That was what the American Protective League already was doing when war was declared; it is what it has done ever since, loyalty, patiently, indefatigably, to an enormous and unknown extent, in an unbelievable variety of detail. If ever you have held its members irresponsible or deemed them actuated by any but good motives, cease to do so now. Beyond all men of this generation they have proven that patriotism is not dead.
The enforcement of the President’s proclamation governing the conduct of enemy aliens in this country entailed a tremendous amount of D. J. work, the larger part of which devolved upon the agents of the League. Thousands of investigations of alien Germans were made under its provisions. Numerically speaking, however, the work in that imperatively necessary line yielded to the more thankless labor of slacker and deserter hunting.
The function of the League in all these matters is obvious. No case at law will “stick” unless supported by competent testimony. We have seen that the League was organized for the collection of evidence, and for nothing else. Limited as its power was, it really saved the day for our hard-pressed country. It increased our Army by many thousands of evaders whom it found and turned over to the military authorities. It put hundreds of aliens into internment. It apprehended plotters and prevented consummation of conspiracies beyond number. It kept down the danger of that large disloyal element, and held Germany in America safe while we went on with the open business of war in the field. It is by no means too much to say that much of the Kaiser’s disappointment over his German-American revolt was due not so much to any loyalty to the American flag—for of all of our racial representatives, the Germans are the most clannishly and tenaciously loyal to their own former flag—as it was to fear of the silent and stern hand searching out in the dark and taking first one and then another German or pro-German away from the scenes that erstwhile had known him. It was fear that held our enemy population down—fear and nothing else. It was the League’s silent and mysterious errand to pile up good reason for that fear.
At the crack of war, certain hundreds of dangerous aliens were interned at once. They simply vanished, that was all, behind the walls of camps or of prisons. It will be mistaken mercy if we shall not deport thousands more when we shall have the time deliberately to do that. Fear is the one thing such men understand. Honor and loyalty, terms interdependent and inseparable, are unknown to them. Too many Germans loved America only because they made money easily here. Their real flag still was across the sea, except as they had raised it here in their churches and their schools.
It was sometimes rumored that many spies were shot secretly in America. That would have been done in Germany—as witness the deaths of Edith Cavell and others. It was not done here. We did not kill a single spy, a single traitor,—more is the pity. By reason of the fact that we had outspied Germany’s vaunted espionage, we nipped in the bud none knows how many plots and conspiracies which otherwise would have matured in ruin to life and property. We did not shoot known spies, but we garroted them in the dark and hurried them to jail. That agency of the law is best, after all, which keeps crime from becoming crime. We did not wait for overt acts—we filled our prisons before the acts were done! That is why the public was obliged to romance as to German spies. They are in jail. The report of the Department of Justice itself, of June, 1918, on these war activities will in this connection prove interesting reading:
During the period of American neutrality many persons were prosecuted for criminal acts connected with efforts to aid the belligerents. Some of these cases were still pending when the United States declared war on Germany. A very satisfactory standard of success was attained in the ante-bellum prosecutions. Almost before the ink had dried on the proclamation of April 6, 1917, a select company of dangerous Germans were gathered in by the United States Marshals. These prisoners were believed to be potential, and in some cases actual leaders of pro-German plots and propaganda. Subsequent discoveries have quite fully confirmed this belief. Recently a most authoritative document was found to contain among other matters the names of several gentlemen whom the German Government trusted to carry on its work here unofficially after the withdrawal of the official representatives. Of these, all were arrested on April 6, 1917, save one who had already left the country. This disposal of the German leaders had effects which have been continually reflected in the disjointed and sporadic character of hostile outbreaks.
One of the most recent, most novel, and most important of the Department’s efforts is the denaturalization of disloyal citizens of foreign origin. Many natives of Germany or Austria, sheltered from summary internment by their acquired citizenship and clever enough to avoid the commission of actual crime, have insulted and injured this government at every opportunity. Fortunately the naturalization law contains a clause permitting the cancellation of citizenship papers obtained by fraud. Without waiting for further legislation, which is apparently on the way, the Department has assailed a number of defendants believed to have made fraudulent mental reservations of loyalty to their native countries. Several of these cases have already ended victoriously for the government. More than one defeated defendant has been interned.
Meanwhile the summary arrests have continued. From week to week through 1917 their numbers steadily increased. Since about the beginning of 1918, the rate has been more nearly constant.
Extremists have advocated the universal internment of alien enemies, somewhat after the English practice. Now, Great Britain interned permanently rather fewer than seventy thousand alien enemies. The United States would be compelled to intern at least eight hundred thousand Germans and more than twice as many Austrians. The colossal expense of maintaining this horde in idleness—civilian prisoners of war are far more useless than convicts, because they may not be forced to work—is too obvious to need discussion.
More temperate critics say that there have been too few arrests, too low a proportion of internments, and too high a proportion of paroles. As to the first and second charges, it is a sufficient answer that conditions have improved instead of becoming worse. A policeman’s record should not be judged by the number of people he has put in jail, but by the kind of order maintained on his beat.