“I know very well that, since, there has been mention of a secret document. I know very well that a ridiculous document has been produced,—ridiculous by the confession of those who for a long time pretended to make use of it, since today they find it so inadequate that they thrust uselessly into this trial still later documents, which they describe as absolute proofs. We shall see what they are worth. But this ridiculous document is that of which they have a photograph, and which contains the words: ‘That scoundrel D——.’ It is a letter addressed by one military attaché to another, which was photographed en route, and has this postscript: ‘That scoundrel D—— is becoming too exacting.’ Let it not be said that this document has no value. Let it not be said that, if it is not a proof, there are others. It is the document upon which, from the point of view of pretended guilt, they have lived for years. We have seen it everywhere, pointed out as of the highest importance,—in the office of Colonel Picquart shown to M. Leblois, in the pages of ‘L’Eclair.’ Oh! if it were only an article from ‘L’Eclair,’ one might say: ‘It is a newspaper invention.’ But Major Ravary has referred to this document in his public report. It is the document that was in the possession of that ideal veiled lady. It is ‘the liberating document.’ It is the document for which the minister of war gave Major Esterhazy a receipt. Major Esterhazy returned this document to the minister under cover of the staff, and therefore it must have the value that I attribute to it. It is the important document. Oh! I know very well that they have invented others since. When the document was invented, there was mention of others. They do not lie, these officers, but they equivocate, consciously or not; in telling only a part of the truth, in not telling the whole truth, they equivocate. There are other documents in the secret file, yes, but they have no importance, because they relate as much to one as to another. M. Picquart has told us that in the secret file there is a document which applies rather to Esterhazy than to Dreyfus. What does that mean? Simply that there are documents concerning spying, which have been placed in the file because they belong there, but which are no more applicable to Dreyfus than to anybody else. And the proof that all these other documents are especially inapplicable is that, when this one no longer seemed sufficient after having been submitted to discussion, they produced another; and we have heard the declaration of General de Pellieux, which was the culminating-point of this trial, and which was intended to change its course, but which, when we have shown its real significance, will be seen to be only an ephemeral incident.
“Only it was not until after the prosecution, gentlemen, that importance was attributed to this document. With General Mercier himself it seems to have been only an artifice, as is proved by the fact that he, who had no right to distrust his colleagues, said nothing about it to them when he was preparing the case.
“And then, in itself, from the judicial standpoint, what can such a document amount to? D——, what does that mean? Really, gentlemen, since this document was in the war department eight months before the prosecution of Dreyfus, and no one had dreamed of applying it to him, must not one have been really hypnotized over the name, or else weak-minded, to see nothing but Dreyfus in this initial? And then, why was no importance attached to it at the beginning? Though the name Dreyfus had been in this document, it might have been the work of a forger. You know that there have been forgeries in this case. When Major Esterhazy talks of forgery, he is not disputed. His statement is accepted because he makes it. But there may be other forgeries, emanating from other hands and applying to other persons. And, even though this document were authentic, and however overwhelming it might be in its significance, it could have no value whatever until it had been discussed pro and con,—until it had been shown to the accused and his counsel, who perhaps could overturn it with a word.
“Again, is it permissible to disdain the official declarations of certain foreign governments regarding relations with Captain Dreyfus? [Murmurs of protest.] I expected these murmurs, and I answer that, if we had wished, we could have called foreigners to this bar; if they are not here, it is because we did not wish to call them.”
The Judge.—“I hasten to say that we would not have listened to them.”
M. Labori.—“Very likely, Monsieur le Président. That would have been another question of law, to be discussed after the others. But it is certain that we considered that in such an affair the light should be produced between Frenchmen, because it is important that the foreigner should be on the side of neither party, in order that tomorrow, if the threatened war should become a reality, we might all join hands to face the foe, of whom we ask nothing. But, so much said, is it permissible, as an honest adversary of the foreigner, to neglect declarations as official as those made in the committee of the reichstag and at the Italian tribune?”
The Judge.—“No, pass on.”
M. Labori.—“I pass on, Monsieur le Président. But I do not think there is anything in my words that can be attacked by anybody.”
The Judge.—“Pass on, pass on.”
M. Labori.—“Continuing on this point, I say that the foreigner has no sort of reason to defend traitors. It is contrary to diplomatic usage. Of course a country does not betray its spies; but it has no reason to defend them when they are caught. Consequently it must be admitted that declarations such as those which I have referred to, if not decisive, must at least be attentively considered, and weighed in the balance. And for that reason I say to you that nothing at all is left of the document referring to ‘That scoundrel D——.’