Pushing his battle forward, Hill was checked at the wooded ridge known as Seminary hill, where the First corps with artillery was strongly posted. Putting his artillery in position Heth gallantly charged the heights with his four brigades, and made so strong a battle that General Howard, with part of the Eleventh corps, reinforced the line of the First. At this juncture Ewell's two divisions came in on Hill's left, and the latter ordered Pender forward to relieve Heth. Ewell's line was at right angles to that of Hill's, and both lines now swept onward with irresistible force. Pender's advance was with Thomas' Georgians on the left of the road, and Lane, Scales and Perrin (McGowan's brigade) on the right. The combined assault of Pender and Ewell's divisions swept the hill and routed the two Federal corps, driving them through the streets, capturing 5,000 prisoners, exclusive of the wounded, several colors and 3 pieces of artillery.
Reporting the advance of Pender, General Hill said: "The rout of the enemy was complete, Perrin's brigade taking position after position of the enemy and driving him through the town of Gettysburg." This special mention by the corps commander of McGowan's veterans, under Perrin, was well deserved. Never was a brigade better handled in battle, and never did regiments respond more steadily to every order for advance in direct charge, or change of front under fire. The Fourteenth, under Lieut.-Col. J. N. Brown and Maj. Edward Croft, and the First, under Maj. C. W. McCreary, on the right of the brigade; and the Twelfth, under Col. J. L. Miller, and the Thirteenth, under Lieut.-Col. B. T. Brockman, on the left, stormed the stone fences on either side of the Lutheran college on Seminary hill and routed their foe from this strong position, capturing hundreds of prisoners, 2 field pieces and a number of caissons, and following the routed columns through the town of Gettysburg. The colors of the First South Carolina were the first Confederate standard raised in the town as Hill's troops were entering it. Late in the afternoon, when Perrin drew up his brigade for rest on the south of the town, a battery which had been driven before Perrin took position on Cemetery hill and fired the first shot from that memorable eminence at the South Carolina brigade. Colonel Perrin reported this fact, and stated that he had watched the battery on its retreat as it was pursued through the town, and saw it take position on the hill. But the loss of the brigade did not fall short of 500. Every one of the color sergeants taken into the fight was killed in front of his regiment.
Perrin was in position in front of Cemetery hill on the 2d, the Federal sharpshooters in his front on the Emmitsburg road. In the afternoon he was ordered by General Pender to push his skirmishers to the road. Capt. William T. Haskell, of the First regiment, commanding a select battalion of sharpshooters, was intrusted with this duty, and Major McCreary led the First regiment, now only about 100 strong, in Haskell's support. The gallant Haskell threw his sharpshooters against the Federal skirmishers, captured the road and drove his opponents up the slope and under their guns. While putting his men in favorable positions on the road, Haskell received a mortal wound and expired on the field. His fall was felt to be a serious loss to the whole brigade. South Carolina gave no better, purer, nobler man as a sacrifice to the cause of Southern independence at Gettysburg.
Perrin held the skirmish line Haskell had won, and on the 3d threw forward the Fourteenth to maintain it against a strong attack. His sharpshooters from the road commanded the cannoneers on the hill, and a desperate effort was made to drive them off the road. In the fight of the Fourteenth regiment to sustain the sharpshooters, Lieutenant-Colonel Brown and Major Croft were severely wounded. The skirmish line was held until the massing of artillery and infantry on the crest made it no longer tenable.
The total loss in McGowan's brigade at Gettysburg was 100 killed and 477 wounded. Including the loss on the retreat, the total was 654. Orr's Rifles, left to guard the trains, did not participate in the battle of the 1st, or the affairs of the 2d and 3d, and lost but few men. The heaviest casualties fell on the Fourteenth, two-thirds of its men being killed or wounded in the three days' engagements. Colonel Perrin mentioned particularly the conduct of the following officers: Major Croft, of the Fourteenth; Maj. I. F. Hunt, of the Thirteenth; Maj. E. F. Bookter, of the Twelfth; Capts. W. P. Shooter, T. P. Alston and A. P. Butler, of the First; Capts. James Boatwright and E. Cowan, of the Fourteenth, and Capt. Frank Clyburn, of the Twelfth.
Among the gallant dead were Lieut. A. W. Poag, of the Twelfth; Capt. W. P. Conner and Lieuts. W. C. McNinch and D. M. Leitzsey, of the Thirteenth; and Lieutenant Crooker, of the Fourteenth. Lieut. J. F. J. Caldwell, of the First, whose graphic and instructive history of the brigade has aided the writer materially, was among a host of wounded line officers.
The break of day on the 2d revealed the army of General Meade in line of battle on the heights south of Gettysburg, running north and south with the Emmitsburg road in his front. General Lee thus described his position: "The enemy occupied a strong position, with his right upon two commanding elevations adjacent to each other, one southeast (Culp's hill), and the other (Cemetery hill) immediately south of the town which lay at its base. His line extended thence upon the high ground along the Emmitsburg road, with a steep ridge in rear, which was also occupied. This ridge was difficult of ascent, particularly the two hills above mentioned as forming its northern extremity, and a third at the other end (Little Round Top) on which the enemy's left rested. Numerous stone and rail fences along the slope served to afford protection to his troops and impede our advance. In his front the ground was undulating and generally open for about three-quarters of a mile."
Immediately south of the Federal left, as described by General Lee, was a still higher hill, known as Round Top, which commanded the whole left of the Federal position, and was not occupied early on the morning of the 2d. To attack a superior force in a position so strong presented a difficult problem for solution, and gave the Confederate general serious pause. He had Ewell's corps on his left, confronting Culp's and Cemetery hills, and facing southwest and south; and Hill's corps on the right facing east. McLaws' and Hood's divisions of Longstreet's corps camped within 4 miles of the battlefield on the night of the 1st, left camp at sunrise on the 2d, and marched to the right of Hill's corps. The Third division of Longstreet's corps (Pickett's) was left to guard the trains at Chambersburg, and did not reach the vicinity of Gettysburg until the afternoon of the 2d. General Longstreet received his definite orders for position and attack about 11 o'clock, and by 3:30 p. m. McLaws was in position opposite the enemy's advanced position at the peach orchard, with Hood on his right facing the Round Tops. General Lee's order of attack directed that his right (Hood and McLaws), strongly supported by artillery, should envelop and drive in the Federal left; that simultaneously with this attack against the Federal left, the Confederate left should storm Culp's and Cemetery hills; and the Confederate center at the same time should so threaten the Federal center as to prevent reinforcements to either Federal wing. General Lee's plan of battle contemplated prompt movement, and concert of action along his entire line. If these conditions, essential to the success of the plan, had been given in its execution, the writer believes that the battle of Gettysburg would have been won by General Lee on July 2d by a victory as complete as Chancellorsville. They were not given and the plan failed.
The actual fighting of the separate assaults was gallant and heroic, and the resistance both steady and aggressive; the Federal position along his main line being unmoved by the assaults. On the Confederate right two divisions of Longstreet's corps made the advance at 4 p. m. (Hood's and McLaws'), supported by four of the five brigades of Anderson's division from the center. Hood on the extreme right, next McLaws, and then Anderson, were fighting forward and struggling to storm the last position of the Federal army on the heights, but these divisions were fighting it out without the simultaneous battle which Lee had ordered on the left.
They had carried the stone walls and numerous hills and woods, the peach orchard, the great wheat-field and rocky bluffs in their front, and were on the slopes of the Round Tops and the heights north of them, but still the battle had not opened on the left. There was not a man to reinforce Longstreet's line, and the enemy in his front was reinforced by both infantry and artillery. Hours passed (General Lee said two, General Longstreet four and Gen. Edward Johnson said it was dark) before General Ewell's left division moved to the attack on Culp's hill, which, after some time, perhaps another hour, was followed by the attack on the north face of Cemetery hill. Edward Johnson's division made the attack on Culp's hill and Early's division on Cemetery hill. The Third division of Ewell's corps (Rodes') did not attack at all. Anderson's (of Hill's corps) was the only one of the three center divisions that attacked from the center.