Colonel Henry.—“You understand that I do not specify dates to a day. I have not spoken of dates.”
This finishing the confrontation of Colonel Picquart with those who had contradicted him, the witness-stand was taken by M. Demange, the counsel of Captain Dreyfus before the council of war.
Testimony of M. Demange.
M. Labori.—“Will M. Demange tell us what he knows of the Esterhazy case, and of any matters connected with it that may be useful as throwing light upon M. Zola’s good faith?”
The Judge.—“Speak only of the Esterhazy case; nothing else.”
M. Demange.—“Exactly, Monsieur le Président. In the latter part of October I learned through the newspapers that M. Scheurer-Kestner had become convinced of the innocence of Dreyfus, and was at work to secure his rehabilitation. I wrote to M. Scheurer-Kestner, asking him to make known publicly at the tribune or elsewhere his reasons for affirming the innocence of Dreyfus. He did not answer, the reason of his silence being, as I found out later, that my letter came during the fortnight in which he had promised General Billot to say nothing. Therefore I was much agitated in mind until November 13 or 14, the day before M. Mathieu Dreyfus denounced Captain Esterhazy as the author of the bordereau before the minister of war. On that day M. Mathieu Dreyfus came to my house in a state of great agitation, bringing with him a sample of handwriting astonishingly like that of the bordereau, and said to me: ‘M. Scheurer-Kestner says that it is my duty to denounce as the author of the bordereau M. Esterhazy, whose writing this is.’ Obeying a feeling of prudence, I said to M. Mathieu Dreyfus; ‘Do what M. Scheurer-Kestner has told you to do; but, first, I advise you to ask him to declare publicly that he has designated to the minister of war as the author of the bordereau the person whom you are about to denounce; thus no one will be able to question your good faith. And, since you have only the handwriting, confine yourself to denouncing M. Esterhazy as the author of the bordereau, and go no farther.’ I was much excited, for I saw a chance for a revision of the Dreyfus case. I had already resolved, moreover, to address myself to the minister of justice, since I had learned from M. Salle that there had been a violation of the law. But I had not yet done so, for a reason that I may point out. Before employing the legal course, and especially that belonging to me by virtue of Article 441 of the code of criminal examination,—that is, the nullification of the sentence on the ground of violation of law,—I desired the assistance of those who, wearing the robe as I do, are anxious concerning the rights of defence. I awaited very impatiently the Esterhazy trial. I was present at that portion of it which was held in public, and even asked permission to intervene that there might be a contradictor. The permission was refused. But what especially interested me was the testimony of the experts. It was here that I expected to find the new fact necessary to the obtaining of a revision in case of Esterhazy’s acquittal. Dreyfus having been convicted only on the bordereau and on handwriting, the expert testimony in the case of M. Esterhazy might bring out elements that would permit me to say to the minister of justice: ‘Here is the new fact.’ I knew from M. Ravary’s report that the experts had concluded that the writing was not M Esterhazy’s, but I did not know their reasons. I got no satisfaction, because of the closing of the doors, and thus this method of revision was cut off. There remained then the method of nullification. But I could not apply to the minister of justice, unless I was certain that the door would open, should I knock. Now, the conditions under which the Esterhazy trial took place had convinced me that the government did not desire to throw light on the Dreyfus case.
“What could I do? I could say to the minister of justice: ‘I am morally certain that there has been a violation of the law,’ but I could not give him legal proof. I had to do, then, what is done in cases of this sort,—call on the minister of justice for an investigation, in order to have my assertion verified. I did not wish to take the step alone, and at that moment I had not found the desired assistance, either among lawyers or among those in political life. They said to me: ‘Have a care: do not stir up this Dreyfus matter now. It is too soon; we must wait.’ And I was waiting at the time when M. Scheurer-Kestner brought his facts to the knowledge of the public. It was necessary to my purpose to have a government desirous of throwing full light upon the matter, because, if there was to be a revision, it should not take place behind closed doors. When seven officers who are honesty itself have condemned a man erroneously, public opinion cannot be convinced, unless their error can be precisely pointed out. Well, I was convinced that the government did not want the light, and so I asked myself what I should do. Then were unchained the passions which today are making such riot, preventing men from giving further thought to the fate of my unfortunate client. It is no longer a question of the Dreyfus case; it is a question of the honor of the army; it is the struggle between the Semites and the anti-Semites. But I, alas! am concerned only with the interests of my client. Consequently, I said to myself, we must await more peaceful times, and I said the same to M. Mathieu Dreyfus and to Mme. Dreyfus. The attorney-general has told you that recourse had been had to revolutionary methods; but this reproach cannot be addressed to M. Zola, because he had not the power to use the legal methods. Only the Dreyfus family could use those, and consequently it is the Dreyfus family that is to be reproached, and, indirectly, myself. And I might even tell you that, for a long time, and especially since the speech of the attorney-general, I have been receiving every morning letters signed and unsigned, the former polite, the latter anything but polite, in which I am reproached with having failed in my duty. I consider that I have not failed. My duty has always been before my eyes, and you may be certain that my conscience will never allow me to shrink from it. But I believe that I acted very prudently in advising M. Dreyfus to wait. And so it is that the Esterhazy case, which had given me hope that I could resort to the legal methods of securing a revision, has made it impossible for me to use these methods, because it has convinced me that the government does not want the light.”
M. Labori.—“Will M. Demange tell us what he thinks of this passage from Major Ravary’s report? ‘To sum up what is left, a painful impression which will have an echo in all hearts truly French. Of the actors in the cast some have acted in the presence of the public, others have remained behind the scenes; but all the methods employed had the same end in view,—the revision of a judgment legally and justly rendered.’”
M. Demange.—“Since I desired to apply to the minister of justice for a nullification of the judgment, I could not have considered it legally rendered.”
M. Labori.—“Why not?”