“You know, gentlemen, what was the reply. It began on the day when, after five days and five nights of deliberation and uncertainty, the minister of war preferred this complaint, the bearing of which you now know, and it continues today in the motions which the attorney-general now makes in the name of the complainant and in his own name. Do you think that that is going to strangle the discussion? Absurd! It is as if one should place himself in the middle of a torrent to prevent it from flowing. The discussion is open. If they wanted to stifle it, they need not have prosecuted either Perrenx or Zola. They had the right to refrain; and, in fact, public opinion, to which, gentlemen, I shall speak,—public opinion, which is not enlightened, and which, admirable in generosity and in faith, but blind, most faithfully supports the ruling powers,—public opinion perhaps would have given its sanction to such a course. But they have chosen to prosecute M. Zola. Being accused, he will defend himself. Are they, then, serious when they say to us today that the three paragraphs cited from this letter of two thousand lines have nothing to do with the intention of M. Zola on the one hand, or, on the other, with the article as a whole and the other charges contained in it? Can the court accept that? Between the three matters taken notice of by the minister of war and the sum total of the matters which I have read to the court there is a connection not only close, but indivisible. In the first place, gentlemen, Major Esterhazy was prosecuted for the same crime of treason for which Captain Dreyfus had been prosecuted. The document of the trial was the bordereau; the bordereau concerning which the first experts testified; the bordereau concerning which, at the second trial, experts testified again. And it is not strange to read that the experts of both trials, not being the same, feel no desire to meet at this bar in contradiction of each other in a discussion where the light is to be complete. But it is certain that the document in question, and which was the object of discussion in the Esterhazy trial and in the Dreyfus trial, is the bordereau. The two crimes were the same. M. Mathieu Dreyfus had denounced Major Esterhazy. If Major Esterhazy had been condemned, the setting aside of the verdict against Captain Dreyfus would have followed as a matter of necessity. Major Esterhazy was acquitted. The question remains open, and we are to deal with it. The question takes the form of a dilemma. Either we are to be prevented from offering any proof, and in that case we shall see; or, on the contrary, we are to be permitted to examine the situation of Captain Dreyfus as well as that of Major Esterhazy, since both are closely connected, and it would not be possible for us to prove here the guilt of Major Esterhazy and his acquittal in obedience to orders, if we had not the right to prove at the same time the innocence of Captain Dreyfus. To say nothing of the fact, gentlemen, that the minister of war, in drawing up his complaint, perhaps not perceiving this dangerous detail, allowed a little paragraph to slip in, in which it was said that the second council of war covered the illegality to which the first had committed itself. Now, gentlemen, how are we to demonstrate that they have covered an illegality, unless we are allowed to demonstrate first that an illegality has been committed? Unless, indeed, they mean—and I confess that that would seem to me a really curious preliminary to this discussion—to acknowledge that the illegality has been committed, and that it is recognized in the face of France and the civilized world. If not, then on this point as on others we must be permitted the opportunity of proof. You know, gentlemen, what the authorities say. It is a matter of doctrine and of law that, outside of the matters set forth in the summons, it is permissible to prove matters connected with them by close and indivisible ties. I have shown you that the matters which it is our right to prove are closely bound up with the other matters of which we likewise offer proof. It remains only to say a single word in answer to a last objection of the attorney-general,—the thing judged. The thing judged! What will be left of it, gentlemen, if we succeed in showing that it has been irregularly and illegally judged, this thing, in which public opinion has such faith that it considers as public malefactors those who dream for a second of doubting it, even though they have declared that they are ready to furnish the proof? Citizens respect this thing judged. It is their right and their duty to respect it. But only, I repeat, because they believe it to have been regularly and legally judged. Where there is no right, there is no legality, no justice, no thing judged, Mr. Attorney-General, and let us say no more of exceptions.”
In reinforcement of the position of M. Labori, M. Albert Clemenceau then addressed the court:
“I wish to speak simply of two points made by the attorney-general. He has told us that his hands are tied by the minister of war, that he is unable to broaden the discussion, and that it must take the form that the minister of war desires. We suspected it, but I believe that it will be interesting to the jury to know that, if he had desired a general discussion, the minister of war perhaps would have done as all French citizens do when they believe themselves injured,—namely, would have lodged a complaint with the attorney-general. The attorney-general is supposed to know something about law. He would have read M. Zola’s article, and it is probable that he would have had us indicted on grounds much more numerous than those which this complaint specifically alleges. So much for the first point. The second is this. The attorney-general, who knows the meaning of words, began his observations by saying: ‘Gentlemen, I am going to make a statement of the case’; but he made an argument, and he finished in a way of which the jury had had no warning, asking the court to limit the discussion which we desire to carry on at this bar.”
M. Labori then submitted a formal motion that the court authorize the introduction of evidence on all the matters referred to in M. Zola’s letter.
Before the court had passed upon this motion, the three experts in handwriting, Couard, Belhomme, and Varinard, intervened through their counsel, M. Cabanes, asking that, in view of the fact that they had prosecuted M. Zola and “L’Aurore” in the police courts, no introduction of their names into the case now on trial should be permitted.
The Judge.—“The purpose of this motion is to enable the experts, in case it is granted, to prosecute M. Zola in the assize court for outrages upon witnesses because of their testimony before the council of war.”
M. Albert Clemenceau.—“We accept any discussion before the assize court.”
M. Labori.—“If that is the motive of the intervention of the experts, I ask the court to suspend judgment on the motion, until that point in the discussion is reached which concerns the experts and their testimony. And, if it is a matter of reserving to these gentlemen a special right, which will end, I imagine, in one facility more for the production of the explanations that we have to furnish, we can only congratulate ourselves in so far as we are concerned. I speak in the name of M. Zola and M. Perrenx.”
M. Zola.—“Complete light!”
M. Clemenceau.—“Whatever motions may be made in this court, and from whatsoever persons they may come, if their object is to bring about a public discussion in the assize court, we second them. In fact, I do not care even to know whether these motions are well founded in law; you warn us that their tendency would be to bring us here again on another charge; we accept every sort of discussion before the assize court.”