We were placed in columns of regiments and lay during the night in the open field. The night before a battle is never a pleasant one, but this was peculiarly trying. Strict silence was enjoined on every man. We had three divisions, which, in all, would not sum up 20,000 men. Before us was Pope with at least the bulk of the Federal army, which, of course, was magnified by many thousands; behind us was no base, no subsistence, no reinforcement! Longstreet with three divisions was beyond Pope, and must be some time in reaching us. God, Jackson and our own hearts were our dependence.
But Longstreet was not "beyond Pope," for he had that day forced the passage of Thoroughfare gap, after a sharp conflict in which Drayton's brigade (which included the Fifteenth South Carolina) took part, and that night his command camped in the gap and west of the mountain.
Daybreak of August 29th, upon the great battle plains of Manassas, found Jackson in his well-chosen position behind the railroad cut, Longstreet descending the east slope of the gap he had won, and the forces of General Pope forming for battle in Jackson's front. The plan of the Federal commander was to attack and crush Jackson before Longstreet could reach him. The battle opened by an artillery attack in force on Jackson's right, which was promptly met. This failing to move Jackson, an equally galling fire of artillery was delivered against his left, and this also was replied to effectively. At 2 p. m. the infantry battle opened against A. P. Hill on Jackson's left, and raged until 9 o'clock at night. Hill repulsed six separate assaults, the forces against him being the commands, in whole or in part, of the Federal generals Hooker, Kearney, Sigel and Stearns.
Gregg's brigade,[D] after sleeping on their arms on Ewell's battlefield, had returned to their first position on the left at early dawn of the 29th, and were put in line on the extreme left of the army, near Catharpin run, occupying a small, rocky, wooded knoll, having a railroad excavation bending around the east and north fronts, and a cleared field on the northwest. This position was slightly in advance of the general line, and besides being on the extreme left, was considered important because of its command of the Sudley Ford road. The brigade line made an obtuse angle toward the enemy, one side nearly parallel to the railroad cut and the other along the fence of the cleared field on the northwest, and enclosed the knoll, which they were ordered to hold at all hazards. On this spot, barely large enough to hold the brigade, they stood and fought from 8 o'clock in the morning until dark.
The regiments of the brigade were posted from right to left in the following order: The Thirteenth, Col. O. E. Edwards; the First, Maj. Edward McCrady; the Twelfth, Col. Dixon Barnes; the Fourteenth, Col. Samuel McGowan; Orr's Rifles, Col. J. Foster Marshall, in reserve.
Early in the morning, the enemy's advance being reported, General Gregg sent forward McCrady to skirmish with it. The enemy lay in force in a wooded hollow in front, and McCrady's advance drew the fire of his line, front and flank. A sharp musketry contest followed and Gregg sent up the Twelfth on McCrady's left. The two regiments charged and gained ground forward, but on the right the enemy held his ground and fired on McCrady's flank. Barnes had passed on beyond, and McCrady's position was critical. Edwards, with the Thirteenth, came to his support, but met such resistance that he had to fight independently. Meanwhile Marshall, with the Rifles, had gone to Barnes' support, and those two regiments were driving victoriously forward. McCrady, fighting front and flank, was stubbornly holding his ground, and Edwards was stemming the tide against his regiment. At this juncture Gregg recalled the four regiments to the railroad position, as his orders were to act on the defensive and not to bring on a general engagement. Time was everything to Jackson, who knew his enemy was in his front with superior numbers, and he did not risk a battle until Longstreet was reported to be on his right.
The affair of the four regiments had checked the arrangements for assault in Gregg's front, and he was in solid line awaiting the next move. It soon came. Pressing on through the thick growth of bushes along Gregg's front, the attack drove in his skirmishers, and the infantry of the enemy poured in volley after volley as they advanced to the railroad. It was a close fight of infantry, across the cut, and ended in a repulse of the attack. Reinforced, he came for a second battle with Gregg, and was repulsed. A third and a fourth assault were met, and a third and fourth battle fought with the same result. Gregg's brigade had now nearly exhausted its ammunition, and most of the field officers were killed or wounded, with many most active and gallant subordinates. Now came the critical hour of Jackson's battle. Coming up the railroad cut from the left and right, and screened by its high banks and the thick brush on both sides of it, the enemy massed on Gregg's right, opposite a thick wood. In this wood were Edwards and McCrady, forming the right of Gregg, McCrady supporting Edwards. Beyond Gregg's right was the left of Thomas' Georgia brigade, quite an interval being between the two brigades.
The fifth grand assault fell on Thomas' and Gregg's right, and easily filled the wooded interval between them, flanking both Thomas and Gregg. The moment was most critical. Edwards and McCrady changed front to face the woods filled with Federal troops, and fought desperately. Barnes came up to their help, while Marshall's Rifles heroically held Gregg's left. But the right was about to be overpowered and crushed, when Gregg sent in McGowan, his only reserve. The Fourteenth rushed upon the crowded ranks of intruders in the wood, delivered their volleys at close range, and shouting, charged the mass. At the instant Thomas attacked from his side with the Forty-ninth Georgia, and the victory was gallantly won. The whole assaulting force was driven by Gregg's and Thomas' forces back across the railroad, and into the woods beyond.
Almost exhausted by such terrible work, the cartridge boxes reduced to two or three rounds, Gregg held his railroad line with a fixed determination never to yield. In this resolve he was supported by every officer and man of his brigade. When General Hill sent to ask if he could hold out, says McGowan, "he replied modestly he thought he could, adding, as if casually, that his ammunition was about expended, but he still had the bayonet." And on the bayonet the brigade was now to rely, as the most desperate assault from fresh forces in its front was about to come. The rush and noise of the advance were heard, the volleys of musketry swept over and through the thinned ranks of Gregg, and in another moment the charging lines of the enemy were mounting the banks of the railroad cut and rushing upon him. Meeting this heaviest assault of the day, and fighting, first with their last cartridges, and then with the bayonet, the men of the brigade gave slowly back. They were not driven far from their battle line, when Gregg's call for help was answered by General Hill. Branch and Field were sent in, and with portions of their brigades met and turned the tide of assault. Gregg's men were rallied by their commanders, and the Virginians, North Carolinians and South Carolinians drove back the great assault across and beyond the railroad, and again Gregg's line was formed. But the brigade, after fighting for several hours, was worn out and its last round of ammunition expended.