CHAPTER XII

HAPSBURG AND BURGUNDY

The disaster of Nancy naturally provoked a strong reaction in the Belgian provinces. We have seen that the large towns bore only with great reluctance the centralized rule of Philip the Good, in spite of the moderation and the diplomatic talents of this prince. In the latter part of his reign, Charles the Bold had completely disregarded local privileges and relentlessly crushed every attempt at rebellion. He raised taxes for his foreign expeditions which weighed heavily on the people. More and more absorbed by his struggle against Louis XI, he neglected internal affairs, and the Belgians were loath to support an expensive policy of foreign adventures which could only be detrimental to their own interests. Mary of Burgundy was thus left alone, in 1477, to confront, on one side the exigencies of the towns and States, and on the other the intrigues of Louis XI. The latter had not only confiscated the duke's French dominions, as soon as the news of his death reached him, but he proposed, with the support of the disaffected towns, to appropriate as well his Northern provinces. Fearing English interference, he thought of striking a bargain with the King of England and offered to conquer Brabant for him. Very wisely, Edward IV retorted that the province would be too difficult to hold and that "a war with the Netherlands would not be popular in England owing to the active trade between the two countries." Left to his own devices, Louis succeeded in persuading the Flemings that a marriage between Mary and the dauphin would be the most profitable solution of the crisis. On the refusal of the princess, who was already affianced to the Archduke Maximilian of Austria, the French king dropped the mask of friendship and invaded Hainault and Artois.

THE "GREAT PRIVILEGE"

By that time, Mary had given full satisfaction to the particularist demands by granting the "Great Privilege," which practically restored all provincial and urban liberties and brought to nought the patient work of centralization accomplished by the dukes. Under the threat of foreign invasion, the people rallied around her to the cry of "Vive Bourgogne!" and identified the cause of their national dynasty with that of their own independence. Arras was obliged to open its gates to the French armies, but Valenciennes and St. Omer made a desperate resistance. It was, however, evident that, under the circumstances, the Low Countries could not oppose the French advance without foreign help. The States therefore agreed to the marriage of Mary with Maximilian of Austria, who entered the country at the head of a small army.

This marriage proved fatal to the independence of the Low Countries, by bringing them more and more under the sway of the Hapsburg dynasty. In spite of their French possessions, the Burgundian princes had maintained a national policy, or, to speak more accurately, had, with the exception of Charles's last adventures, furthered their own interests to the greater benefit of the Belgian provinces. As far as foreign politics were concerned, they succeeded in remaining neutral between the three Powers surrounding them and in interfering in European affairs only when their possessions were directly threatened. There was no conflict between the economic and political interests of Belgium and those of the Burgundian dynasty. The dukes remained in the country and the welfare of the country was the essential condition of their own prosperity. Owing to the union of Maximilian with Mary of Burgundy, this situation was entirely altered. From the end of the fifteenth century to the time of the French Revolution, the Netherlands were more and more sacrificed to the interests of their masters, whether belonging to the Austrian or the Spanish branch of the Hapsburgs. They lost the benefit of the presence of their national and "natural" princes, who were absorbed in far more important affairs and spent most of their life out of the country. They were administered by regents or governors, who generally did not enjoy sufficient independence and authority to pursue a Netherlandish policy. They constituted a sort of outpost of the Power to which they were attached, and were, in consequence, first exposed to the attacks of the enemies of this Power. This is one of the main causes of the sixteenth-century revolution and the subsequent partition of the country, and of the decadence of the Southern provinces which became so evident during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

For some time, however, the Hapsburg policy did not prevail, and it even appeared, at certain moments, as if a national dynasty might be restored. The Belgian States, and more especially the Belgian aristocracy, succeeded in influencing the princes and their governors, who, from time to time, reverted to a national policy. The story of the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries in Belgium is composed of the struggle of the two opposing principles: the national Burgundian policy, based on peace and neutrality in European conflicts, and the Hapsburg policy, drawing the provinces in the wake of Hapsburg ambitions and rivalries.

mary of burgundy.
From the mausoleum in the Church of Notre Dame, Bruges.
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