William of Orange, who had displayed such extraordinary political aptitudes during the first years of the revolution, seemed, since his entry into Brussels, to have disregarded some essential conditions of success. Though imbued by the principle of national unity, he never threw himself wholeheartedly into the struggle and never gave the country the leadership it so badly needed. He first seemed to ignore the difficulties ahead, owing to the rivalry of religious factions, and, when these were made clear to him, he did not take any strong measure to enforce on the people the principle of liberty of conscience which he so loudly proclaimed. The recurrence of excesses and cruelties committed by the fanatic leaders of the Communes contributed to create a widespread impression, among the Catholics, that he was merely paying lip-service to them, while determined to tolerate any disobedience among his own followers. His retirement to Antwerp, in close contact with Holland and Zeeland, but far removed from the Southern provinces, was also unfavourable to the maintenance of the Union under his leadership. Finally, the interference in national affairs of such disreputable adventurers as John Casimir and Anjou diminished, to a certain degree, the reluctance with which the Catholics envisaged the possibility of treating with Spain.

UNION OF ARRAS

On January 6, 1579, Artois, Hainault and Walloon Flanders formed the "Confederation of Arras," which sanctioned the first Union of Brussels—that is to say, the maintenance of Catholicism all over the country; and from that time negotiations began between the Catholic bourgeoisie and nobility and Farnese. Had Orange proved more active or Farnese less diplomatic, the Union might still have been maintained even at the eleventh hour. For nothing but religious passion, and perhaps, to a certain extent, the fear of mob rule, prompted the Southern provinces to accept the Spanish offers. The States of Hainault had declared that they would not undertake anything contrary to the common cause, but wanted only to preserve their existence, to "maintain the Pacification of Ghent against an insolent and barbarian tyranny worse than the Spanish" and "to prevent the extinction of their holy faith and religion, of the nobility and of all order and state." They did not abandon any of their old claims against Spain, but they refused to acknowledge the social and religious transformation which had taken place in the country since the signature of the Pacification. The defenders of the new confederation expressed the hope that in all towns the oppressed Catholics would join hands with them. The Union of Arras ought to be considered therefore, not as a Walloon, but as a purely Catholic League. It confirms the first Union of Brussels, including all its anti-Spanish stipulations concerning the restoration of the old privileges, the voting of taxes by the States, the defence of the country by native troops, the maintenance of the Catholic religion in all the provinces being the only common ground on which Spaniards and Belgians could meet. It was, nevertheless, a breach of the Pacification of Ghent, and was destined to link Belgium with Spain for many years to come. It was also a definite and irretrievable step towards separation.

It has been suggested that the difference of race and languages might have influenced the fateful decision of the Walloon provinces. Such an interpretation does not take into account the language situation in the Low Countries at the time. One seeks vainly for any grievance which the Southern provinces might have entertained on that ground. French was used in all the acts of the central Government and in the deliberations of the States General. Even the Prince of Orange had kept the Burgundian tradition and considered French as his mother-tongue. He was surrounded and supported by a great number of French Huguenots and Walloon Calvinists. Owing to their smaller population the Southern provinces were rather over-represented in the States General, where the vote went by province and not by numbers. Besides, we must not overlook the fact that the confederates represented themselves not as dissenters, but as the true supporters of the Act of Union, which had been violated by the Calvinists. They did not show any separatist tendencies like Holland and Zeeland, but opposed their policy of Union to the policy of the Prince of Orange. One of their most urgent demands was that the Prince of the Netherlands should henceforth be of royal and legitimate blood, in order to restore a national policy, similar to that followed during the early years of the reigns of Philip the Handsome and Charles V. All through the troubled period of the last twenty years, Walloons and Flemings never ceased to emphasize their will to live together. Their mottoes are, "Viribus unitis"; "Belgium fœderatum"; "Concordia res parvæ crescunt"; and almost every speech and public manifestation insists on the necessity of protecting a common "patrie" against a common enemy through a common defence. As a matter of fact, the principle of unity was so popular at the time in the Southern provinces that the confederates would have made themselves thoroughly unpopular if they had dared to preach separation, and, on both sides, it was only by pretending to defend the Union that the extremists, moved by class hatred and religious passion, succeeded in destroying it.

The centre of Catholic reaction might have been formed in any other part of the Southern provinces under similar circumstances. The region of Armentières and Valenciennes had been the cradle of the Iconoclast rebellion, but repression in that quarter was far more effective than in any other. A great proportion of the Walloon workers who did not perish under Alba's rule emigrated to England. The Southern cities were thus considerably depleted of their Calvinist element, and the peasants and the bourgeois outnumbered them far more than in any other part of the country. Even under ordinary circumstances the workers of the towns exercised very little influence on the States of Hainault and Artois. In Hainault (Valenciennes and Tournai forming special circumscriptions), Mons remained alone to represent their interests. In Artois, Arras, St. Omer and Béthune were the only important centres whose representatives could oppose those of the far more important agricultural districts. The question of race and language had no more influence on the attitude of the Walloon provinces than on that of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht. Both were determined by economic, social and religious conditions as well as by their strategic situation.

UNION OF UTRECHT

The Confederation of Arras was proclaimed on January 6, 1579. On the 23rd the Union of Utrecht was constituted, under the same claim of defending the Pacification of Ghent. It grouped around Holland and Zeeland the provinces of Utrecht, Gelder, Friesland, Over-Yssel and Groningen, together with the most important towns of Flanders and Brabant: Ghent, Ypres, Bruges, Antwerp, Brussels, etc. They undertook to act jointly in reference to peace, war, alliances and all external matters, while retaining their local autonomy. The exercise of religion remained free, with the exception of Holland and Zeeland, from which Catholicism was excluded. The Union of Utrecht was the origin of the Republic of the Seven United Provinces. It was entirely dominated by the particularist policy of Holland and Zeeland, which, as events developed more and more in favour of Farnese in the South, took less and less interest in their Southern confederates. The small forces at their disposal rendered any offensive towards Flanders and Brabant, which would have provided the beleaguered cities with food and arms, very difficult, and the reopening of the Scheldt, which must have taken place in the event of the integral preservation of the Union of Utrecht, would have reacted unfavourably on the trade of the Northern ports.

ALEXANDER FARNESE

Owing to the defensive attitude of the North, events moved rather slowly during the following years. After the fall of Maestricht, which was marked by further massacres of the people by the Spanish soldiery, Farnese, who had staked all on a policy of conciliation, gradually dismissed the Spanish troops and organized native units with the help of the Malcontents. Now that all bonds were severed between the Union of Utrecht and the crown of Spain, Philip II endeavoured to revenge himself on his opponent by putting a price on his head (1580). The apology written by the Prince of Orange in answer to Philip's accusations, in the shape of a letter addressed to the States General, is one of the most dignified pleas of such a kind in history. Orange had no difficulty in showing the sincerity of his motives and his devotion to the common weal. The reader of this eloquent document will, however, realize that its author lacked the energy and self-reliance necessary to deal with the desperate situation in which the country was placed. In his eagerness to save the Belgian towns and to safeguard unity, in spite of the unwillingness of Holland and Zeeland to depart from their expectant attitude, he concluded with the Duke of Anjou, on September 29th, the treaty of Plessis-lez-Tours, by which, in exchange for military help, the duke was to receive the title of hereditary sovereign of the United Provinces, undertook to respect the rights of the States General and maintain the representatives of the House of Orange-Nassau as hereditary Stadhouders of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht. This last clause was introduced far more to pacify the Northerners, who strongly objected to these negotiations, than to further Orange's personal ambition. It shows once more the privileged situation occupied by the three provinces and their strong particularist tendencies. The treaty of Plessis-lez-Tours, which was supposed to save the Union, was destined to give it its death-blow and to strengthen the alliance between the Southern provinces and Farnese. By that time, the central Government in Antwerp had become purely nominal. The Northern provinces had ceased to send their representatives and the delegates from the South could not claim to represent the people, who were more and more unfavourable to their attitude. The States General was only used to register and sanction Orange's decisions. In spite of some opposition, it finally proclaimed, on July 26, 1581, the deposition of the king.

Hostilities were at once resumed, Farnese besieging Cambrai and Tournai, which had not yet joined the Confederation. The first town was saved by the intervention of the French troops of Anjou, but the second capitulated on November 3rd. From that time, Farnese endeavoured to treat his enemies with the greatest clemency. He suppressed severely all acts of terrorism or pillage and offered honourable conditions to any city willing to surrender, the Protestants being free to leave the town after settling their affairs and the local liberties remaining intact. By these moderate conditions and by the loyalty with which he kept to them, he gradually earned the respect, if not the sympathy, of a great number of his former opponents, and his attitude contrasted favourably with the vagaries of Anjou, whose rule was, after all, the only alternative offered to the Southern provinces at the time. After a journey to England, where he received a rebuff from Queen Elizabeth, Anjou was greeted with great honours at Antwerp (February 19, 1582). During the year which followed, he grew more and more impatient of the obstacles placed in his way and the restrictions imposed on his authority. He finally decided to make a bid for power, and, on the night of January 16-17, 1583, his soldiers endeavoured to seize the gates of Antwerp and occupy the public buildings. They were, however, defeated by the armed citizens, and the duke, entirely discredited, was obliged to leave the country. This episode is remembered as the "French Fury."