The fascinating scheme endorsed by the Vienna Congress had completely miscarried. Though only a ruler of great political talent could have realized it, the story of the fifteen years of union between the two countries shows that the king and his Dutch ministers were unable to master the very elements of the difficult proposition they had to solve. Up to the last months several opportunities offered themselves to them of retracing their steps and retrieving the situation. They failed to seize them. A careful survey of events will show that the action brought against De Potter and the choice of The Hague as the seat of the Supreme Court did more to estrange the Belgian bourgeoisie from Dutch rule than the activity of French propagandists. The initial blunder of William I was to ignore the fact that Belgium was not merely a group of ownerless provinces, but a nation as strong in her soul, if not as happy in her fate, as the Dutch nation, deserving the same care and the same consideration. Had he acted as a national prince he would have succeeded, in spite of the sad memories of past oppression, as many princes had succeeded before. But he remained essentially Dutch in his manners and his political outlook, and as such he was bound to fail, as Joseph II, Maximilian and Philip II had failed before him.

modern belgium (treaties of 1830-1839 and 1919).
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CHAPTER XXV

THE SCRAP OF PAPER

Having failed to repress the revolution, King William appealed to the Powers signatories of the eight articles creating the joint kingdom. Lord Aberdeen answered that the independence of the Belgians was an accomplished fact, but a Conference was, nevertheless, called in London, in order to mediate between the two parties, to which France was invited to send a representative. On November 14, 1830, the conditions of an armistice were settled, according to which both belligerents were to withdraw their forces behind the frontier which divided the two countries before their reunion in 1814.

This arrangement would have restored to Belgium the left bank of the Scheldt, which she had lost since the Münster treaty. The Dutch king protested, and the line was altered from the frontier of 1814 to that of 1790—that is to say, five years before the annexation by the French of the contested territory.

Throughout the negotiations the autocratic Powers—Prussia, Austria and Russia—were opposed to the Belgians. They treated them as rebels who ought to be only too happy to buy their independence at any price. As a matter of fact, if the same wave of nationalism which had stirred Belgium had not, at the same time, caused serious trouble in Poland and Italy, it is doubtful whether England and France could have induced the Conference to accept even the principle of Belgian independence. But, owing to their internal troubles, both Russia and Austria were disinclined to take action, and Prussia would have found herself isolated if she had maintained an uncompromising attitude.