Intrigues of Figuerroa and the nobility—The law of Garibetto—New efforts of Spain to give Genoa the character of a Duchy—The firmness of the senate and Andrea foils the scheme of Don Filippo—The reception of the Spaniards by Doria and by the people—Sad story of a daughter of the Calvi—Don Bernardino Mendozza and his relations with Prince Doria—Baneful influence of the Spanish occupation.

Charles V. had long cherished the design of rendering the entire Peninsula subject to his authority. He was master of the Sicilies and the Milanese and controlled Tuscany through the servility of Cosimo; and if he were able to complete the conquest of Genoa, it would be easy to expel the French army from Piedmont where Henry II. was preparing to renew the war in Italy. It is true that the emperor through the senate and Doria actually directed Genoese affairs; but dependence on the will and favour of individuals did not seem to Charles either a dignified or durable means of power. The conspiracy of Fieschi had been crushed; but it had left discontents behind it and a new outbreak was possible at every hour. Besides, Charles thirsted to be complete master of a city which was in his view, and in fact, the connecting link between the kingdoms of Spain and his Lombard provinces.

Figuerroa, knowing the wishes of his master, opened his views to the old nobles who were his intimates and drew them over to his wishes. He terrified them by setting forth the prospect of new conspiracies and the popular affection for Gianluigi which was still strong in the city. He told them that Andrea was too decrepit to combat these approaching perils and that prudence counselled adequate provisions to suppress revolt. Figuerroa found in the minds of the old nobles, morbidly sensitive to the least breath of popular commotion, complacent acquiescence, and he induced some of the faction of San Luca to address a petition to the emperor in Germany, in which they exaggerated the Fieschi movement, showed the uncertain faith of many of the Italian princes and the danger of general revolt and concluded by requesting that the security of Genoa be provided for by a Spanish garrison and a more stable form of government.

The emperor answered the appeal by sending Nicolò Perenoto, lord of Granveille and imperial councillor, with some engineers, to construct a fortress on the hill of Pietra Minuta as a rein on the Genoese populace. This fortification garrisoned by a strong Spanish force would have secured the imperial power and stifled all attempts at revolution. But Andrea, who wished to rule Genoa himself, vehemently opposed the erection of a fortress to be occupied by imperial troops. The prince desired to be the sole imperial representative in Genoa and to keep the Spanish crown in a state of dependence upon his loyalty. He therefore resisted the innovation with all his power, and boldly told Granveille that he must lay aside the project. When the imperial minister informed him of the petition sent by the Genoese nobility to the emperor, the old man called to him the persons chiefly concerned in that business, reproached them spiritedly for the weakness they had shown in falling into an imperial trap, and induced them to recant their approval of this scheme of national humiliation.

But Granveille still hoped to win Doria’s consent to the wishes of the emperor, and he frequently sent his engineers to Pietra Minuta for the purpose of defining the position of the new citadel. The people saw these surveys, and they one day broke into tumult, rushed to the place and would have killed Granveille and his engineers if the senate had not forseen the danger and stationed troops so as to prevent access to the hill. The emperor was now convinced that he could only carry out his plans by an open war both with Andrea and the people; and he therefore wrote to the prince that he would renounce a project which seemed so distasteful to his admiral.

Doria on his side pledged himself to reform the government and give it such a direction as to put it out of the power of a few persons to reëstablish the popular constitution. He accordingly instituted the provision called Garibetto which entirely excluded popular families from political power and gave rise to many civil disorders and finally to intestine war. It completed the alienation of the masses from the nobility and destroyed the vital force of the Republic. But the plebeians, the more they were depressed, burned the more for liberty. The spirit of revolution sometimes slumbered but was never entirely extinguished. The opposition of Doria and the threatening attitude of the populace deterred the Spaniards and the greater part of the old nobles from carrying out their scheme of building a fortress to overawe the people. But though Charles bent to the will of our people in that project, he secured through the prince a more oligarchic form of government and removed the new nobles from power. This success and the increasing subservience of Doria inspired Charles with new hope that he might get Genoa entirely in his power as a first step to the complete control of the Peninsula. He renewed his efforts with more shrewdness and contrived a scheme for taking the populace by surprise and lulling to sleep the vigilance of the old admiral.

A conference was held in Piacenza by the Duke of Alba, Gonzaga, an envoy of Cosimo, and Tomaso de’ Marini a Genoese knight. It was agreed that when Doria had sailed to Spain, to escort the Archduke Maximilian, Gonzaga should enter the city with a large body of imperial troops and Cosimo should support the movement with some regiments of infantry. The pretext for this military concentration was afforded by the fact that the Prince Don Phillip, called into Germany by his father, would return with Doria to Genoa and Cosimo and Gonzaga would go thither to pay him homage.

Having made these arrangements, the Duke of Alba sailed with Doria for Spain (July, 1548) in order to prepare other parts of the conspiracy. But the Genoese fortunately received information of the plot. The Pope, who, since the death of his son, distrusted the emperor more than ever, having heard of the conference in Piacenza, instructed Carlo Orsino, governor of Piacenza, to ascertain what had been done by the conspirators. Orsino laboured so well that he penetrated the mystery. Some incautious words of Gonzaga put him on the scent of the movement and enabled him to inform the Pope of the nature of the emperor’s plans. Paul communicated this intelligence to Leonardo Strata, a Genoese noble living in Rome, and Strata immediately wrote to the senate. The scheme was so bold and unexpected that the senators were at first disposed to distrust the report. But their doubts were soon removed. Gonzaga soon after sent a messenger to notify the government that Don Phillip would soon arrive in Genoa, and to ask quarters in the city for two thousand cavalry and as many arquebusiers. At the same time, Cosimo wrote asking permission to pay homage to the prince in Genoa and to bring as an escort, to protect him against the plots of Genoese exiles, two regiments of cavalry and two of infantry. Andrea also wrote from Rosas (October 19th, 1548) a letter to the Doge, which, as an eloquent proof of his servility to Spain, we give entire:—