77. Who cannot from his faculty called rationality understand that a given good is serviceable to society, and a given evil harmful to society? That, for example, justice, sincerity, the chastity of marriage are serviceable to it, and injustice, insincerity, and misconduct with the wives of others, harmful? Consequently that these evils are in themselves injuries, and those goods in themselves benefits? Who then cannot make this a matter of his reason if only he will? He has rationality and he has liberty; the two faculties are bared, show, take charge and enable him to perceive and do in the measure that he avoids those evils because they are evils. So far as a man does this he looks on those goods as a friend looks on friends.
[2] By his faculty called rationality a man can conclude from this what goods are useful to society in the spiritual world and what evils are hurtful there, if instead of evils he sees sins and instead of goods works of charity. This he can also make a matter of his reason if he will, since he has liberty and rationality. His rationality and liberty emerge, become manifest, take charge and give him perception and power so far as he shuns evils as sins. So far as he does this he regards the goods of charity as neighbor regards neighbor in mutual love.
[3] For the sake of reception and union the Lord wills that whatever a man does freely according to reason shall seem to him to be his; this agrees with reason itself. It follows that a man can from his reason will something on the ground that it means his eternal happiness and can perform it by the Lord's divine power, implored by him.
78. (iii) Whatever a man does in freedom according to his thought is appropriated to him as his and remains. The reason is that a man's own and his freedom make one. His proprium is of his life, and what he does from his life he does in freedom. His proprium is also of his love, for love is one's life, and what he does from his life's love he does in freedom. We speak of his acting in freedom "according to his thought" because what is of his life or love he also thinks and confirms by thought, and what is so confirmed he does in freedom then according to thought. What a man does, he does from the will by the understanding; freedom is of the will and thought is of the understanding.
[2] A man can also act freely contrary to reason, likewise not freely in accord with reason: then nothing is appropriated to him—what he does is only of the mouth and body, not of the spirit or heart; only what is of the spirit and heart, when it is also of the mouth and body, is appropriated. The truth of this can be illustrated by many things, but this is not the place.
[3] By being appropriated to man is meant entering his life and becoming part of it, consequently becoming his own. It will be seen in what follows that there is nothing, however, which is man's very own; it only seems to him as if it were. Only this now: all the good a man does in freedom according to reason is appropriated to him as if it were his because it seems to be his in that he thinks, wills, speaks and does it. Good is not man's, however, but the Lord's with man (above, n. 76). How evil is appropriated to man will appear in a section of its own.
79. We said that what a man does in freedom in accord with his thought also remains. For nothing that a man has appropriated to himself can be eradicated; it has been made part of his love and at the same time of his reason, or of his will and at the same time of his understanding, and so of his life. It can be put aside indeed, but not cast out; put aside, it is borne from center to periphery, where it stays; this is what we mean by its remaining.
[2] If, for example, in boyhood or youth, a man appropriated an evil to himself by doing it with enjoyment from love of it—a fraud, blasphemy, revenge, or fornication—having done it freely with the assent of thought, he made it his; but if later he repents, shuns it and considers it a sin to be averse from, and so desists from it freely according to reason, then the opposite good is appropriated to him. Good then takes the center and removes evil to the periphery, farther according to his aversion and abhorrence for it. Still the evil cannot be so thrust out that one can say it is extirpated; it may indeed in that removal seem extirpated. What occurs is that the man is withheld from the evil by the Lord and held in good. This can happen with all inherited evil and all a man's actual evil.
[3] I have seen this verified by the experience of some in heaven who thought they were without evil, being held in good as they were by the Lord. Lest they should believe that the good in which they were was their own, they were let down from heaven and let into their evils until they acknowledged that of themselves they were in evil, and in good only from the Lord. Upon this acknowledgment they were returned to heaven.
[4] Be it known, therefore, that goods are appropriated to man only in that they are constantly with him from the Lord, and that as a man acknowledges this the Lord grants that good shall seem to be the man's, that is, that it shall seem to him that he loves the neighbor or has charity, believes or has faith, does good and understands truth, thus is wise, of himself. From this an enlightened person may see the nature and the strength of the appearance in which the Lord wills man to be. The Lord wills it for salvation's sake, for without that appearance no one can be saved. Also see what was shown above on the subject (nn. 42-45).