HAMPTON'S CAVALRY IN THE MARYLAND RAID—THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG—DEATH OF GREGG—SOUTH CAROLINIANS AT MARYE'S HILL—CAVALRY OPERATIONS.
Early in October, General Lee, from his camp at Winchester, in the Virginia valley, directed J. E. B. Stuart to take a picked force of 1,500 cavalry, cross the Potomac above Williamsport, penetrate the rear of General McClellan's army, damage his railroad communications, and gain such information of his positions, strength, etc., as this opportunity would afford. He was to return by such route as circumstances would determine. In this expedition, Hampton's brigade was in advance, and crossed at McCoy's ford by the dawn of day on October 10th. A section of Hart's South Carolina battery, and 175 picked men of the Second South Carolina cavalry, under Colonel Butler, were with Hampton. Lieutenant Phillips, Tenth Virginia, with 25 dismounted men, at the appointed moment waded the river and surprised the enemy's pickets above the ford, while Butler dashed across with his troopers and routed the guard, and in five minutes the ford was secured. Hampton's brigade leading, rode on rapidly, passing through the narrow strip of Maryland into Pennsylvania, and arrived before Chambersburg at night. Placing Hart's guns in position, the town surrendered upon demand (made through Lieut. T. C. Lee, Second South Carolina), and General Hampton moved his little brigade into it at 10 o'clock at night and established a rigid provost guard, with Capt. J. P. Macfie, Second cavalry, in command. The night was spent in Chambersburg, and on the morning of the 11th, Hampton was ordered to destroy the depot and such storehouses as contained munitions of war. This was promptly done, and as rear guard General Hampton took up his march behind Stuart's column. The march was continued through the day and night of the 11th, and the early morning of the 12th found the rear guard at Barnesville, on the Potomac, with the enemy's advance pressing.
Hampton sent part of his command and one of Hart's guns down the Poolesville road on his left, and with the other and the Second South Carolina and Phillips' legion, he defended the crossing of the wagons, led horses and the two other brigades of Stuart. This being successfully accomplished, he crossed most of his brigade under cover of one of Hart's pieces, then sent the gun over, and brought his last regiment to the Virginia shore, without losing a man or a horse. The brigade brought over 260 horses captured on the raid. General Hampton mentioned in terms of praise the conduct of his whole brigade, and especially commended the service rendered by Captain Macfie, Second South Carolina; Capt. W. H. H. Cowles, First North Carolina; Capt. T. G. Barker, adjutant-general of the brigade, and Lieutenants Hamilton and Phillips.
Early in November, the Federal army, under McClellan, was concentrated about Warrenton, Va., and General Lee had thrown Longstreet in its front, at Culpeper Court House. McClellan's plan was to move directly upon Culpeper and Gordonsville. President Lincoln thought his movements too slow and cautious, losing much time after the battle of Sharpsburg, and had written him to this effect under date of October 13th. In this letter Mr. Lincoln revealed the insight of an experienced soldier and admirable common sense, incidentally paying the Confederate army and its chief so many tributes that we quote the paragraphs: "Are you not overcautious [he asked McClellan], when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess and act upon the claim?" McClellan had called for the rebuilding of the road from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, in order to supply his army if he moved against Lee, then at Winchester. Mr. Lincoln reminded him that Lee was subsisting his army without a railroad, hauling his supplies twice the distance from Harper's Ferry to Winchester. The President rallied his general for not operating on Lee's communications and for being so anxious about his own, and said: "Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond in the next twenty-four hours?... You are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is, by the route that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his." The President was for aggressive action, and urged his general to strike at Lee directly, through the gaps in the mountains, on his communications, in any way, so he fought and beat him. "I would press closely to him; fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say 'try;' if we never 'try,' we shall never succeed.... We should not so operate as merely to drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is [at or about Winchester], we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond."
This letter, written on the 13th of October, did not have the effect of either breaking up General Lee's wagon communications, or beating him in direct battle. The first week of November found the Federal army cautiously concentrating about Warrenton, and on the 5th of November, President Lincoln issued an order relieving McClellan from command and giving the army to General Burnside. The new commander took charge on the 9th, and on the 15th began his march on the "chord," while Lee took the "arc." Burnside's plan was to "beat" Lee to Fredericksburg, cross the river on pontoons and seize the heights, and "move upon Richmond from that point."
The advance of Burnside's army reached Falmouth on the 17th. Colonel Ball, with a regiment of Virginia cavalry, a regiment of infantry and two batteries of artillery, prevented a crossing and held the city of Fredericksburg.
On the 22d, at 8 p. m., General Lee informed President Davis by telegram from Fredericksburg, that General Burnside's whole army was on the left bank of the river opposite Fredericksburg; that he was on the heights with four divisions of Longstreet's corps, Pendleton's reserve artillery, and two brigades of Stuart; that the Fifth division of Longstreet would be up on the 23d, and that he would resist an attempt to cross the river.
On the 23d, Lee ordered Jackson, in the Valley, to move east of the mountains and put his corps in position at Warrenton, or Culpeper, on the flank of Burnside, where he would be in calling distance when needed. On the 25th he again wrote Jackson, that as far as he could judge, Burnside was repairing the railroad to the Potomac, getting up supplies, and making ready for a move on Richmond. "To delay him," said General Lee, "and throw him into the winter, I have determined to resist him from the beginning. From the circumstances which surround you, if you see that no good can be obtained from a flank movement on Culpeper or Warrenton, you can march directly to this point." Accordingly, on December 1st, Jackson was in position on Longstreet's right, and General Lee's army was united.
General Burnside's army was arranged in three grand divisions—right, center and left—commanded by Generals Sumner, Hooker and Franklin. In each grand division there were six divisions, with cavalry and numerous batteries attached. According to General Burnside's report, he had in battle line in Lee's front, December 13th, an army 113,000 strong. There were four brigades of cavalry on his immediate flanks, and twenty-three batteries with Franklin's wing and nineteen with Sumner's and Hooker's. In the battle, as reported by the chief of artillery, all of Franklin's batteries were engaged on the field (116 guns), and only seven batteries of Sumner's and Hooker's. To cover the crossing of the river on the 12th, General Hunt reported 147 guns in battery along the Stafford hills.
Confronting this magnificent array of guns and infantry, Lee's army was drawn up on the hills behind Fredericksburg, "with a view to resist the enemy's advance after crossing," as General Lee expressed it. Longstreet's corps, five divisions, was the left, and Jackson's, four divisions, the right wing of Lee's army. From Longstreet's left, resting on the river at Taylor hill, to Jackson's right on the wooded height at Hamilton, the divisions stood as follows: Anderson's, McLaws', Pickett's and Hood's, of Longstreet's wing; and A. P. Hill's, of Jackson's wing. Ransom's division was in support of the guns on Marye's and Willis' hills. Behind A. P. Hill were the divisions of Early, Taliaferro and D. H. Hill in columns of division. A. P. Hill's division was in two lines, the brigades of Archer, Lane and Pender in front, and Gregg and Thomas behind them. There was a gap between Archer and Lane, and Gregg was some distance behind this gap. The woods hid the front line of A. P. Hill from its supports. Jackson had fourteen guns on his right and twenty-one on his left, posted in good positions to sweep his front and flank. Walton's and Alexander's battalions of artillery occupied the Marye's height and the hills to right and left, on which were also posted the batteries of the divisions of Anderson, Ransom and McLaws.