He selected the Federal left center as the point of attack; ordered, as on the 2d, concert of action from both wings of his army, and organized his assaulting column of 15,000 men. Stuart's cavalry had come up on his left and confronted the main body of Meade's cavalry. The situation on his extreme right was more serious than the Confederate general realized. This is evident from the reports. The Round Tops were unassailable by the force at Longstreet's command, and a division of cavalry, Farnsworth's and Merritt's brigades, was in position on the right rear, confronted by a single regiment, the First South Carolina cavalry, Bachman's South Carolina battery, and three regiments of Anderson's Georgia brigade. Anderson's regiments were at right angles to Longstreet's line, and Colonel Black's cavalry was on Anderson's right flank. Black had only about 100 men in his regiment. In Longstreet's immediate front the situation was such that there was nothing to do but stand on the defensive. He was weaker in numbers on the 3d than he was on the morning of the 2d, and his enemy was stronger by reinforcements and the occupation of the greater of the two Round Tops. If, however, the assaulting column of 15,000 could break the center, the wings of General Meade's army would be so shaken that both Longstreet and Ewell could attack with good hope of success, and Lee was fixed in his purpose.
The column of attack was made up of the divisions of Pickett and Pettigrew (Heth's), to be supported by Wilcox and the brigades of Lane and Scales under Trimble.
All the available artillery of Hill's and Longstreet's corps was put in position by Col. E. P. Alexander, and at 1 o'clock General Longstreet ordered the batteries to open. For two hours more than 200 cannon were in action across the plain against Federal and Confederate. At 3 the assaulting column moved out from cover and down toward the Emmitsburg road, which ran between the two armies, and at the point of attack was held by the Federal pickets. The Confederate batteries had ceased firing and could give no more support, for their ammunition was nearly exhausted, no supply near at hand, and it was essential to reserve the supply in the chests.
All the reports of the advance concur in the statement that the troops moved over the field and into the fire of the enemy's batteries in beautiful order. Coming under the canister fire of the batteries on the crest, the ranks began rapidly to thin and officers to fall, but the advance was steady. General Trimble, riding with his line, then 100 yards in rear of Pettigrew, said: "Notwithstanding the losses as we advanced, the men marched with the deliberation and accuracy of men on drill. I observed the same in Pettigrew's line."
The enemy's batteries were on the crest. Below them 30 or 40 yards on the slope, and running almost parallel with the crest, was a stone wall, breast high. Behind this wall lay the Federal first line. Below this line, some hundred yards, concealed in the undergrowth, lay his advance line. Beyond it, at the road, ran his picket line. Meeting the pickets, they were immediately driven in, and Garnett and Kemper marched against the advance line in the undergrowth. The resistance was slight, prisoners were made, and the attack so vigorous and dashing that the Federal line was driven in rout. But the enemy's batteries opened with redoubled activity, and the fire from the stone wall was galling. A battery on Little Round Top, enfilading the front of the stone wall, and another from Cemetery hill, plunged their shell into the ranks of Kemper and Garnett and raked the advancing line of Armistead as it moved up in support.
Garnett led his brigade forward against the stone wall and got in advance, and arrived within 50 yards, where the fire was so severe that it checked his onset and he sent back to hurry up Kemper and Armistead. Both these brigades were struggling through the withering fire, and in a few moments were abreast with Garnett. At 25 yards from the wall Garnett was shot from his horse. Kemper had fallen and Armistead had been killed, but officers and men rushed for the wall and planted their standards. The fighting at this line was desperate, and hand to hand. But the conflict was too unequal to avail the gallant survivors of Garnett and Kemper and Armistead. Of the three brigades scarcely a picket line was left to grapple with the battle array of their foe. The remnant gave up the fight and left the field. If Wilcox could have reached the wall with his gallant Alabamians, the fight might have been prolonged—it might have been successful. But to reach that stone wall Wilcox must march through the fire that shot to pieces the brigades of Kemper, Garnett and Armistead. General Wilcox says that he reached the foot of the hill; that he could not see a man whom he was sent to support; that he was subjected to such an artillery fire from front and both flanks that he went back in search of a battery; that he could find none; that returning to his brigade he regarded further advance useless and ordered a retreat.
On the left, Pettigrew and Trimble carried their battle to the Emmitsburg road and to the advanced line. Archer's brigade, on Garnett's immediate left, had 13 color-bearers shot one after another in gallant efforts to plant the colors of his five regiments on the stone wall. The direction of the Federal line was oblique to the general line of advance. Pettigrew's line was exposed longest to the front and flank fire, and at the Emmitsburg road he had suffered more severely than Pickett's brigades. When Pettigrew was yet 150 yards from the Emmitsburg road, says General Trimble, who was about that distance in his rear, "They seemed to sink into the earth from the tempest of fire poured into them." Although wounded, Pettigrew led his line across the road and against the first line, but his brigades were shattered too badly to make organized assault further. Archer's brigade on his right fought at the stone wall, as did Garnett's and Kemper's and Armistead's, and suffered a like repulse. Officers and men from the other brigades reached the wall and fought with desperate courage, and died beside it, but the division in its organization was torn asunder and shot to pieces by the time they reached and attacked the first line. Trimble's brigades were as helpless for successful assault as Pettigrew; and yet they moved on until within pistol shot of the main line. As General Trimble followed his line back to Seminary ridge, on horseback, under the increased fire of shell, grape and musketry, he reported his wonder that any one could escape wounds or death. And, indeed, but few did. The loss is reported for Garnett, Kemper, Armistead and Wilcox, but there is no report given of the particular loss of July 3d in Pettigrew's command, or Trimble's. The three brigades of Pickett lost their brigadiers, nearly every field officer, and nearly or quite 3,000 men.
With the failure of this attack, the great contest at Gettysburg was decided. While it was in progress General Stuart, on the rear of General Lee's left, was fighting a great cavalry battle with the main body of General Meade's cavalry. Stuart had the brigades of Hampton, Fitz Lee, Chambliss, W. H. F. Lee and Jenkins. In the battle much of the fighting was at close quarters and with pistol and saber as the charging lines came together. In one of these contacts General Hampton was twice severely wounded. On the day previous, his having been the first of General Stuart's brigades to reach the vicinity of Gettysburg, he was just in time to meet a cavalry force moving from Hunterstown directly against General Lee's unprotected left. After a sharp engagement General Hampton defeated this force, and drove it beyond reach. The arrival of Stuart on the 2d was a source of infinite satisfaction to the Confederate commander; indeed, if he had not come, the three divisions of General Pleasanton would have taken complete possession of General Lee's communications, and the battle of Gettysburg would have been a still greater disaster to the Southern army.
After the defeat of the assaulting column, Meade was too cautious to risk his lines against the army that had held the heights of Fredericksburg. He stood resolutely on the defensive throughout the 4th of July. On that night General Lee began his masterly retreat to the Potomac, which he crossed in the face of his enemy on the morning of the 14th. Ewell's corps forded the river at Williamsport, Generals Longstreet and Hill crossed by pontoon at Falling Waters, and by 1 p. m. of the 14th the Gettysburg campaign was over.