[1307] See above, pp. 379 ff. On this same question, see also our article, "Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives," in the Revue de Métaphysique, May, 1898.
[1308] William James, Principles of Psychology, I, p. 464.
[1309] This universality of the concept should not be confused with its generality: they are very different things. What we mean by universality is the property which the concept has of being communicable to a number of minds, and in principle, to all minds; but this communicability is wholly independent of the degree of its extension. A concept which is applied to only one object, and whose extension is consequently at the minimum, can be the same for everybody: such is the case with the concept of a deity.
[1310] It may be objected that frequently, as the mere effect of repetition, ways of thinking and acting become fixed and crystallized in the individual, in the form of habits which resist change. But a habit is only a tendency to repeat an act or idea automatically every time that the same circumstances appear; it does not at all imply that the idea or act is in the form of an exemplary type, proposed to or imposed upon the mind or will. It is only when a type of this sort is set up, that is to say, when a rule or standard is established, that social action can and should be presumed.
[1311] Thus we see how far it is from being true that a conception lacks objective value merely because it has a social origin.
[1312] See also above, p. 208.
[1313] Lévy-Bruhl, Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures, pp. 131-138.
[1314] Ibid., p. 446.
[1315] See above, p. 18.
[1316] William James, Principles of Psychology, I, p. 134.