The hardships of defense in Wagner were certainly greater while they lasted than those endured in Sumter.... After the 17th of August, when the breaching batteries of Morris island were opened on Sumter and its demolition assured, the holding longer of the northern end of the island might appear to have been unnecessary. General Gillmore says truly: "Neither Fort Wagner nor Battery Gregg possessed any special importance as a defense against the passage of the ironclad fleet. They were simply outposts of Fort Sumter. Fort Wagner in particular was specially designed to prevent the erection of breaching batteries against that fort. It was valueless to the enemy if it failed to accomplish that end, for the fleet in entering was not obliged to go within effective range of its guns." Why, then, was it held? The answer is, General Beauregard estimated it, if no longer an outpost of Fort Sumter, as indeed an outpost of the city of Charleston. He held it long enough to enable him to gain three weeks in perfecting the defenses of James island and the inner harbor.
The following dispatches between General Gillmore and Admiral Dahlgren, sent during the period July 22d to September 2d, and read by the Confederate signal corps, will show from the enemy's point of view how the conduct of Wagner was regarded, and how her fire damaged her adversaries:
July 22d. Dahlgren: We agree that a third assault of Fort Wagner cannot be made at the present time. I have made two that were unsuccessful and do not feel authorized to risk a third just now.
Gillmore.
August 16th. Dahlgren: I shall open on Fort Sumter at daylight. Can you commence on Wagner as early as that?
Gillmore.
August 16th. Gillmore: The monitors will commence to move at six and will open soon after. If it is an object to you, I will open fire earlier, but the tide is very bad before 6 o'clock for the monitors.
Dahlgren.
August 16th. Dahlgren: If I find the fire from Wagner too hot, I will stop firing from my advanced batteries until you get the monitors into action against Wagner.
Gillmore.
August 17th. Dahlgren: What do you think of the morning's work?
Gillmore.
August 17th. Gillmore: Sumter seems greatly damaged. What do you think?
Dahlgren.
August 17th. Dahlgren: I am satisfied with the firing thus far. The gorge wall is covered with shot holes.
Gillmore.
August 19th. Dahlgren: I am now pushing my approaches to Fort Wagner, and need cover against sorties. I think I can destroy the traverse and dismount the heavy gun on the sea front of Wagner with the assistance of a powerful fire from the New Ironsides. If that big gun were out of the way, could a couple of monitors be within 400 or 500 yards of Wagner all the time, night and day? A deserter says there are at least twenty Quaker guns on the parapet of Sumter.
Gillmore.
August 19th. Gillmore: I am going in with the monitors to feel of Sumter. If the enemy's fire is heavy, please get your batteries in action.
Dahlgren.
August 21st. Dahlgren: The enemy's sharpshooters are annoying our advanced batteries seriously. Can you have it stopped?
Gillmore.
August 21st. Gillmore: I will try to do so.
Dahlgren.
August 21st. Dahlgren: The fire of Fort Wagner is very galling. Cannot your monitors keep it down?
Gillmore.
August 21st. Dahlgren: My approaches are suspended on account of the sharpshooters on Fort Wagner. Can you keep down that fire?
Gillmore.
August 21st. Gillmore: I am going in with the ironclads to Sumter, and shall open about 11:30 o'clock. Please give the necessary directions in order that I may not be fired into.
Dahlgren.
August 22d. Gillmore: I have just returned from above. The Passaic, which was some distance in advance, got ashore. It took so much time to get her off, that when I was informed of the fact I would have had but little time to make the attack before daylight, so it was unavoidably postponed for to-night.
Dahlgren.
August 22d. Dahlgren: I received your dispatch stating that your attack is postponed until to-night. I think with our batteries in operation against Sumter she cannot fire a gun at you even in the daytime, if she has any to fire, which I doubt.
Gillmore.
August 22d. Gillmore: It is not of Sumter that I am apprehensive, but of Moultrie and adjacent forts; but most all of Sumter's have been sent to Moultrie, which makes no difference in the fire. This I am inclined to endure rather than have a monitor ashore to defend or destroy, which would change the whole course of operations.
Dahlgren.
August 22d. Gillmore: Wagner is firing rapidly. I fear she will dismount some of our guns.
Turner.
August 22d. Dahlgren: Wagner is firing very rapidly. There is great danger of dismounting our guns. What can you do to stop it?
Gillmore.
August 22d. Gillmore: I will send up some monitors at once.
Dahlgren.
August 22d. Turner: Can you not keep down Wagner's fire with mortars, 30-pounders, Parrotts and sharpshooters?
Gillmore.
August 22d. Gillmore: Is the fire of the ironclads effectual in silencing the sharpshooters at Fort Wagner?
Dahlgren.
August 22d. Dahlgren: Between the gunboats and our batteries, Wagner's fire has been considerably kept under.
Gillmore.
August 22d. Dahlgren: Are you going to attack to-night?
Gillmore.
August 22d. Gillmore: Yes, if the weather will permit.
Dahlgren.
August 23d. Dahlgren: What did you ascertain as to the condition of Sumter?
Gillmore.
August 23d. Gillmore: It was so foggy that but little could be ascertained. We received a very heavy fire from Moultrie. The admiral is now asleep.
O. C. Badger.
August 23d. Badger: Did you receive any fire from Fort Sumter?
Gillmore.
August 23d. Gillmore: She fired two or three times only, when we first opened.
Badger.
August 26th. Gillmore: Would it be convenient for you to open a heavy fire on Sumter, sustaining it until nightfall?
Dahlgren.
August 26th. Dahlgren: I can open a pretty strong fire on Sumter, if you deem it necessary. One of my 8-inch guns is burst, and others are nearly expended. Do you think Sumter has any serviceable guns? My calcium lights can operate to-night on Sumter and the harbor, unless you wish otherwise, and we can arrange for investing Morris island.
Gillmore.
August 26th. Gillmore: I am going to operate on the obstructions and a portion of my men will be without cover. I do not fear heavy guns from Sumter, but wish to keep down the fire of small guns. Your fire will help me very much. I am sorry that your guns are giving out.
Dahlgren.
August 26th. Dahlgren: I shall be able, I think, to light up the waters between Fort Sumter and Cummings point, so that no small boats can approach the latter without being seen by your picket boats.
Gillmore.
August 26th. Turner: Open all the guns in the left batteries on Sumter and keep them going through the day.
Gillmore.
August 26th. Gillmore: To-night I shall need all the darkness I can get. If you light up you will ruin me. What I did want was the active fire of your batteries this afternoon on Sumter.
Dahlgren.
August 27th. Dahlgren: Can I take from your vessel another 8-inch gun and a 100-pounder? I have burst three 8-inch guns in all. We took 68 prisoners, including 2 officers, and gained 100 yards toward Wagner yesterday.
Gillmore.
August 27th. Gillmore: You can take the guns with pleasure. My attempt to pass the forts last night was frustrated by the bad weather, but chiefly by the setting in of a strong flood tide.
Dahlgren.
August 27th. Dahlgren: Can you spare me some 200-pounder shells? My supply is very low. A constant fire on Sumter is more than my guns can stand very long. I have lost three 200-pounders.
Gillmore.
August 29th. Gillmore: Much obliged. All your fire on Sumter materially lessened the great risk I incur.
Dahlgren.
August 29th. Gillmore: I will let you have either guns or projectiles, as many as you wish, if you will inform me how much you require.
Dahlgren.
September 1st. Gillmore: We have dismounted two guns on Sumter and injured one this a. m. But two remain. We are firing with great accuracy.
Lookout.
September 1st. Gillmore: I am glad the batteries are doing good execution. I hope you will give me the full benefit of your fire, as I intend to be in action to-night, if nothing prevents. I would advise great care in handling the hand grenades, as one of my men was killed and two wounded by a very ordinary accident.
Dahlgren.
September 2d. Gillmore: I think your fire on Sumter may be omitted to-day. Have just returned from above and am trying to get a little rest. I do not know what damage our fire did Sumter. My chief of staff wounded; his leg broken.
Dahlgren.
September 2d Adams: I wish to know if Sumter fired at the monitors last night while they were in action. Do not disturb the admiral if he is asleep, but please get me the information, as it will determine whether I continue firing on Sumter to-day.
Gillmore.
September 2d. Gillmore: Not to my knowledge.
[F] In his final report he said: "The formidable strength of Fort Wagner induced a modification of the plan of operations, or rather a change in the order previously determined upon. The demolition of Fort Sumter was the object in view as preliminary to the entrance of the ironclads.... To save valuable time, it was determined to attempt the demolition of Sumter from ground already in our possession, so that the ironclads could enter upon the execution of their part of the programme, ... and arrangements were at once commenced, and the necessary orders given to place the breaching guns in position. Arrangements were also made to press the siege of Fort Wagner by regular approaches."
CHAPTER XV.
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN—GALLANT SERVICE OF PERRIN'S AND KERSHAW'S BRIGADES—HAMPTON'S CAVALRY AT BRANDY STATION.
The spring had gone and summer had opened in Virginia, when, seeing no indications of aggressive movement on the part of the Federal army lying opposite him on the Rappahannock, General Lee determined to draw it from his Fredericksburg base and compel it to follow his movements or attack him in position. General Lee's plan involved the movement of his army by its left to Orange and Culpeper, the crossing of the Blue ridge into the Shenandoah valley, the crossing of the Potomac, and the march of his whole force directly on Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania.
The army of Northern Virginia was now organized in three corps, commanded by Lieutenant-Generals Longstreet, Ewell and A. P. Hill. Longstreet's division commanders were McLaws, Pickett and Hood; Ewell's, Early, Rodes and Johnson; A. P. Hill's, Anderson, Heth and Pender. Still in the division of the gallant McLaws, under Longstreet, associated with Barksdale's Mississippians and Semmes' and Wofford's Georgians, was the South Carolina brigade of Gen. J. B. Kershaw. Also in the First corps were the batteries of Capt. Hugh R. Garden (Palmetto) and Captain Bachman's German artillery, with Hood's division, and the Brooks (Rhett's) battery, Lieut. S. C. Gilbert, in Alexander's battalion of Walton's reserve artillery. Gen. Micah Jenkins' South Carolina brigade, of Pickett's division, Longstreet's corps, was detached for special duty on the Blackwater, in southeast Virginia, under Maj.-Gen. D. H. Hill. In the Third army corps (A. P. Hill's), South Carolina was represented by McGowan's brigade, Hill's light division—North Carolinians, South Carolinians and Georgians—now being commanded by Pender, and the South Carolina brigade by Col. Abner Perrin. Maj. C. W. McCreary commanded the First regiment, Capt. W. M. Hadden the First rifles, Capt. J. L. Miller the Twelfth, Lieut.-Col. B. T. Brockman the Thirteenth, and Lieut.-Col. J. N. Brown the Fourteenth. With the Third corps also was the Pee Dee artillery, Lieut. W. E. Zimmerman. In the cavalry corps of Maj.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, Brig.-Gen. Wade Hampton commanded his brigade, including the First and Second South Carolina cavalry, and Capt. J. F. Hart's South Carolina battery was part of the horse artillery under Major Beckham.