This attempt, like all others, failed to reach the railroad, and served only to inspire Walker and other commanders along its line to increased watchfulness. Thus closed the spring campaign on the coast of South Carolina.
An event occurred in Charleston harbor on the morning of May 13th which, no doubt, determined the movement of a large force against the Confederate position on James island. This was the abduction of the steamer Planter by a portion of the crew, who took the steamer out of the harbor and turned her over to the Federal fleet. The Planter was a swift, light-draught vessel, employed in transporting ordnance and stores to the forts and batteries of the harbor and the vicinity. She had a white captain, mate and engineer, and a crew of eight intelligent negroes. The day before her abduction she had been loaded at Southern wharf with heavy ordnance for the Middle Ground battery in the harbor, consisting of a banded rifle 42, an 8-inch columbiad, an 8-inch howitzer, and a 32-pounder. She carried for her own defense a 32-pounder and a 24-pounder howitzer. The captain, mate and engineer, contrary to written orders, were in the city, when four of the crew, under the leadership of one of their number, Jacob Small, fired up and boldly ran out of the harbor before daylight, the Planter being taken for a guard boat by the forts and allowed to pass. The crew were well-informed men and thoroughly acquainted with the situation around Charleston, and especially with the recent removal of the guns from the Georgetown defenses and from Cole's island, at the mouth of Stono river.
All this information was, of course, carried to the Federal commanders. Great excitement followed in the city, and all the troops and posts were ordered to be ready for attack, especially by way of the land. The abandonment of Fort Palmetto at the mouth of the Stono left the way open to the Federal fleet to enter that river, and to General Hunter to land a large force on James island. Following the plan which he had adopted after the fall of Port Royal harbor, General Pemberton gave up the defense of the sea islands and the harbor of Georgetown, and made the Charleston & Savannah railroad his main line south of Charleston, drawing in the defenses on James island to a line running across the island from Secessionville on its left to Fort Pemberton, on the Stono, on its right.
This policy was unpopular with the governor, the military generally and the people, and made General Pemberton, an honest and patriotic soldier, both unpopular and mistrusted. The idea was abroad that he did not mean to defend the city to the last; that he was not confident of success, and that he was not equal to the emergency. These sentiments were freely communicated to General Lee and to President Davis by the governor and by prominent citizens of the State. General Ripley, who commanded the harbor defenses and the forces on James island, regarded the abandonment of Fort Palmetto as a fatal mistake, and at his request, he was ordered to join General Lee in front of Richmond. General Ripley had shown great energy and unusual ability as an artillery officer, and possessed the full confidence of the military and the people. He had made the Palmetto a strong battery and had put in command an accomplished officer, Maj. J. J. Lucas, with his artillery battalion supported by infantry. Cole's island, on which Fort Palmetto was situated, was surrounded by creeks and marshes, and the causeway in its rear ran along the river to Battery island, and thence by causeway to James island. Battery island was immediately on the river and was also strongly fortified. General Pemberton was satisfied that the Federal boats could run by both forts, and with their superior guns command the approach from James island so effectually as to make it impossible to send relief to either point. In this view of the situation he was fortified by the judgment of General Lee. Possessing the courage of his military convictions, the heavy guns from both positions were removed early in May, and by General Ripley's order were put in position at Elliott's cut and on the lines east of James Island creek. Cole's island was occupied by a battalion of the Twenty-fourth South Carolina volunteer infantry, in observation, under Lieut.-Col. Ellison Capers, with instructions to prevent barges or small boats entering the Stono, or landing detachments on either Cole's or Battery island.
How far Major-General Pemberton communicated his views respecting the immediate defense of Charleston to his subordinates or to Governor Pickens, is not known, but to General Lee he wrote, on May 21st, after the gunboats had entered the Stono and anchored off Battery island, that he favored the abandonment of Forts Sumter and Moultrie and the defense of Charleston from the city itself. This remarkable judgment was expressed to General Lee in an official letter dated at Charleston, May 21, 1862, addressed to Col. A. L. Long, military secretary. The following are extracts:
I don't suppose there is any immediate intention of attacking Charleston.... Our land defenses on James island, however, are very strong. The battery constructed at Elliott's cut, on Stono river (not yet entirely completed), mounts only eight guns. I desire to make it twenty, but under present arrangements cannot effect it. [This battery, gradually strengthened, became a splendid fort, and as its history will show, did gallant service against repeated attacks. It was named Fort Pemberton, in honor of the major-general commanding.] I do not regard Charleston as strong. What under the old system of warfare was our strength, is now our great weakness. The many approaches by water and the recent proof of the practicability of their gunboats passing our batteries [Port Royal] have made the defense of this city a very difficult problem to solve. To obstruct 2,000 yards of channel (and this with relation to the forts, Sumter and Moultrie, is decided upon as the most feasible) looks almost like an impossibility. Every effort, however, is being made to accomplish it. I am decidedly of the opinion that the most effectual defense of the city of Charleston can and should be made from and around the city itself. I believe that when the enemy is prepared to assault the forts at the entrance of the harbor, he will do so with such force and with such appliances as will reduce it to a question of time only. Our great reliance being in these works, when they fall our means of defense will be inadequate to hold the city; but with the guns now within their walls, I am satisfied that however great might be the injury to the city itself from bombardment, his fleet could be kept from polluting its streets. This has been for some time my opinion, and I am glad to find many gentlemen of eminence and intelligence who entirely concur with me.... The forts should not only be dismounted, but destroyed. They will be of no use after the termination of this war in their present condition, for I take it, impregnable ironclad batteries must take the place of stone and mortar. I propose this subject for the serious consideration of the department.
These views of General Pemberton were certainly known to the "eminent gentlemen" who agreed in them, but they were not shared by Governor Pickens and his able council, nor by the military, nor by the citizens generally. Forts Sumter and Moultrie, garrisoned by well drilled and disciplined soldiers, commanded by accomplished and gallant officers, were the pride and hope of old Charleston, as they stood on either side of her great sea gate equipped and eager for her defense. Their history was destined to prove how well this confidence was placed.
Members of the governor's council addressed a communication to General Pemberton, which expressed the apprehensions as well as the fixed purpose of the State authorities. The members of the council proposed to the general specific interrogatories, to which they asked, in the most respectful terms, his immediate reply. He was asked: (1) If in the event of his determining, for military considerations, to retire the Confederate troops from Charleston, would he consider it an interference with his authority for the governor and council to undertake its defense? (2) Would he be willing to advise the governor and council in such an emergency? (3) Would he be willing to give any assistance in his power?
General Pemberton replied promptly, assuring the gentlemen who had addressed him the interrogations of his appreciation of the situation and of his hearty willingness to promote in any way the defense of the city, and asking that any plans for defensive works undertaken by the governor and council be submitted to him. Meanwhile he was doing all in his power to strengthen the defenses on James island and to hold his forces well in hand to be concentrated at the point of attack. General Pemberton had under his command for the defense of Charleston and on the line of the Charleston & Savannah railroad, about 20,000 effectives, and in the department of Georgia about 10,000 from which he could draw reinforcements in the event of an attack on Charleston.
General Hunter, commanding the Federal forces in South Carolina, reported an aggregate of 16,989 effectives, stationed along the coast from Tybee, Ga., to Edisto island. These troops were commanded by Brigadier-Generals Benham, Viele, Stevens, Wright and Gilmore, and were mainly concentrated on Daufuskie island, at Hilton Head and Beaufort, and on Edisto island. The Federal force was greatly overestimated by the Confederates, and it was believed that an army of at least 25,000 or 30,000 could be thrown upon James or John's island in an advance upon Charleston from that direction, while a powerful fleet of armored vessels might be expected to attack by the harbor. The Federal commander, with a similar overestimate of the Confederate forces, wrote to Washington in the latter part of April, 1862, rating General Pemberton's forces as follows: At Savannah, 30,000; at Charleston, 25,000; at Augusta, 10,000; a total of 65,000! He was doubtless better informed by the intelligent crew of the Planter, and then determined upon the occupation of James island.