room for altruism. The practical application of scientific knowledge already gained admits much self-denial and good feeling. Struggle against prejudices of all kinds and the development and diffusion of sound ideas require a conduct very highly altruistic.
The fears of my opponents are still less justified when we reflect that the feelings of sympathy and of cohesion must play a large part in the business of helping the evolution of man towards the goal of normal life.
Although our actual knowledge already provides a basis of rational morality, it may be admitted that in the future, if science continues its forward march, the rules of moral conduct will become still more improved. There will be no ground for reproaching me for a blind faith in the all-powerfulness of science. Much more trust can be given to one who has faithfully carried out his promises, than to one who has promised much and fulfilled nothing. Science has already justified the hopes which have been placed in it. It has saved people from the most terrible diseases, and has made life much easier. On the other hand, religions, which demand an uncritical faith as the means of curing the ills which afflict humanity, have not fulfilled their promises.
The reproach that I preach blind faith in the progress of science, destined to replace religious faith, is unjust, because my faith depends on a confidence that science has already deserved. Equally unjust is the reproach that I have built my system on a partly metaphysical principle. According to M. Parodi,[232] the hypothesis of physiological old age and of natural death seem to “involve the idea of a natural duration of human life, which, however, from accidental reasons man does not complete at present. M. Metchnikoff repeatedly uses the expression ‘normal cycle.’ Now do we not see here the surreptitious repetition of the old teleological conception of nature, although at first he so energetically disavowed it? It is the belief that the species is a necessary reality, corresponding to a definite type of its own, in fact a special design of nature; that nature, to guide herself, had an ideal which circumstances could mistake or degrade, but which had to be restored to its perfect form? Otherwise, why does he insist that there must be a condition of perfect and stable equilibrium between individual and environment? that there is a normal cycle and that it must be possible to harmonise the disharmonies?”