On July 27th Stephen D. Lee, who went to Virginia in 1861 as a South Carolina artillery officer, took command of Hood's corps, with the rank of lieutenant-general, and on the next day he was ordered to attack the Federal right, being extended southward west of the city. In this fight Manigault's brigade was again engaged. Capt. T. W. Getzen was in command of the Twenty-fourth, and after he and Captain Home were wounded, the gallant "Adjt. James O. Ferrell reported to General Manigault that all his captains were now wounded or killed, and the general ordered the adjutant himself to take command." The loss of the Twenty-fourth that day was 53. The Tenth was engaged with like gallantry, its commander, Lieut.-Col. C. Irvin Walker, falling painfully wounded. Lieuts. G. A. Jennison and W. E. Huger, of Manigault's staff, were among the wounded. The brigade made repeated assaults, and left dead and wounded within a few feet of the Federal intrenchments, but the Confederate battle was not successful.
The investment of Atlanta was actively pressed after the battles of the latter part of July to the 25th of August, 1864. During that period the Federal line was firmly established on the east, north and west of the city, and steadily pushed southwestward. On August 25th, Hood's line, west and south of Atlanta, had extended to cover East Point, on the Macon railroad, 5 miles distant from the city.
Early in August General Hood sent General Wheeler with half his cavalry force to operate on Sherman's railroad communications with Chattanooga. Satisfied of his ability to hold Atlanta and keep open his Macon communications, he was equally well satisfied that Wheeler's success would compel Sherman to assault or raise the siege and recross the Chattahoochee. But Sherman had already determined to raise the siege, to intrench one of his corps on the Chattahoochee to guard his supplies and protect that crossing, and to throw the Federal army first on the West Point and then on the Macon road, south of Atlanta. After an ineffective cavalry expedition, Sherman's movement began on the night of the 25th, and by the morning of the 28th nearly his whole army was in position on the West Point railroad, tearing up the track from East Point to Fairburn. Finishing this work of destruction on the 29th, Howard and Thomas were ordered to march on the 30th across to the Macon road and take possession of General Hood's only remaining railroad communications. Howard's destination was Jonesboro, 20 miles south of Atlanta.
Meanwhile General Hood had been uncertain as to the real character of the Federal general's movements, but supposed his main force was actually recrossing the Chattahoochee in retreat. Not until the evening of the 30th was General Hood convinced that his rear was seriously attacked. General Hardee was then ordered to march immediately with his own and Lee's corps, and to attack and drive across Flint river the force reported to be marching for Jonesboro. The head of Hardee's corps reached Jonesboro about sunrise, and the last of Lee's corps did not arrive before 1 p. m. Howard had crossed Flint river with one corps in the afternoon of the 30th, and occupied and fortified a ridge of high ground parallel with the railroad and between the river and Jonesboro. He could just as well have occupied the hamlet of Jonesboro and intrenched himself across the coveted railroad facing the city of Atlanta, for he had nothing to oppose his army but a brigade of cavalry. But he was deceived by reports that Jonesboro was occupied by a large force of infantry. Before "bedtime" of the 30th, General Howard had two corps in position, the Fifteenth east and the Sixteenth west of the river. Early on the morning of the 31st the Seventeenth corps came up, and his army of the Tennessee was ready for battle.
As the troops of Hardee and Lee arrived on the 31st, they were quickly put in line of battle facing west, and immediately confronting the Fifteenth corps, commanded by Gen. John A. Logan. Lee's corps occupied the right, the divisions of Patton Anderson (including Manigault's brigade) and Stevenson in front, and Clayton's in reserve. Hardee's corps, commanded by General Cleburne, occupied the left, the divisions of Bate (under J. C. Brown) and Cleburne (under Lowrey) in front, and Cheatham's (under General Maney, and including Gist's brigade) in reserve. General Hardee ordered the attack to begin on the extreme left by Lowrey, to be followed up from left to right, Lowrey and Brown wheeling to their right and Lee attacking directly in front. Lowrey engaged the skirmishers in his front at 3 o'clock, and Lee, hearing his fire, led his corps forward. Lee was repulsed, but Lowrey on the extreme left was brilliantly successful, driving the enemy in his front across the river. He established his line on the east bank of the river, but the attack having failed on his right, he was recalled to his original position. Patton Anderson's division was conspicuous in the attack of Lee's corps. He was severely wounded and his division suffered heavily. Persuaded of the certain advance of General Thomas, and interpreting General Howard's defensive attitude as indicative of his near approach, Hardee wisely decided not to risk another assault and also stood on the defensive.
In the attacks, right and left, the brigades of Manigault and Gist were each in the line of support to the line of attack. Gist's brigade (commanded by Lieut.-Col. James McCullough, General Gist being absent wounded) was on the extreme left of Cheatham's division, and followed Lowrey's advance; but was not actively engaged and suffered only 4 casualties. Manigault had a more exciting experience. His brigade for this engagement was assigned to Clayton's division, supporting Anderson and Stevenson. General Clayton describes the attack of the front line as wanting in dash and persistency. Ordered up on its first repulse, Manigault on his left, Holtzclaw next, and Gibson on his right, Clayton led his division with spirit. Encountering a rail fence, parallel to his advance, and the enemy's rifle-pits near it, a large part of the division halted at these obstructions to return the enemy's fire of musketry and canister which raked their ranks. To this circumstance the repulse of the division was due. "Never (says General Clayton) was a charge begun with such enthusiasm terminated with accomplishing so little."
Gibson led the brigade with the Confederate battle-flag in his grasp, and lost half his men. Manigault on the left was equally unsuccessful. This was the experience of each division in the assault with the one exception of Cleburne's, led by Lowrey. The whole attack was most unsatisfactory and disappointing. The troops went forward with spirit, but were soon discouraged and halted behind any and every obstruction to reply to the enemy's fire. This was fatal to the attack, though much determination and courage were shown by fighting from shelter, or even in the open. The corps of Hardee and Lee were physically unfit for the heroic exertion demanded of them on the 31st of August. To expect men who are worn out physically and wanting food, to carry intrenchments held by equal numbers, is unreasonable. The great Jackson failed to push his corps across White Oak swamp and join the battle at Frayser's farm, and his friend and biographer explains this unusual want of his characteristic energy by telling of his absolute physical exhaustion. However much we may deplore the disappointing results of the battle of the 31st of August, no true man, who knew the men who failed there, would charge their failure to a lack of spirit or courage.
The situation on the night of the 31st was critical. Thomas' two corps were on the railroad in the rear of Howard and in supporting distance, and Schofield, with another corps, having eluded Hood at East Point, was in supporting distance of Thomas, on the railroad at Rough and Ready. Thus Sherman had thrown his entire army (the Twentieth corps excepted) between General Hood and the two corps at Jonesboro, and was hard at work breaking up the Macon railroad. Hood was holding on to Atlanta with Stewart's corps, and the militia of Georgia, the latter under Gen. G. W. Smith. Hearing late at night of the 31st, of Howard's success in repelling Hardee, Sherman at once ordered everything against Jonesboro, while General Hood directed Hardee to return Lee's corps to Atlanta, saying: "There are some indications that the enemy may make an attempt upon Atlanta to-morrow." The execution of this order exposed Lee to what seemed almost certain capture, and left Hardee to defend the supplies and ordnance trains of the army and the very existence of the army itself, against the whole of the force of General Sherman. Lee left Hardee before day on September 1st. That he succeeded in reaching General Hood, with Thomas and Schofield directly in his front, is a wonderful comment on the value of bypaths and a brilliant testimony to Lee's skill in finding them.
Hardee made the best possible disposition of his three divisions of infantry, and his small cavalry force, and stood behind such a defensive line as he could make. The troops worked all night of the 31st, the entire corps being in position from the railroad (a deep cut) on the right, to a position covered by cavalry on the left, and north of the hamlet of Jonesboro, Lowrey on the right, Brown in the center and Carter (Anderson) on the left. Gist's South Carolina and Georgia brigade was on the extreme left flank. The whole line was in one rank. From sunrise, Howard was threatening attack, with three corps in position, and his artillery commanding every part of Hardee's line. The Confederates took the shelling patiently and worked hard upon their line of defense, well aware of the responsibility of their position.
At the railroad on the right the line was turned back, almost parallel with the deep railroad cut which passed through the ridge, north and south, on which Hardee's line was formed. This turn in the line was made to meet a fire from the opposite side of the cut, which was densely wooded, with a growth of small trees. The cut was too deep to be crossed at that point. About 1 o'clock Gist's brigade was ordered from the left, and put in position in one rank in the wood just described, by the lieutenant-general in person, and charged with the defense of the right flank. The Second battalion Georgia sharpshooters, Maj. R. H. Whiteley, and the Twenty-fourth South Carolina, Col. Ellison Capers, occupied the position at the railroad cut, and Colonel Capers was specially charged with its defense. On the right of the Twenty-fourth was the Sixteenth South Carolina and on its right the Forty-sixth Georgia. The men climbed up the smaller trees, bent them down, cut across the trunks with their pocket knives, and made a first-rate abatis of small trees, interlaced, covering the front for some distance. A barricade of rails, small trees, and timbers brought up from a settlement in rear, was quickly made, and these preparations saved the right when the attack came.