“It does not concern thee, white moor and traitor that thou art!”
Lavagna was not accustomed to receive abuse with patience, and he angrily retorted:—
“Moorish Jew, thou liest in the throat!” and drawing his sword, threw himself upon the Spaniard. The fight was of brief duration. Despite the assistance of his companions, the knight was pierced to the heart. The Spaniards descended into the piazza and came to blows with the populace, who killed some and put the others to flight. Lavagna fearing the vengeance of Phillip took refuge in the province of Piacenza.
Don Phillip did not relinquish the hope of reducing Genoa to the condition of a province, and he was encouraged by Gonzaga, Figuerroa and the Duke of Alba. The plan of the new fortress was again taken up. The partisans of Spain reasoned that the popular hostility to Spain constantly threatened the city with revolution and that so stubborn a people needed a strong rein. It was reasonable enough they said that Doria, when he was in the full vigour of life, should have opposed the erection of the citadel, but now when he was old and infirm almost to decrepitude he ought no longer to resist the will of Cæsar.
Charles sent to Genoa a certain Sigismondi Fransino with instructions to confer with Doria and Centurione and endeavour to gain their consent to the fortification. Some engineers also came secretly, for the purpose of selecting the most convenient site. They renounced the plan of fortifying Pietra Minuta and recommended that the fortress of Castelletto should be restored. Doria hearing of this new plan and wishing to finish once for all with these projects for the humiliation of Genoa, sent Adamo Centurione into Flanders to confer with Cæsar and convince him that there was imminent peril of losing the Republic altogether unless these schemes were renounced. Charles made the most formal pledges that he would put a stop to the intrigue and never again raise the question. The advice of Don Bernardino Mendozza probably had more weight with Charles than the remonstrances of Centurione. Mendozza was a man of infinite cunning and dexterity in politics. He pointed out to his sovereign the excessive devotion of the Genoese to the acquisition of wealth, and advised him to employ every artifice to get their money into the imperial treasury in the form of loans secured upon lands, privileges, feuds and jurisdictions in Sicily, Naples and Spain. “Thus,” said the adroit politician, “you will bind the Genoese to the fortunes of your kingdom by a voluntary chain; since when their riches are in your hands they will be naturally inclined to increase and maintain your power. This hold upon their affections will be worth more than any fortress.”
This shrewd advice was followed; every inducement was held out to the wealthy nobles to place their money in the hands of the emperor, with such securities and guarantees as would infallibly induce other citizens to follow the example and bind themselves with their fortunes to Spain. By this expedient Charles seemed to leave the Genoese their independence, but he really made them tributary to his crown, Phillip II. pursued this policy with even greater assiduity and it became hereditary in the Spanish princes. It was in fact for two centuries the political science by which the court of Spain regulated the affairs of Italy; and the people found themselves insensibly bound, without their own action, to the interests and policy of that crown. It must be said that some give a different version of the affair of the citadel. Writers of weight tell us that, even in this, Doria was subservient to Charles; but we cannot believe it possible. His steadfast resistance to that scheme is more consistent with the greatness and fame of the illustrious admiral; and, though he was a vehement partisan of the imperial cause, he could not have wished to become, like Cosimo, its slave. When the Medici gave up to imperial troops the fortresses of Florence and Leghorn, he found himself in the hands of a master, and never digested the retort of Venice, who refused to treat with him “because he was, in his own house, the servant of another man.”
We think the truth to be that when Doria saw the unanimity of the people in opposing the erection of a citadel, he wisely resolved to support his fellow-citizens, and the people are entitled to the chief praise for the failure of that scheme. They were not yet corrupted by the servility of the nobility, and might have renewed the examples of their ancient valour and prevented the foreign power from striking root in the Republic. They lost no opportunity of manifesting their profound dislike of Spain, as Doge Lercaro himself testifies. When Charles gave to Cosimo the government of Piombino, then in the hands of the Appiani, the Genoese rose up in arms and demanded of the senate that galleys be despatched to Elba to expel the Florentines and Spaniards. This time, too, it was Doria who held back the arms of the people.
It is easy to see that the new ties between Genoa and Spain were the principal occasion of our decline. Doria, by breaking the French alliance and persecuting the men of Barbary (instead of courting their alliance after the example of Venice) hastened our fall. Our commerce gradually declined. French and Barbary fleets roved over our seas and destroyed our marine. The city was put to great straits, and longed in vain for the only remedy for its maladies, the alliance of France to open up the commerce of the East. Fieschi, who had courted these benefits, was remembered the more sadly as disasters multiplied upon the Republic.
The government comprehended that some important and energetic measures must be taken to restore our fortunes; and, after mature reflection, the senate resolved to attempt the recovery of our Eastern trade. The only remnant of our extensive possessions in the Levant was the island of Scio, which was still held by the family of the Giustiniani. In 1558, Giovanni Di Franchi and Nicolò Grillo were sent to Constantinople, with eight vessels bearing costly presents for the Sultan and his principal ministers, to ask a renewal of trade and treaties of amity and commerce such as the Porte maintained with the Venitians.
The Porte was disposed to accept our trade and friendship, but the king of France raised objections which destroyed the hopes of Genoa. He showed the Porte that the Genoese were the fast allies of Spain, and could not remain neutral between Spaniards and Turks; that all the maritime enterprises of Charles to the damage of the Turks had been conducted with Genoese fleets; that Doria the greatest of the enemies of Turkey and the admiral of Spain, lived in Genoa and ruled it at his caprice; that, in fine, the Porte could not safely listen to the proposals of the Genoese unless they declared themselves enemies of Spain. These arguments changed the purpose of Soliman, and he sent the Ligurian ambassadors home without giving them audience. The Republic lost hope of reacquiring that commerce with the East which had once enabled it to triumph over Pisa and Venice.