For a short time it seemed as if all would go well, but the Tunganis who had surrendered decided on a final bid for power at Yarkand and treacherously attacked Yakub Beg. Buzurg Khan, too, at this juncture deserted his general, whose position appeared desperate; but again Yakub Beg’s remarkable courage saved the situation. He imposed his will on the Tunganis by attacking and capturing Yarkand; then, marching on Kashgar, he defeated Buzurg Khan, who had declared him a rebel. As a sequel to this victory Buzurg Khan was deposed and finally expelled, and Yakub Beg assumed the powers of his master. His position was recognized by the Amir of Bokhara, who in 1866 conferred upon him the title of Atalik Ghazi or the “Champion Father”; but, on the other hand, he had to reckon with the constant jealousy and hostility of neighbouring Khokand, which was continually inflamed by Russia. The capture of Khotan, which followed in 1867, ended his first successful period of action, during which, in spite of inadequate means, he had accomplished much.
While Yakub Beg was establishing his power in Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan, his chances of success were being increased by events in the districts to the north of the range. The Taiping rebellion, which raged from 1850 to 1864, had laid waste the richest provinces of China. In 1855, apart from this convulsion, a fierce Moslem insurrection broke out in Yunnan; and in 1862 there was a rebellion among the Moslems of Shensi and Kansu, which gradually spread across the desert to the Ili province, where the Tarantchis combined with the Tunganis against the Chinese authorities. This rebellion was successful, and Ili was seized in January 1866, when a Tungani-Tarantchi Government was formed, which remained in power until the occupation of the province by Russia in 1871.
We now turn to Yakub Beg’s campaigns to the east of Kashgar. The Tunganis and Khojas of Aksu were not supported to any material extent from Ili, and he therefore had mainly to deal with an already defeated force when he commenced operations in 1867. Aksu, although naturally a strong position, offered but slight resistance, and the Atalik marched on to Kucha, which he also captured. After receiving the submission of Karashahr, Turfan, Hami, and Urumchi he returned in triumph to Kashgar. He subsequently annexed the upland district of Sarikol, carrying off its inhabitants and filling their place with Yarkandis and Kirghiz.
It is probable that Yakub Beg was induced to resume operations against the Tunganis as much by the difficulty of feeding and paying his army as by ambition. In the autumn of 1869 he passed farther east to Korla, which fell, and the series of campaigns was continued, generally with success, until 1873, the Kashgar troops penetrating as far east as Chightam, a small town to the east of Turfan. Little regard was paid to the wretched inhabitants, who were plundered without mercy and sometimes massacred, in accordance with the usual practice in Central Asia. The Atalik thus achieved military success, but he failed to organize his conquests against the day when the slow-moving Chinese Government should attempt to regain its lost provinces. On the other hand, he probably could not control his troops, who would have deserted had looting been forbidden. In any case his constant military successes produced a great impression in the neighbouring states and spread his fame far and wide.
Yakub Beg’s power was based on a mercenary force which was remarkable for its heterogeneous composition. Just as his palace, which was built and organized on the lines of barracks, was full of cannon of every description, ranging from ancient Chinese pieces to modern artillery, so his army included men from every neighbouring province. The most trustworthy and efficient soldiers were Khokandis, who, being strangers in the land, would naturally be loyal to their chief and fellow-countryman, whereas the local peasantry made indifferent fighters. An element numerically important, but for the most part of untrustworthy quality, was the Tunganis, who served mainly from fear. There were also a number of Indian and Afghan adventurers, some of the former being deserters from the Indian army. The Chinese troops were never used for distant campaigns.
The men above mentioned, who constituted the regular troops, were divided into mounted infantry, artillery and infantry, the force being increased by levies of Kirghiz, Dulanis and other irregulars of doubtful military value. It is now believed that Yakub Beg had never more than 20,000 trustworthy men in his service, although exaggerated accounts of his strength were generally credited. His troops, owing to his somewhat remarkable personality and many victories, were of better fighting value than those of Khokand and Bokhara; but, as the event proved, they were unable to cope with Chinese troops trained on European lines, nor would they have withstood equal numbers of Russian troops.
His government was based on the Moslem law, and was very onerous. It must be recollected that he maintained a court and a large army, mainly at the expense of perhaps a million poverty-stricken peasants, who, in addition to paying the heavy taxes of nominally one-tenth of all produce, were ground down by the unjust tax-collectors until their condition was pitiable. Moreover, he kept a huge body of town police and also a large force of secret police, whose united activities must have added considerably to the general misery. The fact that he was a strong ruler implied the imposition of heavier burdens on his unhappy subjects. Moreover, during the period of his rule, trade with China entirely ceased, to the great loss of the merchants, who had but little commercial intercourse with Russia or India.
The relations of Yakub Beg with Russia were of primary importance to him until the Celestial army re-entered Chinese Turkestan, and it is consequently desirable to summarize them briefly. The Atalik’s defence of Ak Masjid and his action before Tashkent have already been mentioned and were not forgotten by the Russians, who in 1866 dismembered Khokand and defeated Bokhara. The establishment of his power at Kashgar caused the Russians much anxiety, and their frontier officials were at first instructed not to recognize Yakub Beg, but, at the same time, to be conciliatory, in the illusive hope that this line of action would induce the Atalik to make overtures.
In pursuance of this fatuous policy the Russians requested sanction to bridge the river Narin and to construct a road to Kashgar; but, needless to say, these concessions were categorically refused. By way of marking their displeasure the Muscovites began to construct a strong fort at Narin; but their hands were tied by attempts on the part of the Central Asian Khanates to throw off their hated domination. Yakub Beg, openly at any rate, preserved neutrality, and for five years the struggle continued, with the result that the Russian yoke was riveted more firmly than before on Khokand and Bokhara. To these preoccupations the Atalik probably owed his safety for the time being, as the construction of Fort Narin was avowedly intended as a preliminary to an attack on Kashgar, and it appears that an expedition destined for that task in 1870 was at the last hour diverted against Khokand, which unexpectedly revolted.
Later on the Russian authorities exchanged their somewhat menacing policy for one of peaceful penetration and attempted to gain an entry into Chinese Turkestan through their merchants. They also sent a young officer to discuss various questions with Yakub Beg, who in turn despatched one of his nephews to Russia. As, however, his envoy was accorded no official recognition, little progress was made in developing relations, and the Atalik maintained towards his formidable rival an uncompromising attitude, which convinced the Russians that his power was much greater than was actually the case.